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FROM THE EDITORIAL DESK

LAJOHIS is a bi-annual publication of the Department of History & International Studies, Lagos State University. The objective of the journal is to publish original articles and research findings in traditional and emerging fields of history and international relations which explore not only the various thematic dimensions and traditions of the disciplines, but also shows their relevance and applicability in different areas of human endeavour.

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2. Abstract (not be more than 250 words); keywords (minimum of four, not more than six)
3. Run spell-check, and double check the grammar
4. Use minimal formatting (don't use built-in styles):
 - Use double line-spacing except notes, extracts, and references
 - Use justification to align text both to the right and left margins
 - Indent prose extracts (Ctl+M); add a blank line before and after
 - Use bold to indicate heading levels
 - Use hanging indents (Ctl+T) with cursor anywhere in the entry for reference entries
6. Paper must be prepared for blind-review
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The Nigerian Historian and the Challenge of Relevance in the Era of Globalization

Adeniji,¹ Abolade

Introduction

History has virtually become a minority subject in Nigerian universities. Worse still, it is held with so much contempt in the employment market. At the intermediate school level, it is a third alternative to government, or geography. My daughter only recently confessed to me that of the 834 students who sat for the West African Schools Certificate Examinations in her school (Queen's College, Yaba) this year, only six registered for history. Hardly does any student chose history as a desired course of study in the university matriculation examinations. Those who are studying it are suffering from a crisis of confidence in a discipline on the precipice. As a result, many departments of history are not able to fill the available spaces. A few years ago when educational administrators threatened to rationalize some courses, history was among those earmarked.

Nor has the professional practice of history fared any better. The challenge has been that of relevance to finding solutions to national problems of political stability and economic underdevelopment as well as providing paid and self-employment to graduates. Unlike the so-called professional and economic sciences, history is viewed as professionally irrelevant and at best a leisurely enterprise. The current situation is a far cry from the prestige and honour which the discipline and its practitioners were held, especially in the immediate post-Independence period on to the 80s. This lecture therefore sets for itself the task of examining the

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degree to which the Nigerian historian could be said to have braced up for the challenges of the 21st century. How set is the Nigerian historian for the battle of tomorrow? Indeed, what battle are we talking about? Is it true that in fighting tomorrow's battle we have been employing yesterday's weapon? How do we ensure that we do not persist in employing antiquated weapons for battle in a nuclear war? Before proceeding to answer these questions, we might do well by first adumbrating the evolution, development and ideological content of historiography in general and African (Nigerian) historiography in particular.

The Evolution, Development and Ideological Content of African Historiography

As a modern intellectual activity, history dates back to the beginning of the human society. It reached a stage of sophistication during the era of classical antiquity, but lapsed during the Roman period. It however witnessed a new resurgence during the era of the Renaissance at which time its methodology and rational perception were fairly advanced. By the 19th century, history had emerged as a scholarly discipline through the efforts of Leopold von Ranke and other German scholars, from which it entered the contemporary period. Each of these epochs had its body of knowledge which history students and historians learn from. But our task here is not to embark on an exhaustive study of these periods, for this has been done elsewhere (Carr, 1978; Collingwood, 1962; Sturly, 1972; Marwick, 1970; and Obiegbu, 2001). Rather our tasks is to assess the evolution of African (and by extension Nigerian historiography) with a view to depicting the degree to which it constituted the ideological wing of the struggle for decolonization and independence.

For the foregoing survey of historiography to be relevant, some special reference need to be made to the history of historical writing in Africa. This is very important because the tendency has been for western scholars to pretend African historiography does not exist, even though, as it is well known, "the writing of African history is as old as the writing of history itself" (Fage, 1981). We had, for example, the writings of such men as al-

Mas'udi (c. 950), al Bakri (1029–1094), Ibn Battuta (1304–1369) and others. It was however ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) that could be said to have engaged in looking at history in its modern and current sense.

Indeed, as has been suggested elsewhere, “if he were better known to western scholars (he) might well usurp Herodotus” title of “the father of history” (UNESCO 1981:26). Perhaps because Ibn Khaldun was an African from Tunis, and part of his work was on Africa, he might well have been intentionally ignored by western scholars. Whatever was the case, the fact remains that his view of history as a cyclical process, his use of analysis and comparisons in his work, coupled with his insistence that all evidence should not be weighed equally, stood him out as one of the greatest historical thinkers and writers of the early period. In a fitting testimony to his intellectual acumen, the respected professor of African history, Prof. Ali Mazrui, voted ibn Khaldun as the African man of letters in the last millennium.

Beside the works of ibn Khaldun and the other mentioned writers, there were also *Tarikhs* and Chronicles such as *Tarikh al-Sudan*, *Tarikh al-Fatlash* as well as the Kano and Kilwa *Chronicles*. These writings were to be followed by those of European travelers such as Cadamosto, Barbot and Bosman. By the 18th century, European historians had begun to give some attention to tropical Africa. There were, for instance, Dalzel's *History of Dahomey* published in 1793 and Silva Corrcia's *History of Angola* published in about 1742. Different writers also made several other publications, writing and comments pertaining to tropical Africa. Of course, not all these writings and comments were positive. Typical of the negative ones were those of Hugh Trevor Roper in which he alleged that what people call history in Africa was nothing but the “unrewarding gyrations of barbarian tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe” (Roper, 1963). On his part, C. G. Seligman in his *Races of Africa* (1930) concluded that “the civilizations of Africa are the civilizations of the Hamites, its history, the record of these peoples and their interactions with the other African stocks, the Negro and the Bushmen . . .” (cited in Fage, 1981:35).

It is in reaction to this kind of writings that there developed what

became known as the “new African historiography,” in which Africans and a few non-African tried to debunk many of these Eurocentric views about Africa. In other words, the emergence of nationalist movements in the various African colonies during the second quarter of the 20th century altered the intellectual climate within which historical scholarship was pursued. The nationalist movements sought to revive within the colonies, African culture with values at variance with those of the colonizers (Bernstein & Depelchin, 1979: 24-25).

As the nationalists began to triumph, African history began to reject the perspective and restraints imposed on the colonial situation and to create a “new history,” and a rich one at that. The task was to establish that the African past had glorious achievement to its credit, which allows it to be comparable to those of Europe. Thus, if Europeans had established organized polities, monarchs and cities, then nationalist historiography felt challenged to prove that Africans too had produced such. Thus as Ranger (1976:18) notes, “there was a demand for some almost any past . . . as a source of pride in Africa.”

Such notions are demonstrated in the works of K. Onwuka Dike, who first published in 1956, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885*. In this work, which was intended as an “introduction to the economic and political history of Nigeria, Dike using the Delta community as a case study, demonstrates the viability and richness of Africa history.

Saburi Biobaku in 1957 published his *Egba and their Neighbours: 1842-1872*, in which he depicts the game of power politics among the Yoruba people. There were also notable examples in other parts of Africa amongst who was B.A. Ogot, who worked on the history of the Southern Luo in East Africa. All these had similar vision and were engaged, as Ranger (1976:18), recalls “in the task of demonstration of the possibility and viability of the field” and the evocation of a glorious past in the face of its denial by the colonial mythology of racism. One other important aim of these scholars was to show that the course of the history of relationships between Africans and Europeans down to the colonial period was itself

determined as much by the responses of Africans as by the actions of the agents of imperialism (Okuseinde, 2001:56).

Indeed, nationalist historiography should not just be seen as an installation component of the movement towards the independence of African states. Rather it must be seen as an ideological response to racialism and the inherent idea of cultural supremacy. For, whereas the early black scholars sought to enhance the status of the Blackman, the nationalist historian pursued the idea further by extolling whatever in African. Egypt was reclaimed from the Mediterranean civilization and declared a region of African history. The histories of the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai were resurrected from oblivion and given the widest publicity as African achievements in Empire building. As one observer noted of the Egyptian experiment, it was essentially Negro and all Africans could draw the same moral advantage that westerners draw from Greco-Latin civilization (Temu & Swai 1981:22). Put differently, the contributions of ancient Egypt to the civilization of the world was emphasized as Africa's contribution to world history.

As if to consolidate the above idea, it was argued that the renowned ancient philosophers of Europe, including Plato, Isidore and Pythagoras gained tremendous inspiration from Africa, which only could explain why they spent thirteen to twenty years in Egypt (*ibid*). More outlandish claims soon emerged. For example, in the work of Dick Awka, Moses and Buddha were seen as Egyptian Negroes; Christianity derived from Sudanic people; and Nietzsche, Bergson, Marx and the existentialists were reflections of Bantu philosophy (Wallerstein, 1964:309). And so, for the moment, these assumptions were enthroned as historical facts.

In spite of these strenuous efforts, concurrent Europe-centric view of Africa still persisted. Imperial historiography continued to treat Africa as extras in an essentially European epic. One could hear Trevor Roper from his base in Oxford contemptuously declaring history "cannot be created out of the darkness discernible in the African past" (Ajayi & Alagoa, 1979:403). In light of this assertion, nationalist historians continued to evolve strategies to dislodge the prevailing racist outlook. One innovation

was in the area of sharpening the methodological tool of African historiography. For instance, non-written sources were acknowledged and utilized as legitimate tools of producing historical knowledge. information from other disciplines like anthropology, archeology and linguistics were also employed in studying the African past.

Such was the degree of achievement recorded by African historians that in 1965 when Julius Nyerere, then President of Tanzania, addressed the Dar es-Salaam Conference of African Scholars, he could confidently pontificate thus:

You are not starting right from the beginning. Because of the work which has already been done, there is one thing which this conference will not have to discuss. That is the contention that Africa has no history! The days when this was seriously suggested by intelligent men and women have now passed (cited in T.O. Ranger, 1962:2).

But what have we learned thus far? We have learned that in recent past, history as an academic discipline has been confronted with extinction. We have learned that this situation was not always so; for, especially during the period of the struggle for independence, history came handy as an ideological tool to imbue Nigerians with the needed confidence in taking on the colonials. We have learned that contrary to some uninformed speculation, Nigerian and indeed African history, i.e., is as old as the history of any other civilization. The summary of the foregoing is that Nigerian historians could be said to have used yesterday's weapon in prosecuting yesterday's battle.

To the extent that the study of ancient empires and civilizations exploded the myth of the Hamitic hypothesis, which attributed every achievement in, political organization and cultural development to external (that is, "white") culture heroes, to this extent, Nigerian African historians could be said to have triumphed.

However, from the late 1970s, the discipline faced a crisis of identify and relevance and came under heavy criticism for romanticizing or

mystifying the past, adopting monocasuality in the interpretation of events and for irrelevance to current needs (Olukoju, 2001:127). As an active participant in the nationalist struggle, the Nigerian historian was willingly or otherwise a nationalist historian. He was thus caught in the trap of excessively romanticizing the past to justify his people's demand for political independence (Tenu & Swai, 1981; Adeoye, 1992; Dibua, 1997). Second, there was a tendency in the discipline to engage in reductionism or monocasuality. A single factor or group of factors was usually singled out as a cause of a major event. Thus the transatlantic slave trade or colonialism was highlighted almost to the virtual neglect or underestimation of other, equally compelling considerations (Afigbo, 1977; Afigbo, 1978:31–39). Worse still, it became glaring that the discipline lacked access to the lower class and was rightly perceived as an elitist preoccupation.

Furthermore, the Nigerian historian's unwillingness or incapability to make use of models and concept in organizing their data incited critical comments from the likes of Prof. John Peel, a sociologist who had himself made extensive use of historical data (Smith, 1977: 49-59). Accepting the criticism, Prof. Ade Ajayi concurs that "models and concepts as tools of analysis, have become critical matters of necessity for the historian if we are to make significant progress" (Ade Ajayi, 1980:39). Yet another criticism of Nigerian historians was that their admittedly technically perfect histories failed to address problems of public policy since they shied away from confronting current issues. Many historians, it is alleged, studied the past for its own sake rather than as a means of profering solutions to current problems (Olukoju, 2001:128).

Tomorrow's Battle

The context must be clear: we are in the era of the new globalization. Innovations in science and technology, communications and economic relations are becoming the order of the day. Yet, a simple look at the current state of the Nigerian economy and society reveals a frightening and sorry state of affairs. Children are engaged in prostitution, workers are not paid regularly for work performed, ditto for contractors both local and

expatriate. Assassinations have become a national trademark with the police yet to display any capacity for solving mysterious killings. The roads are in total disrepair. Universities are closed sometimes for seven months with the government displaying an unconscionable degree of indifference, even as libraries are at least seven to ten years behind in the relevant literature. Traditional institutions have been corrupted, compromised and rendered useless, corruption has become not just a way of life, but life itself, despite the lip-service occasionally pronouncing government's determination to ensure its eradication and unemployment and under-employment have reached unprecedented levels. To all these may be added the fact that the health care delivery system is still in the doldrums, with deteriorating facilities, lack of funds and equipment, and with qualified staff abandoning the hospitals and clinics for greener pastures. Electricity is still as erratic as ever with serious implications for all sectors, especially industry. Transportation and communications are still archaic with many banks, hospitals and businesses unaware of the utility of computers even in 2020! Finally, in spite of the proliferation of states, local governments, ministries, parastatals, banks for agriculture, industry, housing and so on, the Nigerian economy is still largely a "private economy" largely governed by informal regulations. Thus, given the degree of decay and deterioration, the marginalization of the people, rural neglect, institutional fragility, and declining interest from foreign investors, the average Nigerian can be forgiven if he now feels that political independence has made little difference in the quality of life of the people. In a world where people of all ages are discovering new boundaries of knowledge and articulating powerful ideas that are bound to shape the future, such defeatist, fatalistic and submissive attitudes hardly support an agenda for a productive and rewarding participation in the new world order. For our purpose the emerging question from the foregoing scenario is: How have the Nigerian historians reacted to the unfolding drama? Put differently, what new weapons have been fashioned by practicing Nigerian historians to combat this worrisome state of affairs?

In confronting the scenario painted above the Nigerian historian

would undoubtedly have to make recourse to contemporary history. But the contempt of Nigerian historian for this branch of history is well known. This writer recalls the frustrations faced while trying to choose a contemporary topic of study which was dismissed for no other reason other than their contemporary nature. Nigerian historians seemed to have drawn inspiration from the declaration of Arthur Marwick to the effect that “to go all modern, and deny any value to the study of earlier history, is in fact to deny the value of history altogether” (Marwick, 1970:281). They further posit that it is unnecessary to seek a rehabilitation of History through overstressing its utilitarian value in order to carve a role for it. The historian’s past, whether in the West, or in Africa, they argue, should be conceived as a period distant enough to task the effort and imagination of the researcher and allow a reasonable degree of detachment that will afford an objective reconstruction of the evolution of societies and cultures through an interpretative analysis of cultural survivals and oral traditions (Adediran, 2002:6).

Nor was that all, for it has been argued that the more distant the historian’s focus, the greater the opportunity to contribute to an understanding of long-term development culminating in contemporary phenomena. Indeed, it is further stated, for development to have an enduring impact in any society; there is need for it to be properly rooted in the peoples’ culture, which is the totality of their historical experience. Thus, an understanding of long-term structural changes in the society they insist is crucial in explaining the shaping of the present especially because it provides a solid basis for self-assertion and group solidarity (*ibid.*). As if to fortify this position, the doyen of the discipline, Prof. Ade Ajayi asserts:

Perhaps one reason why there is so much violence, aggression and instability in our day-to-day life is that we have little conscious of a time perspective. We act and react as if there is only today, we have no enduring heroes and we respect no precedents. Not surprisingly, we hardly ever consider what kind of future we are building for our children and our children’s children. (1984:85:1)

For the avoidance of doubt, this writer is not by any means trying to denigrate the traditional understanding of the meaning of history or what it stands for, that is “a narrative based on a scientific reconstruction of past activities of man.” Rather what is being emphasized is that for the historian, the past is not an isolated entity completely cut off from the present, indeed, there is continuity between the two. E.H. Carr (1961) summarizes it impressively when he refers to history as “an unending dialogue between the past and the present” (p. 49). Thus when Benedetto Croce admonishes that “the practical requirements which underlie every historical judgment give to all history the character of “contemporary history,” what he implies is that whatever account the historian produces has some relevance to the present (1941:15). I shall be expatiating further on this using the Yoruba as a case study.

For about one hundred years (1793–1893), the Yoruba people had engaged in various wars among themselves. Beginning with the constitutional crisis in which saw several *Alaafin* being made to commit suicide following conflicts with the *Oyomesi* under the leadership of the *Basorun* who was *primus inter pares*, to the takeover of Ilorin by the Muslims following Afonja’s extermination in 1823, to the destruction of Owu in 1881 by a combination of Ijebu and Ife and roaring band of Oyo refugees, to the emergence of Ibadan as a nascent power in 19th-century Yorubaland, to the challenge of Ibadan power by Kurnmi of Ijaiye, the Are-Ona Kakanfo, to the resolve by the Ekiti, Ijesa, Akoko and Igbomina to resist Ibadan’s tyrannical rule through the formation of the Ekiti Parapo confederacy.

One fact which needs to be emphasized at this point is that Yoruba nationalism did not exist until recently. All the various kingdoms considered others, even though speaking the same language, as aliens. The Ekiti and Ijesa, for example, did not see any difference between the Ilorin and Ibadan hegemonist desires. The war did not come to an end until the British took it upon themselves to enforce peace.

It is essential to stress that the consequences of this century of warfare on the psychology and politics of the Yoruba people were long lasting.

In fact, one cannot totally understand the politics of the Yoruba today without karking back to these difficult and disturbing times of warfare. The war ironically fostered the spirit of proto nationalism in Yoruba land (Osuntokun 2001:154). The feeling of oneness among the Yoruba today is no doubt traceable to a feeling of common and unifying ancestry with Ile-Ife being the initial point of takeoff. Somehow, the one hundred years war came to be regarded as nothing more than a bitter struggle between children of the same father. Perhaps, more than any other tribe in Nigeria, the Yoruba understood and appreciated the deleterious effect of violence and warfare. No wonder they resisted the resort to arms in the prosecution of the June 12 struggle. Put differently, the recent history of the Yoruba has taught them how to survive in difficult times.

The extended discussion of the recent history of the Yoruba has been outlined to fortify the viewpoint that history can be –

Useful in meeting new situations . . . because a full understanding of human behavior in the past makes it possible to find familiar elements in present problems and thus make it possible to solve them more intelligently (Strayer, 1978:264).

If we thus accept that there is a connection between the past and the present, the reluctance or indeed refusal of the Nigerian historian to comment about contemporary issues therefore becomes a disservice to the Nigerian nation. Who, other than the historian, is best placed to comment and proffer viable solutions to the numerous socio-economic crises confronting the nation? Who, especially by virtue of training, is best placed to enlighten policy makers about the implications of some of the fundamental decisions, especially regarding communal crises, cry of marginalization and even corruption? The refusal of historians to take up the challenge perhaps account for its takeover and subsequent monopoly by practitioners of “inferior history.” This may account for the submission of the Guilbenkian Commission declaration (1998) that –

To be historical is after all not the exclusive purview of persons called historians ... we do not believe that these are monopolies of

wisdom, or zones of knowledge reserved to persons with particular university degrees (ibid).

While it is true that the rigid compartmentalization of knowledge has been blunted, an acceptance of the kind of views being put forward above can only encourage pretenders to make forays into areas for which they have no competence. No wonder, the writing of biographies is now dominated by journalists.

As earlier alluded, for over four decades, the teaching curricula in most African universities have been an overreaction to the euro-centric conception of history. But African history has matured beyond the level of demonstrating that African has a pre-European history that could be reconstructed. While it is true that in our programmes we should emphasize the history of African peoples as this will put us on firm ground and enable us counter effectively such issues as racism and neo-colonialism, there is no doubting the fact that, if we seek to have a good comprehension of the world in which we live, there are some aspects of world history that should not be ignored. This is because, national frameworks, in any field, are now recognized as unsatisfactory for political action and academic enquiry. Especially since the last two decades of the 20th-century, historians worldwide have found it necessary to transcend the national boundaries in their research, to document the actual history of humanity. Globalization has brought in its wake those subjects whose comprehension requires global frameworks. These subjects, including environmental issues, health of populations, crime, migration, transportation, popular arts etc can no longer be understood and regulated within the boundaries of nation states (Adeniyi, 2003:48). The challenge to African historians is not to shy away from universal history or deny its existence as a branch of the field. Rather, they must participate in the international discourse to shape the curriculum, methodologies and scope of the subject.

Indeed, the imperative for the above course of action is unassailable, for, without doubt, the global system is entering a new era. The end of the 20th century has ushered in unprecedented and largely unanticipated

changes. Thus, the reunification of Germany with the fall of the Berlin wall; the end of apartheid in South African and the election of Nelson Mandela as the first black president of the country, the collapse of the Soviet Union as a super power nation, the widespread adoption of market reform programmes as dictated and supervised by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the emergence of the United States at the hegemonic military power in the world (Jackson, 1995: pp. 59-86) all these merely adumbrate the dramatic changes that have taken place in the last thirty years or so on the international scene. As well, we can add the renewed role for the United Nations, especially in the area of humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peacemaking, the redundancy of nonalignment as a political/ideological posture in global power relations, the drastic alteration of cold war based on foreign policy platforms and above all the new economic alignments “towards one or others of large economic markets the U.S., the European Union (EU) and Japan (Ihonybere, 1997:292).

One major featured of the new globalization is the increasing powerlessness of the State, at least, as far as regulating the movement of information, ideas, capital and even skills, is concerned. Rapid changes in information technology have greatly impacted on the autonomy, capabilities and spheres of action open to the nation states. Boutros Boutros Ghali, former UN Secretary-General has observed that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed” and states must “find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world” (Kaplan, 1994: pp. 44-76; Homes, 1993).

The extended discussion of Africa and globalization brings to the fore the need for African, nay Nigerian historians, to escape from the cocoon of the pre-colonial and colonial historiography which many has embraced. If the challenge of writing universal history is “to find in the diversity of materials and languages, common experiences and explanations of the human past,” surely this is not beyond the capacity of Nigerian historians (Oduntan, 2001:123). An incredible amount of source materials have been gathered and are available for anyone interested in the field. Perhaps as

Nigerian historians take up the challenge, we might have a truly credible global history, or at least a universal history from a Nigerian perspective. Many Nigerian scholars have expressed the same reservations about the restrictions in African historiography. The words of Professor G.O. Olusanya in explaining why African historians have not contributed meaningfully to African politics and Pan-Africanism, captures this reservation:

There has been too much concentration on the colonial period, too much emphasis on local and national history and little or no effort at looking at African history from a Pan-African and/or world context perspective (Olusanya, 1984:14).

It is my firm conviction that the historian in any part of the globe must be prepared to imbibe the idea of world history in order to broaden his intellectual horizon (Toynbee, 1954; McNeil, 1991; Mazlish and Bultjens, 1993). By strengthening the non-African history components of our programme, Nigerian historians would thus have widened their focus beyond the plainly political or economic topics to include themes which in the middle of the 20th century would have appeared to the orthodox historian as esoteric or simply mundane. I have in mind such environmental issues problems like deforestation and pollution, medical issues like HIV/AIDS and infant and maternal mortality, social menace such as drug peddling, child trafficking and cultism or even ethical issues involved in genetic engineering relating to cloning and the production of new foods, etc. The historical approach will be of relevance to intervention strategies. By so doing, the Nigerian historian would have succeeded in deploying tomorrow's weapon for tomorrow's battle.

To be sure, universal history does not preclude hemisphere, national or local histories. In fact, these sorts provide the insights that are aggregated in universal history. For this reason, Nigerian historians must continue the accumulation of historical data to increase the African data stock for universal history. The question is not whether we approve of it or not; universal history is written and will continue to be written. Global forces are at work and they require global perspectives to deal with.

Concluding Remarks

What have we learned thus far? We have learned that contrary to the initial prevailing Eurocentric view, Africans do have a history, and a proud one at that. We have learned that African historians indeed played a heroic role in the struggle for decolonization and independence in African by giving the struggle the much needed ideological fillip. We have learned that following the attainment of independence, history as an academic discipline experienced a decline from which it is yet to recover.

We have therefore argued that for history to regain its lost pride, Nigerian historians must utilize two potent weapons. First, they must desist from shying away from discussing contemporary issues. We must accept the admonition of that great French philosopher to the effect that “those who study too curiously the actions of antiquity are ignorant of what is done among ourselves today” (quoted in Collingwood, 1946 (1993):49). Secondly, we must embrace the study of universal history in order to broaden our intellectual horizon. This is especially important if we must derive relevance in the new globalization. It is my considered conviction that if we do these, we would have been fighting tomorrow’s battle with tomorrow’s weapon.

R E F E R E N C E S

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Artificial Intelligence: The Missing Critical Component in Nigeria's Security Architecture

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Abstract

Nigeria, a country of over 200 million people, has been battling with various national security threats since independence in 1960. Some of these core threats include religious extremism, ethnic conflicts, poor public health facilities, porous and poorly-manned borders; and, added to these in the 21st century are terrorism, insurgency, banditry and cybercrimes. This study discovers that the country has deployed various multi-levered measures that are a mix of both traditional defence mechanisms and socio-economic and political measures designed to ensure the survival of the Nigerian state. However, the study discovers that artificial intelligence has zero presence in the country's strategic policy document and doctrine. It argues that Nigeria should follow in the footsteps of countries like the United States, Russia, China, Israel and Estonia that have effectively integrated artificial intelligence into their overall national security architecture. This integration, it discovers, has helped in the creation of a more secured environments in such states. The study concludes by arguing strongly for the integration of artificial intelligence into the Nigerian national security architecture in the areas of cybersecurity, intelligence, defence and internal security.

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Keywords: artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, security, Nigeria, architecture

Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI), is a relatively recent phenomenon that started in the middle of the 20th century. However, the idea that mechanical statues were capable of wisdom and emotion is as old as antiquity and finds expression in Greek and Egyptian mythologies (McCorduck, 1979). AI has many definitions, but the idea behind it is that machines can develop the capability for intelligence similar to that of humans or even better. Indeed, Babuta et al. (2020) have rightly observed that AI systems can rapidly derive insights from large, disparate datasets and identify connections that would otherwise go unnoticed by human operators. This makes AI a significant tool for the improvement of humans' everyday life. In fact, it is not outlandish to liken AI to electricity, which Thomas Edison had rightly predicted as, "a field of fields (that) holds the secrets which will reorganize the life of the world" (NSCAI, 2021). The Russian President, Vladimir Putin was therefore not exaggerating when he claimed that "whoever becomes the leader in the field (of AI) will rule the world" (Hoadley & Lucas, 2018, p. 1). AI has many uses and can readily be adapted and adopted into different sectors within the society. Countries like the United States of America, Israel and Russia have comprehensively integrated AI systems into every area of their respective states. Infact, AI systems play prominent role in ensuring the overall security architecture of such states. This is apart from the fact that such states now rely extensively to regulate their social, political, and economic lives. For example, Isreal deployed offensive and defensive weapon systems largely controlled by AI systems to counter the various attacks launched against it by Hamas during the latest phase of their confrontation in 2021 (Lappin, 2021).

The United States relies on AI systems to ensure the effective and optimal functioning of its healthcare, financial and energy sectors (Sayler, 2020). The adoption of such AI systems has contributed significantly to the overall security of such states. To be able to use AI systems effectively,

there is need to continuously provide adequate and accurate data. Data, in the form of raw information, is the primary material that any AI systems require to function optimally and effectively. The paucity of such data has been a major barrier to the adoption of AI systems technologies in developing countries. Nigeria, being a developing country and with its low internet penetration, has found it difficult to effectively utilize AI systems to address its pressing security challenges. It is the considered opinion of these authors that the effective utilization of AI systems will go a long way to help Nigeria to efficiently and effectively resolve such security challenges like terrorism, banditry, insurgency and economic insufficiency.

Conceptual Clarification: Artificial Intelligence

What exactly does AI mean? Owing to the diverse approaches to research in the field, AI has no universally acceptable definition. One of the earliest definitions came in 1956, the year AI was discovered as a field of science, when John McCarthy defined the term as “the development and use of machines to execute tasks which usually require human intelligence” (Hoadley & Lucas, 2018, p. 5). With the explosion of interest in AI technology during the new millennium, more definitions sprang up. Russell & Norvig (2016), for example, defined the concept as “the use of technology to carry out a task that would typically require human intelligence.” Similarly, Bundy (2017) defined AI as the branch of computer science dealing with the reproduction or mimicking of human-level intelligence, self-awareness, knowledge, and thought in computer programmes.” Despite the varied definitions and descriptions of AI, one thing is constant, AI aims to replicate human intelligence in machines. AI has been defined by the European Commission (2018, p. 1) as systems that display intentional behaviour through the analysis of their environment and take specific actions, with some degree of autonomy to achieve specified goals. AI-based systems can be purely software-driven, acting in the virtual world (search engines like Google or speech and face recognition software) or embedded in hardware devices (advanced robots

or autonomous drones). AI system works on rationality and it achieves this through immersion (perception of the environment via sensors), after which it reasons and tries to modify its environment through actuators (European Commission, 2018, p. 2)

Going by this description, AI has three broad categories. There is the Artificial Narrow Intelligence (or Narrow AI), which refers to algorithms that address specific problems, but can either have limited memory or be reactive (Ajayi, 2020, p. 5). It responds to different stimuli without previous experience, just like the human mind. A second category is known as Artificial General Intelligence (or Deep AI/Strong AI). This category of AI is a machine that can solve any task with its human-level intelligence. Its likeness to humans means Deep AI can discern emotions, needs, thought processes, and beliefs (Ajayi, 2020, p. 5). The third and final category is the Artificial Super Intelligence, which is a hypothetical AI system that does not just understand or mimic human intelligence, but surpasses it (Ajayi, 2020, p. 5). Many experts have predicted that it will take many decades before the field of AI advances to the state of Artificial Super Intelligence. In fact, all current AI fall into the Narrow AI category, which includes social media monitoring tools, drone robots, self-driving cars and so on (Hoadley & Lucas, 2018, p. 2). This is the kind of AI system that this research addresses.

AI in History

The birth of AI research is often traced to 1956 at a workshop held in Dartmouth College (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2020, p. 3). It was at this gathering that Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy coined the term Artificial Intelligence to distinguish the field from related disciplines like cybernetics (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2020, p. 3). By this time, AI had also advanced to the level of solving algebra and even speaking English. Such was the optimism of the age that, by the mid-1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense started funding research into AI very heavily (Russell & Norvig, 2021, pp. 63-79). Unfortunately, the enthusiasm that greeted this new science was not sustained and AI technology began to wane in the

1970s. The 1980s provided a brief period of boom in AI technology. This revival was, however, short-lived as a couple of new additions to the technology were commercially and functionally unsuccessful in the late 1980s. This marked a period of a second hiatus in AI science (Russell & Norvig, 2021, pp. 63-79). The late 1990s and the early 2000s represented yet another period of resurgence in AI technology. The period coincided with breakthroughs in the science, and AI started being used for logistics, data mining, and medical diagnosis, among others (Russell & Norvig, 2003, p. 28). This period witnessed advanced technology in computer games to the extent that computers began defeating human champions in games such as chess.

Anderson (2015) has detailed how changing methods of communication, vis-à-vis information technology, have posed new challenges for intelligence agencies who have to grapple with terrorism and cybercrimes. As such, these challenges call for the development of more sophisticated analytical tools, and AI is likely to inform an important element of this new toolkit. This fact is not lost on developed countries. In the U.S., for example, the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy posits that “the United States, together with its allies and partners, must adopt AI to maintain its strategic position in the world” (BPC, 2020). In fact, the U.S. Department of State AI efforts are being coordinated by an agency established for that purpose, the Join Artificial Intelligence Centre (JAIC) (BPC, 2020, p. 3). Hoadley & Lucas (2018) have indeed documented how AI is an integral part of U.S. combats in both Syria and Iraq, with algorithms designed to speed up the target identification process (Hoadley & Lucas, 2018, p. 2). Indeed, U.S. is not the only developed country that has tapped into AI for the purpose of national security, China, Russia and the U.K. are nations that infuse AI into their security apparatus. Of a truth AI belongs to the immediate future and countries—whether developed or developing—need incorporate it into their national security fabric, particularly in countries such as Nigeria where insecurity is rife.

Artificial Intelligence and Nigeria

The year 2015 was a landmark in the development of AI worldwide as the number of projects that use AI within Google (now Alphabet) increased to 3,000 projects (Clark, 2015). This development owed much to affordability, which itself is a consequence of a rise in cloud computing infrastructure as well as research tools and datasets (Clark, 2015). This development led AI software developers to expand their presence from the West into developing countries such as Nigeria. *Andela* was the first prominent company AI software developer company to have an operational branch in Nigeria (Odeyemi, 2019). Founded by Ian Carnevale, Iyinoluwa Aboyeji, Jeremy Johnson, and Christina Sass, the company launched operations in Nigeria in 2014, few months before the explosion in AI technology, to help global companies overcome the severe shortage of skilled software developers (Odeyemi, 2019, pp. 2045-2046). It is, in fact, a training company set up to match developers in emerging markets now known as technology hubs with North American companies. With the presence of a company such as Andela, software using algorithms to generate instantaneous credit scores to users in Nigeria started emerging (Strusani & Hounghonon, 2019, p. 5). This represented one of the greatest advancements in Nigeria's financial technology (fintech). An example of such software application is *Branch*, a Nigerian fintech company that was launched in 2015 and started disbursing loans to Nigerians in 2017 (Deloitte, 2019). The company offers microloans to first-time borrowers and customers without bank accounts. Many other examples of such technologies including *Carbon*, *Palmcredit* and *Fairmoney* (Deloitte, 2019). In truth, most AI innovations in Nigeria to date have come in the area of fintech. There is also the adoption of "chatbots," which was an innovation by Nigeria's United Bank for Africa (UBA) when *Ada and Leo* were introduced as customer service touchpoint in 2018 (Ebarafeye, 2019).

It was not until the second decade of the 21st century that Nigeria started tapping into AI technology. By this time, algorithmic improvements and access to large amount of data had further aided the development of AI and guaranteed better accuracy of the technology in the country. "Intelligent

personal assistants,” which were software agents that could perform tasks for humans based on commands, were incorporated into phones to make them “smartphones” in 2012. Consequently, Nigerians hands-on experience with AI came mainly in the form of the use of smartphones which became popular in the 2010s. By 2018 there had been a proliferation of AI software development companies in Nigeria, with an overwhelming majority of them located in Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital. Many of these companies have contributed to the development of AI technology, particularly in the financial sector and such contributions have not escaped government notice. The Lagos State Government, for example, is using AI to enforce traffic regulations with the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras to scan license plates and fine motorists who violate traffic laws (Google, 2019, p. 4). In fact, the vehicle inspection service has revealed that about 13, 750 motorists have been identified through this system in the first quarter of 2019 alone (Google, 2019, p. 4). It must however be noted that Nigeria has failed to integrate the AI systems into its overall security architecture. This is an important considering the fact that the use of AI in its security architecture would have gone a long way in helping the country to effectively tackle overarching existential issues like banditry, terrorism and insurgency.

Nigerian National Security Policy *sans* AI

Nigeria has three important policy documents, National Security Strategy (NSS) (2019), National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) (2016) and the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (NCPS) (2021) that were specifically created to guarantee the country’s human and state security. There are various security challenge that threaten the existence of the state. Some of the major ones are banditry, kidnapping, armed robbery, insurgency, terrorism, food insecurity, decrepit health sector, flailing economy, cybercrimes and cattle rustling. For instance, Nigeria’s cybercrime statistics is high and climbing (Osho & Onoja, 2015, p. 121). Kidnapping, armed banditry and militia activities have become very serious threats to Nigeria’s national security, to the extent that they

collectively constitute about 40 per cent of incidences of national insecurity in Nigeria. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) still engage in intermittent attacks on various locations in the Northeast. The effects of these terror campaigns include loss of lives, mass displacements and destruction of properties. In fact, the defeat of ISIS in Syria has been deemed a potential threat to Nigeria as former fighters from the terror group have now moved into the Sahel. To make matters worse, the potential use of disruptive and emerging technologies, AI inclusive, by non-state actors remain a key concern considering growing advances in the field. The U.S. NSCIA (2021, p.2) has warned that state criminals, and terrorists will conduct AI-powered cyber-attacks in the foreseeable future. Countering these security threats will, therefore, require effective intelligence gathering among other things.

Internal security is the statutory duty of a number of security and intelligence agencies in Nigeria. The Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) work together with the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC). All of these coordinate intelligence and information analysis required for strategic decision making by the National Security Council. It is also worth mentioning that law enforcement and the criminal justice system are paramount in internal security. These roles are carried out by all security agencies in Nigeria, but principally by three critical institutions: the Nigerian police Force (NPF), the Judiciary and the Nigeria Prison Service (NPS). While not discountenancing the function of the JIB and the ICC, the State Security Services (SSS) is the foremost intelligence agency in international security matters. The Nigerian Police Force (NPF), on the under hand is responsible for crime detection, prevention and general constabulary functions. In response to the prevailing security threats in the country in the past decade, successive Nigerian governments have put in place some policies to stem the tide. For example, in response to the threat posed by terrorism, the Nigerian government under Goodluck Jonathan enacted the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013; and in 2016, during Muhammadu Buhari's tenure, Nigeria developed the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)

and established the Counter Terrorism Centre to coordinate the country's national counter-terrorism efforts. In 2017, Nigeria also adopted a policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (Falode, 2019).

In fact, in recent years, a number of notable initiatives have been employed in the fight against terrorism. This includes the initiation of programmes to encourage defection from terrorist groups as well as promotion of rehabilitation and reintegration of repentant terrorists. In response to increasing cyber security threats, Nigeria developed the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (NCPS) in 2015 (Falode, 2021b). This gained traction with the subsequent promulgation of the Cybercrimes Act (CPPA) that same year (NCPS, 2021). The Act provides the comprehensive legal framework for cyber security as well as the prohibition and punishment for cybercrimes in Nigeria. Both the NCPS and CPPA, in particular, try to build comprehensive capabilities to protect Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) and to mitigate cyber risks. Banditry and kidnapping are still crimes Nigeria's security infrastructure struggle with, and the best done in this regard is the attempt to better equip the NPF in training.

Despite all these efforts, Nigeria has not been able to effectively tackle the various threats. A major factor is the country's over reliance on conventional strategies to resolve security-related challenges in the state. Indeed, the country's three policy documents on how to effectively shield the country from attacks in both physical and cyber realms did not give any critical consideration to the role an AI system could make in ensuring a more secured Nigeria. That the three aforementioned documents fail to mention AI systems show the level that Nigeria accorded emerging technologies in its security architecture. This is unlike what is obtained in the security documents of some other comparable nations like the United States and China that gave prominent role to AI systems in their security architecture (NDS, 2018; DoD, 2020; NIDS, 2020). One should remark at this point that various factor are militating against the adoption and

absorption of AI systems into the overall security architecture of Nigeria. It is these factors that are analyzed in the next section.

Challenges of AI Adoption in Nigeria

AI is still in its nascent stages in Nigeria and as such, there are certain challenges affecting full implementation. AI and machine learning are quite complex and intricate. The technicalities involved in harnessing AI demands particular skill set and expertise which is currently lacking in Nigeria. The following are factors militating against the integration of AI systems into Nigeria security architecture: inadequate data and statistical information, dearth of military hardware for possible AI systems integration and lack of ready workforce

Inadequate Data:

Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), the most commonly used AI in existence, uses algorithmic techniques that enable machines to discover patterns and insights from data, and then use the generated information to make informed decisions (Delipetrev, Tsinaraki & Kostic, 2020, pp. 4-5). This is how Apple's Siri and Amazon's Alexa are able to interact with their environment and humans they come into contact with (Gadzala, 2018, p. 2). However, to perform such functions optimally, AI requires large volume of data, usually referred to as "big data" (Gadzala, 2018, p. 2) Machines (AI) analyze this data to learn, make connections and arrive at decisions. Thus, the availability of plenteous and uninterrupted supply of data is key to the successful utilization and integration of AI systems into the security architecture of any state. Herein lies the first challenge to successful AI systems integration into the Nigerian security architecture – dearth of large volume of data. The presence of big data explains why it has been relatively easier for both China and the United States to integrate AI systems into their overall security architecture. For example, successful and targeted drone strikes that the United States Army recorded in Iraq and Syria were only possible because of the inexhaustible supply of real-time data fed into its weapon systems during the war against the

Islamic States (Fisk, Merolla & Ramos, 2019). Although, in 2019, due to the burgeoning menace of the activities of non-state actors like terrorists, bandits and kidnappers, Nigeria mandated a federal agency, National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), to “forcefully” collect the biometric data of its citizen. The aim is to use the collected data to establish a national database of all Nigerian citizens and use the warehoused information to check largescale incidences of kidnapping and banditry in the country (NIMC, 2020).

A related problem is the poor quality of data available. There is no accurate statistical data available on most metrics in Nigeria. For example, Nigeria has not been able to conduct accurate census since independence in 1960. This has affected both short and long-term planning in the country. The country still relies on both the census figure of 2006 and extrapolation to provide an estimate of the total number of people in the country (Ezeah, Iyanda & Nwangwa, 2013, p. 52).

Lack of Military Hardware for Possible AI Integration

Nigeria relies heavily on conventional human-directed weapons in its engagements with non-state actors with the country. Such conventional weapons include tanks and small arms and light weapons like bombs, rifles and machine guns. All these does not involve the use of AI systems. Advanced weapon systems like drones, cruise missiles and robots would have required the use of AI systems. However, despite their suitability to the warfare terrain, especially in the vast Sambisa Forest, the stronghold of Boko Haram in Bornu state, they are non-existent in the military arsenal of the Nigerian army. This is partly due to the cost of purchasing such advanced weapon systems and the lack of qualified engineers to maintain the weapon systems.

Nonexistent Knowledge Base

Successful integration of AI systems into the Nigerian security architecture requires that there should be a ready and continuous pool of both the skillsets needed to generate data and create software. These can be gotten

from both the country's educational system and private and public sector partnership in the area of AI research and innovation. However, the educational system that should have been the powerhouse for innovation and research into AI systems and that should have supplied the local manpower need in the areas of software and hardware development had fallen short. The president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, presented the 2021 budget proposal to the National Assembly on October 2020. Out of ₦13.08 trillion budgeted for the coming year, ₦742.5 billion was allotted to education. At just 5.6 percent, this is the lowest allocation since 2011 (Olufemi, 2020). The effect of these were made even more apparent at the height of the lockdown in Nigeria due to the Coronavirus. With schools shut down, some secondary and tertiary institutions transitioned into e-learning. This wasn't without its difficulties though as most tutors are not ICT compliant and also the high cost of ICT infrastructures, as well as the constant erratic power supply that constantly affects all sectors in Nigeria. Strusani & Hounbonon (2019) have explained this in terms of the lack of access to expertise and data, which often discourage private investors from pursuing AI projects in emerging markets. Therefore, scarce AI expertise in developing countries increases the cost of implementing any AI projects in emerging markets.

AI and Nigerian National Security Architecture

Nigeria has four domains—land, air, water and cybersphere—to protect in order to ensure its security. The country's preeminent defence and strategic policy documents spell out specific measures that Nigeria can use to ensure effective protection of the state from malign state and non-state actors. What is missing in these strategic documents are the specific areas that AI systems can be used or integrated into the country's overall security architecture to provide adequate and holistic protection. By using specific and poignant examples from other climes, this section will show that Nigeria can effectively integrate AI systems into its overall security architecture. This study has identified four key areas for AI integration

in the Nigerian security sector: cybersecurity, defence, intelligence and internal security.

- i. *Defence*—Nigeria has an expansive territorial space that is very difficult to police effectively. Over the years, this has made it easier for non-state actors like Boko Haram and bandits to embed themselves in pockets of ungoverned spaces within the country. The issue of non-state actors embedding themselves in ungoverned spaces is a problem that is felt in all regions of the federation. To overcome this challenge, in the first instance, the country can use AI systems with hardware such as drones and ground robots to provide active and continuous coverage over large swath of the country. It will also be possible to effectively use such systems for surveillance and reconnaissance. The information provided by these AI-enabled systems will make it possible for the state to carry-out targeted and surgical response to every emerging threats. This will not only save time and money but will further lead to optimal deployment of warfighters to where they will be most effective. Secondly, and crucially, the use of AI ground robots in contested zones in the northeast of Nigeria like Borno state will save lives of warfighters and it will further keep down the cost of deployment. This is because non-state actors in the region, especially Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), rely heavily on the use of IEDs to cripple and blunt the response and effectiveness of warfighters in the zone (Falode, 2016, pp. 42-47). AI-enabled ground robots could be sent ahead of the main force to act as scout and decoys, and be the first to come into contact with surreptitiously planted IEDs. For example, Israeli army used AI-enabled ground robots in Gaza during the latest phase of its war with Palestinian militants (Sprengel, 2021).
- ii. *Intelligence*—AI systems will be particularly suited to intelligence collection and real-time analysis. Copious data now exists Nigeria because of the ubiquitous use of smart phones and the Internet. The rate at which data is churned-out by such activities would have been very difficult for human to process effectively and efficiently. Bu, AI systems can help to quickly show threads that connects data, flag suspicious activity, spot trends, fuse disparate elements

of data and anticipate future behaviour. Since all the malign non-state actors in Nigeria make use of either smart devices like phones (bandits and kidnappers) or Internet-enabled technologies like Youtube, Facebook and Twitter (Boko Haram and ISWAP), there exist treasure troves of data that can be mined to better counter the nefarious activities of such groups. Using AI to sieve through these data can help Nigeria to predict the actions of malign non-state actors, responds proactively before attacks are launched, and effectively curtail the spread of violent extremist ideology. China has effectively used such AI systems like Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) to keep radical extremist at bay within the country (Ding, 2019, pp. 43-46; Feldstein, 2019, pp. 20-21). Importantly, intelligence is the livewire of any successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (Falode, 2021a). The integration and deployment of AI systems into Nigerian security architecture, especially in the areas of collection and analysis of data, will complement or even eclipse human intelligence (HUMINT) in the contested zones of the northeast.

- iii. *Cybersecurity*—Although, Nigeria has devoted considerable efforts to protect the state in cyberspace, the country has failed to deploy and utilize AI as a key plank of its security protocols. The cyber domain plays critical role in every sector of the Nigerian state. Key sectors like financial institutions and oil and gas rely heavily on cyberspace. Realizing the significance of the domain to the overall of the state, Nigeria developed a robust cybersecurity policy and strategic documents to shield the state from the activities of malign state and non-state actors in cyberspace (Falode, 2021b, pp. 553-554). However, the absence of AI tools in the nation's cybersecurity architecture has left the country wide open to deadly and opportunistic attacks in cyberspace. Using AI systems as one of the tools in the country's cybersecurity arsenal will allow the country to respond to breaches faster and make the system to be more resilient in the face of attacks. Importantly, AI tools could be deployed to monitor and flag insidious financial transactions in cyberspace. This point is crucial. Money is the livewire of successful malign activities such as terrorism and transnational crimes. AI

tools can be used to monitor financial transactions in real-time, flag suspicious exchanges and cut-off funding to malign non-state actors.

- iv. *Internal Security*—AI tools will be particularly suited to border policing in Nigeria. Nigeria has multiple official and unofficial border points. It has been extremely difficult and expensive for the state to effectively man most of the borders. Indeed, illicit goods, especially small arms and light weapons (SALWs) have found their way into the country via some of these poorly manned borders (Falode, 2021c, pp. 411-415). In addition to this, malign non-state actors like bandits, cattle-rustlers, kidnappers and terrorists have successfully infiltrated Nigeria through these borders. To overcome this challenge, Nigeria can use AI tools to complement the efforts of its human security agents. Unmanned aerial vehicles and AI-enabled ground robots can be used to monitor borders through advances in automated surveillance and anomaly detection. AI systems that monitor human emotional expression and behaviour, like those used in China, could aid in recognizing humans that appear nervous or are acting erratically (McKendrick, 2019, p. 13).

Conclusion

Nigeria has four important domains - land, air, sea and cyberspace - to protect in order to ensure the existential survival of the state. In the 21st century, the country has had to confront simultaneous threats from three out these four domains. The major threats are terrorism, insurgency, trans-border crimes, kidnapping, banditry and piracy. These threats have severely challenged the ability of security agencies to respond proactively and effectively to the defence of the state. To protect Nigeria in these critical domains, and to check the activities of malign non-state actors that threatens its existence, Nigeria has relied on conventional counter measures. These measures include the use of ground forces, police, SALWs and HUMINT. However, all these have failed to provide holistic and effective security shield that the country sorely needed. In order to make

the nation's security more effective and strategic, this work has suggested the integration of AI tools into the country's security architecture. The work identifies key areas like cybersecurity, intelligence and defence for AI integration and deployment. With the present multi-modal threats that confronts the country in different arenas, AI systems integration and deployment into Nigeria's security architecture will save money, time and countless lives.

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The *Abidat* and *Arabu*: The Nigerian Migrants in Libya and International Migration Law

Lawal,¹ Olawale

Abstract

*Many Nigerian migrants who attempt to enter Europe end in Libya in a causeless twist to their migration story. Libya is not in any way prepared for the accommodation of strangers—a well-spelt out policy in its law. Migrants and asylum-seekers to Libya enjoy no protection from international protection law because Libya is not a party to its tenets and obligations. The political crisis which engulfs the country escalates lawlessness where migrants and migrations become major sources of war financing. Migrants human rights are often violated. This study examines the relationship between migrants (*Abidat*) and the Arabs (*Arabu*) where migrants have no legal recourse both nationally and under international protection laws. This work is exploratory as primary sources of data are interviews with deportees who had been to Libya as illegal migrants. The study concludes that despite Libya's disavowal of international protection law's intervention in her asylum and migration system, international law can still intervene in Libya's immigration policy by relying on international humanitarian laws where Libya has certain obligations.*

Keywords: Libya, Nigerian migrants, International law

Introduction

The spate of irregular migrations in Nigeria conjoins with the state of the battered economy of the Nigerian state, fueling the notion that most irregular migrants are pushed out by their state of economic despondence—inferably, they did not take the plunge by choice. The desperation of

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Nigerians to seek a better life elsewhere has developed a well-coordinated mechanism called the migration industry which serves as a tool for the transportation of young Nigerians. Most often, the destination is Europe where tales of wonderful paradise await them, albeit, untrue. Nigerians desirous of illegal migration often go through the migration routes which start in Kano, then to Niger, and arrive in Libya after going through one of the most harrowing human experiences- a rather general grotesque reflection of the hopelessness in the home country. Arriving in Libya is only the first stage of the journey in the migration circuit which has four crosspieces. The second leg is how to survive in Libya (which is the most difficult) before advancing to the third stage which is crossing the Mediterranean Sea and the last, of course, is arriving in Lampedusa in Italy (Lawal, 2020:76-84). Many migrants' journey terminates in Libya as most of them never make it to Europe. This work investigates the various challenges of Nigerian migrants in Libya by analyzing the norms, administrative practices, and the legal (both national and international) context of Libya's migration practice as applicable to Nigerian migrants.

Libya has seen a surge in migration incidence in the last two decades mostly because of her prosperity and largely her geographical location and its contiguity to Europe, combine to make it a transit choice for irregular migrations to Europe. But before the political upheaval of 2011, Libya's oil wealth held enough luster for migrants fleeing there. Libya indeed came under intense migration pressure because of her stable economy thus making it a destination choice for many despondents. Currently, the statistic of migrants and refugees in Libya is shoddy, the 2018 survey showed that there are about 700,000 to 1 million migrants in Libya, many of the migrants are from North Africa and a very significant number are from West Africa states of Nigeria, Chad, and Niger. Women represent 9 per cent of migrants. The UNHCR reported that by 2018 it had registered 53,285 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya (UNSMIL/OHCHR Report, 20, Dec. 2018).

Investigations (IDIs, FGSs, 2019) and reports (UNHCR. 2015, EUROSAT, 2017) reveal that the beam of illegal migrations in Nigeria is the structure

provided by migration cartels. This structure is designed cliff-like with delicate precipices of rape, death, brutality, and oath-taking. This trajectory, more than anything else, catapults migrations to closed

Women trafficking: the route from Nigeria



Source: BeFree



combative consciousness. The roles of the migration cartels and oath-taking, commingle into a writ which explains the concealed trait of the migration industry in Nigeria. To that extent, migrants are under the command chain of the cartels. A migrant that is stranded in Libya is often a victim of failed clientele transaction between the cartels and the Arabs human traffickers (personal communication with a returnee, June 20, 2019). According to a returnee respondent, many Nigerian migrants in Libya got stuck in the country because many of the cartels who are to ensure crossing of the Mediterranean Sea to Europe failed to perfect the plans (personal communication, June 20, 2019). This failure is largely a result of the inability of migrants to satisfy the financial obligation attached to the process of crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Getting stuck in Libya is almost shockingly repellent as the journey to Libya, save that migrants arrive alive, but not altogether, intact.

Illegal Migration Routes

The details provided here are sourced from interviews with returnees and deportees from North Africa and Europe who all have used these routes. There is also a snowball sampling from officials who have collected data and interacted with the users of the routes. The information has been cross-checked and found relatively reliable and could be major sources for future researches on Migration (NAPTIP, IOM, NEMA Reports, 2019).

Kano is reported to be the starting point of illegal migration routes from Nigeria to Europe. From here migrants embark on a 700-kilometer journey to Agadez in the Republic of Niger and through the Saharan desert. There is nothing so secret or clandestine about this route. The passage to Agadez wrecks of official connivance and surreptitious corruption without limit. Everything is regulated and open to official scrutiny if the goal is to check irregular migrations. The trip to Agadez is undertaken only on Mondays. Crossing over to Agadez is easy with sleazy Nigerien gendarmes who partner with the cartels. Although Agadez is a slave city where slavery appears to have a rebirth, a migrant is not likely to be sold to slavery except if he/she is unable to pay his/her way through (personal communication with a deportee, October 16, 2019).

Illegal migrants from other parts of Africa converge at Agadez for onward transportation to Europe en-route Libya. Most passengers come from Benin, Ivory Coast, Senegal, the Gambia, and Mali, they are known locally as *les aventuriers* - the adventurers. They are lodged in some hidden compounds while the cartel goes to find a human smuggler or connect with his regular trustworthy smuggler if he already has one (Pax-List, VIE-LOS-BJL, 2019).

The journey next is to Qatroun where migrants are packed in an open pick-up van with lower and upper cabins. On these routes, many migrants die as a result of exhaustion and falling off while sleeping, and not being able to have a good grip of ropes that support stability on the trip. Migrants learn the danger of these routes through the sight of rotten bodies of humans who had fallen off in earlier trips (*IOM Migration Reports on Nigeria*, 2018).

The trip to Sebha is considered most dangerous because unlike in Agadez where slavery is accidental, Sebha is home to kidnappers who operate with AK. 47 guns and would stop the travelling van to take hostage of migrants and eventually sell them off as slaves between \$200-\$300. There is of course a political explanation to the lawlessness in Sebha. This is a volatile insurgent's region and it is not under the control of the central authority in Tripoli. AK 47 constitutes authority and anyone in its

possession directs affairs around the area. Women are also raped and forced to marry insurgents, while some men are forced to join the militants in their rebellion. Victims of Sebha militants can buy their freedom because money is respected in the area. The insurgents need money to prosecute their war and kidnapped migrants are the major source of funding for the bandit's war in Sebha. Captured migrants pay around \$800-1,500 to secure their freedom (Pax-List, VIE-LOS-BJL, 2019).

From Kano to Libya, the journey of a migrant is just a completion of a phase. The majority who aspire to make it to Europe end their journey in the North African nation, whether as slaves, labourers, mercenaries,

or as prisoners in

Libyan

immigration

camps. Tragically,

some end their

sojourn in life at

this phase. For

the lucky ones,

the next phase is

how to cross the

Mediterranean

Sea to Italy

(Malakooti, 2016,

p.17).


The hazards

associated with crossing the Mediterranean Sea are well documented (Fargues, & Bonfanti, 2014, p.34). The aggregate of all the reports is that certain deaths await migrants who seek to cross the Mediterranean illegally. Those deaths may be a result of the rickety nature of the fishing boats used for human transportation. Or as a result of the dinghy-style small boats that often capsize on the sea. A far more compelling hazard on the Mediterranean is the operation of border control agents who often appear like they have no life savings mandate. The IOM (2018) has



A truck packed with migrants' tears through the Sahara, north of Agadez, Niger | Photo by Mackenzie Knowles-Coursin

described the Mediterranean Sea as “by far the world’s deadliest border.” The IOM has reported that more than 33,000 migrants have died at sea trying to enter Europe since 2000. At the end of 2017 the organisation, again, reported more than 3,180 deaths crossing the Mediterranean in that year alone.



Lampedusa is a Mediterranean Island of Italy. It is the southernmost part of Italy and here, most illegal migrants from Libya and Tunisia berth first in Europe. Since 2000 this Island has served as a primary European entry port for migrants of African origin. Although Lampedusa is a major tourist centre in Italy, this fortune has dwindled as tourists resent the huge presence of police who are sent there for immigration patrol duties (Crawley et al., 2016, p. 8).

The Migrant in Libya

The human ecology of migrants in Libya put Sub-Saharan African migrants in some precarious and parlous storm. As earlier noted, Libya is a transit state to many migrants desirous of crossing to Europe, many

of these migrants are Arabs from sister middle East states but they do not suffer the same inhuman treatment that Sub-Saharan African migrants are exposed to, thus fueling the view that racism and xenophobia subvert the application of standard practice in migration policy of Libya. In Libya, skin pigmentation alludes to the susceptibility of individual immigration control tactics that are not parented in both international and municipal laws of Libya. Although, Libyan officials often claim there is no difference in the treatment of migrants in Libya, however, blacks are separated because of the prevalence of diseases as it was claimed that many blacks come in with Tuberculosis, AIDS, and other venereal diseases. Generally, in Libya, there is a widespread assumption that black Africans are carriers of diseases, albeit, not evidenced in any credible study (UNSMIL/OHCHR Report, 20, Dec. 2018). Although, some of the diseases that are often the source of these claims are general sexually transmitted diseases contracted by Libyan authorities during forced or mortgaged sexual affairs with migrants.

Nigerian migrants have been labelled highly promiscuous by the Libyan authorities claiming that their low mores are due to their non-Islamic value and these Nigerians are often targets of grim migrant deportations by Libyan immigration officers. A grotesque dimension was introduced to this when a certain official of Libya contracted sexually transmitted disease from a Nigerian woman and he later instigated the forced deportation of the lady on grounds related to immigration status (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

Libya's detention facilities for migrants are perhaps designed to further dehumanize the migrants but as earlier observed, these are targeted at black migrants. Accounts are available on how the detention camps are so overcrowded that diseases are easily transmitted by migrants; stories of scabies and tuberculosis transmissions are common in the detention. In detention, migrants are flogged with pipes and horsewhips for offences ranging from noise-making and lack of cooperation with a camp director called *munir* in Arabic. The UNSMIL reported many infractions in Libyan detentions, for instance the *Tarik al-Matar* detention centre is said to be

particularly notorious for migrant tortures. According to the UNSMIL (2018) report: A man from Cameroon described the situation at the *Tarik al-Matar* centre thus:

They beat us every day. They use electric sticks, just because we ask for food or [medical] treatment or for information about what will happen to us... Those who try to escape or make trouble are taken outside for more brutal beatings; they come back with fractures.... We are not alive in here. Someone died here 10 days ago and more will certainly follow if we stay here.

The migrant's detention camps in *Tajoura* and *Gharyan* are also noted to engage in migrants' torture and human rights violations (UNSMIL/OHCHR Report, 20, Dec. 2018).

Ethno-Racial Dynamics in Libya's Migration Policy

Racism and xenophobia creep into Libyan migration practices when one observes that there are two sets of rules and they are applied according to colour and skin pigmentation. Although the Libyan migration laws do not make any distinction in the application of its law, there is ethno-religious and racial applications of Libyan migration laws in practice. Migrants from West Africa are often the target of inhuman treatment and discrimination both on the streets of Libya and in detention centres. Many black migrants have been subjects of trump-up theft charges and have been mobbed on the streets of Tripoli and the environs. Again, strangers (migrants) are often blamed for any crime and even infrastructural decay in Libya.

On arrival, blacks are separated from other migrants, albeit some officials looking for a quick fix for their sexual urge. A respondent reported that it is a rarity for a migrant to make it to Libya and transited automatically to the coast to cross the Mediterranean Sea without detention. She said only very high-caliber migrants enjoy that privilege. This is sufficient to say that most migrants are detained on arrival in Libya. While in detention, the black migrant faces stiff discrimination as a result of skin colour, he is separated and made to sleep on a bare floor and he is only allowed access

to any facility only amid surplus (which is not likely). Migrants from other Arab states are treated less with disdain and very fundamental, is the fact that, often, the principle of international protection laws are employed when dealing with Arab migrants, even when most of the Arab states are not signatories to international protection protocols. Conversely, migrants (like Nigerians) who come from states under the obligations of international refugee laws, are the target of inhuman treatments (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

In Libya, blacks are generally referred to as *Abidat*, (personal communication, June 20, 2019). an Arab word which means “slave.” Although some Libyans and especially officials, deny that the word connotes slave, they accept that it is used to describe blacks but deny it has a racist interpretation. A respondent however tackles this exculpation with a rider that the term *Abidat* is often used in circumstances and environments where blacks are subject of derogation and maintain that all blacks in the detention camps are called that term. Despite the denials, this study confirms that the term *Abidat* is a racial connotation for black migrants in Libya. The issue of racial discrimination against black Africans in Libya has been a source of concern for the United Nations Special Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) since 2012 during many regular visits to prison and detention camps in Libya. In fact, in April 2018 the UNSMIL observed that the Arab detainees had beds and/or mattresses, while Sub-Saharan African detainees slept on the floor on blankets. Further, according to the report, in some facilities, Arab and Libyan detainees had more frequent and regular access to prison yards (UNSMIL/OHCHR Report, 20, Dec. 2018).

There is another explanation for the hostility against blacks in Libya and this has to do with the perceived role of black Africans in the political crisis that has engulfed Libya since 2011. It is generally believed that blacks exacerbated the crisis in Libya when many of them acted as militias to different warring parties in the Libyan crisis. Some Libyans, therefore, see black Africans as conduce party in their political predicament. In view of this, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

submitted to the 94th session of the UN concern about discrimination in Libya between November to December 2017. Despite this, the authorities in Libya have not taken any step to reverse this dangerous trend.

Many of the returnees who came back from Libya maintain that what fuels racial discrimination in Libya is indeed the lack of supervision of the work of immigration officers. It was reported that most junior officers in charge of immigration are most likely unaware of any law guiding their conducts. Many of them are said to act as though as if they are not responsible to anyone and their conducts appear unregulated. But since 2011, it has been observed that, Libya has become more or less a failed state and the extent of the law in regulating official duties is abysmal.

Nigerian Migrants in Libyan Society

Findings show that many migrants who are currently in Libya are stranded sojourners to Europe. The circumstances leading to migrants being marooned in Libya have enjoyed some certain mention above. At this juncture, the political situation in Libya shows that many of the migrants ran aground are not there of their volition compared to details of migrations to Libya in the 1990s to mid-2000, when migrant travelled to Libya by choice.

The migrant's condition in detention is almost the same as when he is not confined, same unbridled hostility in the throes of all pangs of suffering. According to one of the respondents, a Nigerian migrant who is stranded in Libya has two choices depending on gender. If a male, he does menial work that can hardly sustain him as a stop-gap solution because many male migrants would still want to find other alternatives to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. The other option is to report at the nearest detention camp for onward transfer to the office of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which ensures returns to Nigeria. It was reported also that the Libya Migration Office (LMO) also embark on the deportation of illegal migrants including Nigerian migrants, the only difference is when IOM is not involved in deportation, the migrants tend to be subjected to some inhuman treatment while in transit and even

before deportation. Our respondent also reported that money (in form of bribes) plays a significant role in whether a migrant is deported by the Libyan Immigration authority or returned to Nigeria by the IOM. It was reported that even while in detention, many migrants scout for money (sometimes from relatives at home) to facilitate being transferred to the IOM office (personal communication, June 20, 2019).

Many stranded female migrants have a more deplorable account of their stay in Libya while waiting to be returned home. Various accounts show that many female migrants have been subjected to various degrees of sexual abuses while primarily on menial jobs to make ends meet. Many of them are employed as house helps but are constantly sexually abused by their male employers who often hide under the common Libyan fable that migrants are the ones running after their masters for lackluster mitigations (personal communication, June 20, 2019). It is therefore convenient for male employers to quickly cry hoarse to their wives whenever there is a failed attempt to have canal knowledge of their migrant employees. According to one of our respondents, although sexual abuse is a very serious offence in the penal code of Libya, migrants or refugees have not benefitted from legal recourse whenever they are abused. This, it was reported, was because the wives of the villain husbands are the ones who incident the cases against the migrant, claiming that they are the ones harassing their husbands. Again, law enforcement in Libya is skewed against migrants' redress because there are reports of complainants who ended up being deported afterwards.

The coinage "*Arabu*" is a bastardization of the word "Arab" but beyond that, it has a sociological application as it is often used in a negative sense and it enjoys wide usage in migrants' communities. Most references to the word *Arabu* connote that the Arabs have done something wrong to the user(s). In a migrant setting, the word *Arabu* is often a connotation of a bad Arab man, this was reported by many of our respondents who implied that rare cases of kindness from the Arabs are rewarded with the reference to such a person as Arab and not "*Arabu*" (personal communication, October 16, 2019). One of our respondents who is Yoruba from Nigeria, claims that

the Yoruba migrants are the ones who coined the word *Arabu* from two words, Arab and “*bu*.” *Bu* in Yoruba means bad, hence when joined with Arab, it forms *Arabu* which means bad Arab (personal communication, October 16, 2019). Whichever its origin, *Arabu* is often used in migrants’ communities in Libya to express disaffection for the Arabs

This study confirms three different causes of disaffection between the Arabs and Nigerian migrants. One, the Arabs are also middlemen between migrants and the agents who are responsible for crossing them across the Mediterranean Sea but these Arab middlemen are reported to often abandon the migrants despite heavy financial commitments. Incidents were reported that many of the boat owners abandoned their boats (while migrants onboard) on the high sea whenever they sight coast guards. Again, some reported that a certain makeshift boat known as “*lapalapa*” are usually provided for migrants to cross the Mediterranean without any expert on board. The resort to the use of the *lapalapa* is to attract the attention of rescue organisations, like the Open Arm. The strategy is that the *Lapalapa* is not expected to make the three-day journey on the high sea, thus rescue operations are expected to come to the aid of those onboard and will then be taken to safe areas in Italy (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

In the wed of the throes of crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the migrants are not in any position to determine the mode of operation of smugglers, so they could not dictate how they cross the Mediterranean Sea, therefore, it is difficult to establish any breach. At the center of the whole, however, is the claim that the Arab middlemen are deucedly clever in the process and hardly mind about human lives (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

Many of our respondents who returned from Libya have similar stories of Arab exploitations. Many of them reported that the Arabs capitalized on their illegal migrant status to harvest cheap labour for their factories and employ domestic servants. The journey toward exploitation begins with how the migrants are sourced for their masters. One avenue has been through immigration officials who supply factories with illegal migrants.

Some of our respondents however qualify this process as one that appeared like a favour to many migrants because according to them, many migrants rushed to have the opportunity to work in factories (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

The incidence of exploitation arises only when the factory owners refused to pay the migrant workers or when they pay less of the agreed wages. A respondent claimed that some Libyan immigration officers are paid part of the wages of the migrant workers, but this claim was not corroborated by any other source. Migrants who worked as domestic servants reported that they suffer all manner of ill-treatments in the hands of their masters. Some of them claimed that their salaries are often cut down without explanation and some masters do not pay at all. Efforts by migrants to report this activity to local authorities usually left the migrants with regrets as the complainants either end up in jail or face deportation.

The third and most grotesque account of migrants' cause of disaffection with the *Arabs* is about sexual relations. During this study, two pregnant returnees were interviewed who claimed that the *Arabus* were responsible for their pregnancies. In addition, they claimed that they got pregnant after sexual violence meted out to them as domestic servants. One of them claimed that the son of her master was responsible for the sexual violation. The other explained that she was raped after being shot in her foot when she resisted. In both cases, it was clear that there were no attempts to seek legal interventions (personal communication, October 16, 2019).

From many of the returnee accounts, it appears that migration administrations in Libya are an all-comers affair where there is no central regulation relating to the treatments of migrants and refugees. Some observers believe that the illegal treatment of migrants is generally modulated by lack of functional authority in Libya as has been the case since the exit of Gaddafi in 2011. For such observers, therefore, this phenomenon is a post-2011 event that came with the political crises in Libya. Another view insists that migrants have always been subjected to aggravated ill-treatment in Libya and the fact that Libya is not a signatory

to any international protection law, and such, even while Gaddafi was in power, Libya was not a migrant-friendly nation.

Libya And Migration Laws

Virtually all the states in the gulf under Islamic influence are not signatory to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Conventions and its 1967 Protocol. Many of the Arab states' discord with international protection laws stems from two perspectives, namely, the Refugee Convention does not serve their purpose and secondly, Islamic law (which many of them subscribe to) has a firm prescription on how refugee should be treated.³⁰ Arab states, therefore, allow this to regulate refugee and migrant protection than the global law governing refugee administration. Libya, like other Arab states, is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Refugee convention and the 1967 Protocol but it is a party to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Although this Convention adopts many of the 1951 Geneva Convention standards, it sets its peculiars to the African continent at a juncture. Libya's acquiescence to the OAU Convention may have been influenced by OAU Convention's critical departure to the extant international protection law when it took cognizance of colonialism as a major source of displacements in Africa.

In spite of her denials of international protection law interference in her refugee and asylum administration, certain international human right obligations still set legal limitation to how migrants should be treated in Libya. One of such is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which is not primarily a migration regulatory tool but has competence on issues concerning arbitrary detention and deprivation of life—two major human right violations that often accompany states' migration control system. One other international human right convention which could have served as check to Libya's migrants' abuses is the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which prohibits many of the torture and ill-treatment of migrants in Libya.

Libyan authorities often claim that they derive their authorities on the

treatment of migrants from the state's municipal law which criminalises illegal entry, stay and exit from Libya. As noted above Libya categorizes all entries into her country as migration and disavows the asylum system in a fundamental way. Concerning entry to Libya, there are just two variants, namely, legal and illegal entries and there is no allowance for circumstantial entry where certain push factors are examined and when certain entries can be justified even when they are illegal. This type of legal framework provides a floodgate of detentions of migrants who enter illegally without regard to why they enter. According to Libya's Law No. 6 of 1987 Regulating Entry Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals, imprisonment and deportation of those who entered the country irregularly or sought to exit, are prescribed based on immigration status.

Libya's national law seems to have taken cognizance of migration challenges she faces and many of her laws appear to be responses to some of these challenges. In the process, even the OAU Convention and other international human right conventions which Libya is a party to, do not play any significant role in the drafting of Libya's immigration laws. For instance, in 2010, Law No. 19 on Combatting Irregular Migration was adopted, allowing for the detention, pending deportation, of migrants and refugees in an irregular situation was to attend to the upsurge of migrations to Libya from Sudan following the ructions of the Darfur crisis. Through this law, many migrants and refugees have been detained and even pay fines, which include "imprisonment with labour or by a fine not exceeding 1,000 Libyan dinars" (Lawal, 2019, pp11-32).

Apart from its fundamental abuses, Libya's migration law is not entirely anathema to the general concept of migration law amongst states. States view migration laws as border control measures and prevention of human influx into their territories. There are dimensions to the operationalisations of migration laws amongst states, some states skewed national refugee law with migration laws and often do not identify the boundaries of the two when determining the status of migrants. In Africa, South Africa falls into this category because it applies the refugee act in migrant related issues. Some European nations too preferred to apply their national migration

laws to refugee and asylum adjudications. Australia and New Zealand are particularly known for this especially when the two often refuse to admit refugees under international protection law provisions but prefer to do so under their national migration jurisprudence. Other states, as we have seen in the case of many Arab states, simply refuse to accept the incursion of the international protection laws into their migration policy.

Conclusion

From the standpoint of this study, international law appears to have done little to assist migrants in Libya. Although observations reveal a noticeable presence of United Nations Agencies in Libya, many of them concentrated on monitoring migrations across the Mediterranean Sea. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), have made huge impacts on the operations of Libya's Coast Guard (LCG) and other Libyan states forces in charge of migrations, but this is concentrated at the sea and the on the coastline. The implication is that many of the human rights violations of Libyan authorities have not come under the surveillance of the United Nations Agencies. The UN's work has been hampered by Libya's deliberate policy to prevent access to migrants and refugees and to monitor the situation in the detention facilities.

The migrant's situation in Libya needs urgent international interventions as human rights violations continue unabated. The journey to human right abuses starts with the automatic detention of all illegal migrants, especially blacks and specifically, Nigerians. According to some of our respondents, detention in Libya is not a holding facility for illegal migrant, it is real detention as prescribed for criminals who have committed crimes. The lack of alternatives to the detention of migrants should be of greatest concern to the UN.

Libya's absence from the UN Refugee Convention is not sufficient to leverage for violation of migrants' human rights. In most cases. the refugee convention is not always applied to migration issues even by advanced states, so the UN has no relief from it on the migration issue.

Another contour to the UN's intervention on migrants abuses in Libya is that international law has no international migration law, in a single file, that is well codified and clearly articulated as in the case of the refugee convention. The reason for this is that international law does not want to tamper with immigration law and border control of member states (Lawal, 2017, pp. 126-130.) In the intermediate, international law can derive its power of intervention in national migration practices, when issues of human rights violations are established because human rights protections have generally enjoyed a *jus cogens* nature amongst all states, in other words, no derogation is permitted.

Libya's human right violations relating to migration practices are well documented by international law agencies but the political instability in Libya makes it difficult to hold a central government responsible for these violations. Many human right violators quip with the alibi of denials when they know that there is no one to be held accountable. Migrants abuses in Libya, therefore, thrive on the political turmoil which breeds unbridled lawlessness in that country. Still, international communities have a responsibility to restore law and order in Libya where laws and not might, will regulate migrations in that country.

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Africa, Historicism and Historical Dynamics: Need for Affirmative Action in Postcolonial Africa

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Abstract

Africa is arguably the most battered and the most misrepresented continent in the world; slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism and continuous stereotyping its people. African civilization is dynamic – language, socio-political structure, architecture, religion, art, philosophy and ethics, technology and economy etc. – and has been part of the human march to progress. Using historical analysis, the paper interrogates Africa's experiences through historical trajectory and examines how to harness its potentials for future greatness; for continuous shining of the inextinguishable African light on the Mainland and in the Diaspora. The study demonstrates that historical defeat is a menace that a people can turn into a success through the lessons of history. The paper calls for jettisoning historicism, reemphasises Africa's immense contributions to civilization and provides a glimpse into the future of its greatness. Looking beyond the centuries of subjugation and dehumanization, the grandeur of African past and its resistance to subjugation and exploitation demonstrate a culture of struggle and resilience. The various discoveries and inventions by Africans show the undying African spirit. Contemporary Pan-Africanism is to Africanise globalization, celebrate African achievements and create – Innovate Africa! The thesis of the paper is that a distinctive African personality is required to achieve African renaissance – a cultural rebirth geared toward African technological development.

Keywords: *African personality, renaissance, technology, historical dynamics, civilization*

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Introduction

The demand in the 1970s for a new international economic order, Harry Johnson (1976) argued, is to an important extent a demand for greater power for international bureaucrats, disguised as a demand for justice for the ordinary people of the developing countries. In his exposition on accumulation of surplus, Johnson pointed out the fundamental problem in economic philosophy as the rights of property and justification for them. So, developing countries have merely used the rhetoric of colonialism, imperialism, and dependence - past policies of the developed countries - to cover up the inadequacies of their societies, past and present. In other words, the affluence of the developed countries and the poverty of the developing countries are the results both of the astuteness and fecklessness of their respective ancestors.

This is vantage illustration of the menace of history, the ultimate mark of defeat (of the past) that haunts the present and darkens the prospect of a people. It hurts the most when the forebear lost out and descendants of the subjugator justify their vantage position in the present dispensation on a superiority complex that justifies their stereotyping the descendants of the defeated ancestors. As Keita (2004, p. 17) points out, blackness to racists connotes African; "...blackness is forced to bear the weight of Africa's history, and then collapses into Africanity." It is apparent that Johnson is not concerned, at least, not overtly, about racism. Ironically, the people of the developing countries fall into brackets, racial and geographical, that we are forced to read in-between the lines of the stark intellectualism. This is more so given the appeal to the respective levels of ancestral competence.

History is the study of man's struggle to master his environment. It is the aggregation of man's actions, reaction and even inaction. When people are united in experience, they share the same history. No matter how disparate they think they are, in subsequent epochs the mark of the past defines their common history. The Africans that lived through the immediate past centuries felt it as part of their immediate experience. Just as the historian cannot come into history as a judge (Taylor; 1963,

p.70), the present generation also does not have the luxury of rejecting their past no matter how unsavoury it was.

If we go by de Watteville's description of political economy as "the science of wealth acquisition common to the State as well as the Family" (Horvat, 1968), it makes sense that our concern about developmental issues in post-colonial Africa, as elsewhere, should be explored based on the aggregation of how Africa fared in a world (past) in which international trade was a zero-sum game (Hoogvelt, 1997, p.8) and in the (present) international society structured to function still in power relations matrix. Power as used here is a correlate of various variables; economics, polity, ideology and even the prevailing theory that explains current international economic relations.

History studies the past as a window on the present to enable us project thoughtfully into the future. Relations between rich and poor states follow the same historical trajectories as it obtains between rich and poor persons. Since these relations are continuously institutionalised and theorised (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 13), the rich (state or individual) understandably gloats at the poor's predicament. The poor sees the situation as inexorable. Yet, as Hoogvelt points out, Cox's "historical structure" illuminates the relative stability of international capital accumulation. Once understood, the jinx is broken; it is not in the stars of anyone (individual or state) to be poor.

A collective body of poor states need to fathom historical change, tackle the conundrum of international economic relations and learn from the pitfalls of their historical past. As the Yoruba say; "Let the nitwit not wise up so that people (of the world) can revel in taking advantage of them" (Proverb). So, the defeated of history need not despair. History is a continuum, a meshing of the past into the present, into the future, transforming cyclically into the past, the present and the future; marked by events, bringing forward the past into the double entry of the present. Its balance sheet is the future. The defeated of the past need not despair! Through library search and historical analysis, the paper interrogates Africa's experiences through the historical trajectory and examines how to harness its potentials for future greatness.

Literature Review

The balkanisation of Africa into colonial hold by the European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 started a process that marked the second phase of European subjugation of Africa (The first being the Trans-Atlantic slave trade) and introduced an element of discordance into African search for unity. Meanwhile, eleven years after Berlin, precisely in 1896, Ethiopia defeated Italy decisively in the Battle of Adwa (Milkias, 2005; Braun, 2012). While the world press reported widely this African defeat of a European power, the Victory of Adwa had been under-documented, understandably in European scholarship. It has been glossed over in historical literature ironically even by African authors. To portray Africans as perpetual losers, Berlin has been celebrated, Adwa has been relegated. Yet, the significance of Adwa cannot be wished away, both for the world and Africa.

It is also instructive to note that eight years into the partitioning of Africa by European powers, Pan-Africanism as an idea had metamorphosed into a movement action plan and activities to ensure that all people of African descent around the world would act in concert. From 1893 down to 1927, the African World sought unity and solidarity even as the world powers were uniting against Africa (Esedebe, 1980). Pan-Africanism arose in tide from 1924, with the proliferation of pressure groups in Europe, North America and Africa. This period also marked the rise of dynamic leadership of the movement, first Afro-American, then Afro-West Indians with the assistance of Africans abroad and culminating in African leadership of the movement in Mainland Africa (Ajala; 1980). Both W.E.B. DuBois (The intellectual) and Marcus Garvey (The activist) shared the Diaspora platform with so many others to raise the consciousness of Africans anywhere they were and the awareness of the world on African issues and plights.

The claim of the inferiority of the Black Man had been refuted by writing and by personal careers of people like Olaudah Equiano, James Africanus Horton and Benjamin Banneker. The calls for the Africanisation of Christianity and to abate European encroachment were part of the

responses to the humiliation and discrimination against Africans in the Diaspora. Perhaps the first most widely read and articulate Pan Africanist writer was Edward Wilmot Blyden. According to Blyden, men were the creatures of the circumstances in which they lived. Aside from calling the attention of the world and Africans themselves to the glory of Africa's past, Blyden called for "African nationality," and a citadel of hope and a centre of "African power"- physical, pecuniary and intellectual - from which African strength shall be felt around the world (Esedebe, 1980). Blyden was the first to advocate for the preservation of the "African personality," to ensure the distinctiveness of and equality of the African race with any other race. His seminal work, "Christianity, Islam and Negro Race" showed not only how Africa nestled the two faiths as "...the cradle which cherished their helpless infancy." The continent produced leaders and intellectuals of the two religions (Esedebe, 1980). Blyden was thus the precursor of all the intellectual Pan-Africanists such as DuBois, Garvey, Padimore, Nkrumah, Makonnen, and Nyerere among many others.

Langley (1973) has shown how the ideology and social classes emanating firstly in the Diaspora developed in West Africa through Black Consciousness. Ras Makonnen (Formerly Thomas Griffiths) in *Pan-Africanism from within* (King ed.; 1973) illuminates the alternative non-traditional approach to Pan-Africanism; the cluster of activities that marked his brand. Basically, as King explains, Makonnen conceived Pan-African movement as an all-African affair devoid of any entangling alliances that could hinder the attainment of the black objectives. George Padmore (Formerly Malcolm Ivan Nurse) was the intellectual and writer. Makonnen was the organiser, the entrepreneur and financier. This epoch-making idea and movement, Esedebe (1980, p.14) highlighted, has the following components:

- i. Africa as the homeland of Africans and the persons of African extraction;
- ii. Solidarity among men of African descent;
- iii. Belief in a distinct African personality;

- iv. Rehabilitation of Africa's past;
- v. Pride in African culture;
- vi. Africa for Africans in church and state;
- vii. The hope for a united and glorious Africa.

According to Prof. J.F. Ade Ajayi (2001), Pan-Africanism is the only ideology of nationalism that Africa has. It is a political and cultural phenomenon that unifies Africa, Africans (on the Mainland) and Africans in the diaspora. Makonnen sees as tragic the fading out of the spirit of revolt that led to the end of slavery in the West Indies (King ed., 1973, p.1). The Manchester Conference (1945) benefitted a lot from Makonnen's entrepreneurial savvy and organizational skills. It yielded the conviction that independence is never given; that it has to be taken (King, 1973, p.165).

Pan-Africanism shifted from an outside movement to the Mainland post-1945; it triggered nationalism and decolonization process. 1960 became "African Year" during which seventeen African states attained independence. Unity and solidarity, the Pan-African objectives were however threatened by the divergent views on how they could be achieved. African leaders split into the radicalists (Casablanca) and the gradualists (Monrovia) camps on how to effect African unity (Ajala, 1980, p.45). The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May, 1963 was a watershed, not only in the annals of African history or in general international relations; it marked the culmination of the two generations of theoretical and practical Pan-Africanist activism. The organization provided a platform for the African voice in world affairs and a multilateral setting for African international relations. But the Africa that united into an international organization in 1963 was a far cry from the Africa of the pre-colonial era. Moreover, the organization was formed at a time when the international system had its peculiarity – its bipolar nature that divided the world into two antagonist blocs.

The functions, prospects and problems of the O.A.U. were dictated by three factors; first, the circumstances of its birth and the nature of the international system at the time, Europe had already created the world

in its own divisive image and the world was divided into two, behind European East and Euro-American West. But it was a world, nay Africa that had been defrauded (of its history), robbed (of its land and resources) and numbed (of its mind)! Second, the state systems that operated in O.A.U. member states were of political and economic contradictions. Third, the type of Charter (a compromise document) put in place at its formation.

Pan-Africanism was a means to and an end of African unity and solidarity. The combination of the above factors made the delivery (formation of the O.A.U.) a traumatic experience. Nonetheless, Pan-Africanism as a means has been successful. Its pursuit as an end lost tempo in 1963, with the individual states, perhaps with the exception of Ghana at the beginning, abandoning Pan-Africanist for nationalist agendas. The continuous call for African renaissance is an admission of a mission unaccomplished.

Africans: Masters of the Past, Victims of the Present

If we look beyond the immediate past of some five centuries ago, the picture will be that of the great march of Africans towards progress and development of the African self. As Oluwatoki (2016) points out, the chances that states have in the international system are products of their historical background and experiences and how much they could navigate successfully in the precarious sea of the international arena. Africans, like other branches of *Homo sapiens*, adapted well to their environments; the flat nose with almost upturn nostrils is most suited for the Tropics. African ingenuity is displayed in the architecture of the thick mud wall which does not allow the heat to enter the house so fast, and which, rarefied at sunset, make the inside of the house cool all through. African proverbs and folklores show that Africans are empiricists. They conceive gravitational pull by the proverb: “Whatever goes up comes down” and the law of relativity by “Whatever faces someone inexorably backs someone else just like the *Gangan* drum.”

Africa produced the Great Pyramid out of 6 million tons of stone, as Architects and Engineers (Diop; 1974, p. 234) not simply as unskilled

labourers. Through the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, Africans were in captivity for centuries. They were subjugated and discriminated against. But after the emancipation and in the very first generation, the fecundity of the African mind manifested. Dr. Lewis Latimer, Physicist, invented the Electric Light Bulb (1882), Thomas Marshall, Fire Extinguisher (1872), Albert C. Richardson, Insect Destroyer Gun (1899), George W. Carver, Peanut Butter (1896), Thomas A. Carrington, Stethoscope (1876), Alexander Miles, Elevator (1867) and Frederick M. Jones, Air-conditioning Unit (1949), among many others (The Black Inventions Museum; Biography.com). Banneker (Astronomer), Derham (Physician), Horton (Scientist), Augustine of Hippo, Cyprian and Tertullian (Church Fathers), Septimus Severus (Emperor), Suetonius (Historian), Terence (Playwright) and Apuleius (Philosopher and Author) are examples of Africans of genius (Esedebe, 1980).

Pushkin, arguably the greatest Russian poet was proud of his African ancestry (Rogers, 1947 cited in Makonnen (1973, p.84). Bilal Ibn Rabah was the first and perhaps the most important black personage of early Islam. Equal among equals of the companions; he was the *Muezzin* and the Treasurer of the Prophet (Abdul-Rauf, 1977). Antara Ibn Shaddad al-'Absi (ca. C.E. 525-615), the foremost name among the black personages of pre-Islamic Arabia was a poet laureate and the Achilles of the Arabian heroic age. He was born a prince of Arabia, a son of a black maid from Ethiopia. There was Rashid, slave and companion of Idris Ibn Abdullahi, founder of the Idrisid dynasty in the Maghrib. He exercised authority as regent for eleven years and preserved the young Idrisid state. Abu'l Misk Kafur (Musky Camphor), the Black Eunuch, was slave of Ikhshid, governor of Egypt (935-946). He died in 968, after 19 years of virtual (as regent for the Ikhshid sons) and three of titular rule (Oluwatoki; 1999, pp. 27-32). The self-taught, charismatic Malcolm X (1964) remains arguably the most articulate and the most eloquent "talk back" to the white man and white society for injustice to the black (Malcolm X and Harley, 1964).

African Art influenced European Surrealist Art when the latter encountered the former. One of the greatest legacies of African Art for

the Art World was the Africanisation of the Great Artist and Priestess of Obatala, Susanne Wenger, Adunni Olorisa. Her sculptures in the Sacred Groves in Oshogbo are but a part of the creations of the Sacred Art group of artists and are among the best in the world. Adunni Olorisa learnt the blue and white *Adire Eleko* from Yoruba women, created from it the multi-coloured batik, a new genre in design. Oluwatoki (2006) referred to Wenger as the Art Bridge of Africa - Europe relations.

Professor Thomas Adeoye Lambo introduced the village setting treatment of the mentally ill to Psychiatry and revolutionised the discipline. The Aro Mental Hospital, Abeokuta is a lasting testimony to African ingenuity in Psycho-therapy and the institutional rehabilitation of the neurotic (Adekile, 2002). In Obstetrics and Gynaecology, in Ophthalmology, Epidemiology, Cardiology and Paediatrics among others, Africa holds solution in updating the medical strides of humankind. In Social and Personal Relations, Financial Management, Animal Husbandry, Architecture and Building Technology, much of the daunting contemporary challenges can be handled through Africa's antecedents. They have been masters of the past. As Connah (2004, p. 239) put it, "Africa has been home to many cultures and civilizations over the ages, and to a rich technological heritage."

Africans are victims of the present. There are two angles to the problem. First is the spill over of the defeat of the recent past; slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism and the attempt at obliterating the glory of Africa's past. The colonial mentality befuddles the African mind; the reason Malcolm X (1964) and Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1986) asked for the decolonization of the African mind. Second is the bifurcation (sometimes trifurcation) of contemporary African worldview. Christian and Islamic ideas confuse Africans and they take wrong views on improving their lives. They shackle themselves with wrong theology that conceives God as an umpire that shifts the goal posts while the game lasts. Today, Africans have made themselves victims of superstitions. The latest wave of Pentecostalism (late 1980s onward), a hybrid of religion and Americanism, casts every aspect of life on witchcraft and more attention is often paid on Satan

than God in the churches. The enemy is always lurking in the shadows in individual's social and economic life. Salvation is commercialised. Prayer centres mush room for deliverances and miracle work. Muslim clerics have caught into the fray.

Africans spend ample creative hours in "religious" services throughout the week; time meant for work. People are intimidated in the mass media with the unseen enemies which only these anointed ministers can combat. Rather than face the realities of the contradictions of the post-colonial state and the emotional intelligence deficit that hinder progress, even educated Africans put everything at the behest of the principalities. Thus crippled by encumbrances, the African mind is doubly rendered ineffective in a globalized world that is competitive, acquisitive and aggressive. In personal and national affairs, Africans hide behind religiosity and neglect to face the realities of the 21st century.

African Personality, Bridge to African Renaissance

Renaissance refers to a period of renewal and rebirth during which new attitudes, values and new principles of life replace the inadequacies of a former period. As Ade Ajayi (2001, p.2) explains, the concept derives from European History of 1300-1600, end of the middle Ages and transition to modern History. It was however a period that culminated in European Imperialism and ardent efforts to whiten Egypt and delink it with the Black. Renaissance was a revolt against restrictions on the freedom of thought, a time of revival of learning and scholarship, exploration, adventure and discovery. African renaissance remains a mirage as long as we shy away from the processes of European renaissance. European encounters with the Muslim World especially in the Crusades revealed European backwardness. Identifying the problems, scholars and philosophers addressed the issues and called for new perceptions of life. Voltaire (1694-1778) called for mutual tolerance, condemned dogma, equated fanaticism to superstition as delirium to fever or rage to anger. He abhorred fanaticism and wondered how reformed and enlightened minds can superstitiously believe in witchcraft (Perry, Peden and Von

Laue; 1995, pp. 62-64). Thomas Paine (1737-1809) denounced Christian mysteries, miracles and considered the prophecies as superstitions. The supernatural birth of Christ he considered as having mark of fraud and impositions, which even the Jews rejected (Perry, Peden and Von Laue; 1995 pp.65-66). These two among others were the deists; they believed in God but rejected aspects of religion that do not sound to reason. Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789) saw religion as "a mere castle in the air," theology, "ignorance of natural causes reduced to a system, a long tissue of fallacies and contradictions." He considered man devoid of reason who believes in God (Perry, Peden and Von Laue, 1995, pp. 67-68). The point here is, the West freed itself from the shackles of religion numbing their minds and unleashed reasoning, thereby conquered nature and in effect they conquered the world.

The world today has gone past the narrowness of the atheists. But superstition camouflaged as religiosity is anti-science, anti-reason and anti-development. Africa cannot afford the luxury of lethargic indulgencies in the 21st century giving the damages done to its individual and collective psyche since the 19th century.

Ade Ajayi (2001) identified three aspects to European renaissance; first, it took approximately three centuries, second, it was led by artists and men of letters, not industrialists and technologists and third, it was an attempt *to revive past glories, inherent in the people's consciousness* (italics mine). In other words, European men and women of letters vociferously attacked whatever notions shackled European minds. They called for new views on and approach to human affairs and thus released people's energies in education, politics, economics and ethics. In a few centuries, Europe emerged ahead in science and technology and reformed its governmental and economic methods. Europeans took colonies often through gunboat diplomacy by the aid of the Maxim gun. Africa and other parts of the world were drawn effectively into the European orbit, acculturated and disoriented from their own cultural and technological templates.

In reverse, Africa has to first awaken its consciousness to its past glories; unlearn the falsehood imparted to its collective memory, remove the

garbage of untruth passed to Africa as education. It is only then that any cultural revival will be possible. This task however cannot be left to any part of the African family. All hands must be on deck. But Africa cannot wait for three centuries. Africa did it before. Technology is advanced and Africans are partakers in its development already. It is about refocusing and the time is now!

The Europe-led globalisation and its sequel, which Akinyemi (2000, p.18) termed “uni-globalisation” (the American brand) have changed the world forever. Africa cannot opt out of the new order. But for its renaissance, Africa cannot play ostrich; the continent has to admit to itself what hinder its progress and be ready to discard them. There can be no renaissance without the personality to drive it.

If we can take the achievement of African unity for granted, how does this unity operate to solve the social, economic and political problems facing Africans, Mainland and Diaspora? Ade Ajayi's (2001) emphasis that African renaissance is better discussed in the context of Pan-Africanism, shows that the latter concept is the quintessential African ideology. African renaissance refers to the rebirth of African ethos that will drive African development in its entire ramification.

The thesis of this paper is that a distinctive African personality is required to drive African renaissance. As Ofoegbu (1980, p.60) has explained, the depersonalization of the African was a by-product of his/her disarticulated social and political conditions. Aggrey's pride in the African colour, Azikiwe's insistence on respect for human dignity, Senghor's positive assertion of African identity and values; all identify first, Africans' need to find in their glorious past the élan for positive actions to regain their self-respect.

In his quest for a synthesis of psychoanalytic and historical methods to understand the role of human nature in historical events, Gay (1985, pp. xiii-xiv) explains as a moral imperative, an aesthetic taste, a scientific discovery, a political stratagem, a military decision and all the countless other guises that are soaked in the particular, immediate, as well as in their general cultural surroundings. They are however also responses to

inward pressures, that is, as translations of instinctual needs, defensive manoeuvres and anxious anticipations. Needless to say, Gay's observations apply to persons as well as people. African renaissance therefore calls for the recognition and a desire in Africans for the renewal and improvement of their condition. This renewal however to be truly African must be based on African milieu and adapted to the African identity and values. Failures to be so, Africa will remain adrift in the sea of human personality.

African personality does not indiscriminately reject everything non-African. As Mbonu Ojike (cited in Ofoegbu, 1980, p.63) pointed out, it is about boycotting the boycottable, by recognising, as Ofoegbu explains, what Africa possesses; sharing with the world, being self-reliant, taking duly from the world but never being dependent. As the proverb goes, "A joint meal is not enjoyable to someone who does not provide part of the dishes." After all the centuries of subjugation and derision from our human cousins, and all the denials about our contribution to our human heritage, if Africa fails to establish and assert herself, it will be laughable bad news for subsequent generations.

The hope put in African socialism based on humanism and communalism that it will supplant Euro-Christian individualism has been dashed by the gradual death of the pre-colonial social structures. Through western education and the outreach of its ideas, values and tastes, African society has lost much of its basic features in family (Yoruba *Idile*), family compound (Yoruba *Agboole*) and society (Yoruba *Awujo*) and in social relations and ethics. Urban centres present more glaring dislocation but the rural communities are not spared.

To get back the old order might be impossible. The need for that does not even arise. But Africa can evolve a new Africa where individualism will be tempered, where communalism will be reinforced, in cooperative societies, in communal projects and in eschewing division in ethnic nationalism, religious bigotry and aggrandisement. Africa has the onerous task to recreate its society addressing the issues of neglecting the common good for self-annihilating narcissism.

Globalisation and Africa's Tensile Strength

Globalization operates as universalization of capitalism. It operates, as Tomlinson (2002, p.272) explains, "simultaneously and interrelated in the economic, technological-communicational, political and cultural spheres of human life." The cultural implication surpasses the imposition of western lifestyle; it involves the dissemination of the "entire range of institutional features of cultural modernity." Modernity involves institutionalization and regulation of cultural practices, submerging cultural identity; self and communal definitions, Tomlinson explains, based around differentiations.

Our identities - gender, religion, race and ethnicity, nationality, sexuality - are publicly organised and institutionalised as ours. It is in this respect that Akinyemi (2000) sees "uni-globalisation" as reflecting a globe "where the overriding values of one nation (USA) and one civilization (western world) bestride the world and everyone else bends to its will."

Tomlinson conceives globalization's distribution of identity across all cultures, not as obliteration of identities but as part of the cultural package of global modernity. This is a verbose attempt to distract from packaging westernization as modernity. It is understandable that the conqueror states present their civilization and cultural values as superior. Europeans claim that they were on civilizing mission; Modelski (2000, p.58) has catalogued the disintegration of the societies of Peru and Mexico, the terrible decline of the population of Central America through violence, diseases and depression and the extermination of the Amerindians. Europeans - English, French, and Spaniards etc. - destroyed the people, took their land and planted their "new civilization." It may well be that the white man and his rule might not be the last on the (American) continent, as Turner (Armstrong, 1972, p. xviii) postulates concerning North America; some combinations of events might still restore the Indian to his original status as the ruler of the land. Perhaps this is what the Dwamish chief Seattle (Cited by Turner: Introduction in Armstrong, 1972) warned about when he said:

When the last red men shall have perished, and the memory of my

tribe shall have become a myth among the white men, these shores will swarm with the invisible dead of my tribe.

At night when the streets of your cities and villages are silent and you think them deserted, they will throng with the returning hosts that once filled and still love this beautiful land. The white man will never be alone.

Let him be just and deal kindly with my people, for the dead are not powerless. Dead, did I say? There is no death, only a change of worlds.

This primordial admonition has not been heeded. The invisible dead of the Amerindians might still come; the non-powerlessness of the dead might still be shown. But Africa needs not allow the long wait; Africans have refused to perish from the onslaught of Euro-American hegemony.

The “new civilization” now packages its new identity to the world making everybody a global citizen through what has been termed “coca-colization,” the denim jeans and the culture of eating out, among various others; the “mixed blessing” of Tomlinson’s reference. But this new civilization makes the pancreas dysfunctional, leaves in its trails cirrhosis of the liver, renders the lung cancerous. This cultural package obliterates specific identities, replaces them with general often vulgar attenuate identities.

Africa’s tensile strength shows the robustness of its civilization in the face of slavery, slave trade, colonialism, denials, neo-colonialism and globalization. No African people have been wiped out; none of its civilisations has been buried. While it has European settler communities with the attendant socio-political tension, Africa was not demographically submerged by the swarm of European adventurers. African Diaspora survived in spite of the odds and over the centuries, the Diaspora has retained the African identity in its distinctive culture.

The first step to “Africabrate” will be to dig into the past of Black

African creativity; to correct the centuries of European denial of Greek debt to Black-ruled Egyptian civilisation. This “Africabration” will close the gap in the history of civilisation and galvanise the present and future generations of Africans to “Africreate” and spur them out of their lethargy and inferiority complex. This is the first step towards the decolonisation of the African mind; the unlearning, relearning, unthinking, rethinking paradigm (See Diop’1974, pp. 233-234).

Mainland and Diaspora Africa must make a synthesis of mutual needs to make Africa rise again in the Arts and the Social Sciences, in the Natural and the Medical Sciences, in Engineering and Technology, in the Agricultural Sciences, in Military and Strategic sciences. Africa has not been researched enough; it has many challenges crying for solution. African governments under the auspices of the African Union have the onerous duty of challenging its citizens; create the atmosphere that will unleash African ingenuity in the arts, letters, science and technology. In today’s world that knows only the language of power, Africa has got to package its cultural identities and through globalised means, give them to the world.

African identities should manifest in African creativity – in all spheres – addressing the needs of humanity. The hard and soft powers to be “Africreated” will Africanise globalisation for the world to have to turn to Africa. By globalizing African creation and inventions – in governance, economy, and strategy, and in all conceivable fields -, the world will concede to Africa its torch bearer status in human civilisation.

Africa can draw on its culture of struggle, the inextinguishable spirit, and its depth of wisdom. The spirit of Adwa (1896), Isandlwana (1878) and much other African strategic ingenuity that turned the scale against the Europeans on the battlefield (Greene, 2006) should be invoked in African combat of its various challenges. It requires a collective approach.

According to Barraclough (1967, p. 195), Asian and African societies were neither stagnant nor static prior to European incursion. Aside from their transformation by western industry and western technology, by far the most important force that propelled them to political awakening

was their determination to maintain, reshape and create their own personality. The people realized, Barraclough explained, the necessity for modernization and avoidance of the alienating westernization. They sought for Modern Africa, to assimilate useful European elements, to be adapted in combination with elements from the African past; they desired to create “a modern viable African culture” (Legum, 1962 cited in Barraclough, 1967, p. 195).

Six decades into independent Africa, Africans continue to lose touch with their great heritage while thanks to technology, a globalized (western) culture is creeping menacingly into the African psyche making them gradually to succumb to the very westernization they had despised at independence. Historicism as a theory can use history to explain cultural and social events and situations. It does not condemn a people to a lethargic quagmire. Africans should seek for inspiration from their glorious past and great achievements and especially from their strength and resilience that have kept them standing in the face of the Menace of History. The key to this renewal is not in some futile efforts to copy a receded life and entertaining pattern of the past, nor is it in superstitious clinging to religiosity. It is in embracing technology. As Adiele (2006, p. 27) put it, “...many developing countries do not adequately appreciate the controlling role of technology in international affairs.” There is no gainsaying it that a state’s level of technology determines its position in the International Community. This is a riot act for the African Union and its members to work on removing Africa’s technological deficit without delay.

Conclusion

We have in the course of this paper attempted to put the African experience in historical perspective. Africa has contributed its quota to world civilizations by being the pioneers, peopling ancient Egypt and creating its civilisation that led humanity in its stride to development. As products of Africa’s geography; its people not only adapted phenotypically, its civilization demonstrates their absolute mastery of their environment.

Africa has in the course of about five centuries got through slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The partitioning of Africa in Berlin (1884/1885) as the final act of the Concert of Europe ushered in a new era of African History with the change of its face – politically, economically and even demographically. Even as European states balkanised Africa among them, Africa gave a devastating defeat to Italy. A grand alliance among African states after Adwa could have changed the fate of Africa in its subsequent encounters with Europe. The idea and movement that triggered Africa's actions towards rebirth started in the New World. Pan-Africanism was also nurtured and practiced from within. Now than ever before African unity is needed for its renaissance. This is the time to seek African solutions to African problems.

Pan-Africanism ended up in the Mainland Africa and yielded the nationalist struggles that led into the decolonization of Africa. The fervour for African unity culminated in the formation of the Organization of African Unity. The tempo of Pan-Africanism went down with the states concentrating on national agenda; a miscalculation since the individual African states had been divided against themselves. They had been so structured that they could not individually combat the European states (and later American hegemony).

Globalization is a new challenge that calls for African unity and renaissance more urgently. This renaissance can only be effectively anchored on the African personality. Once again, we should celebrate African achievements on a continuous basis and create a new atmosphere—*Innovative Africa*—that will nurture the Africa of the future; vibrant, progressive and proudly African.

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Hausa Migrants in the Socioeconomic Development of Postcolonial Lagos State

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Abstract

The transformation of Lagos to an industrial and cosmopolitan society is a combination of many factors. Its geostrategic location, for example, played a prominent role in its emergence as the economic nervecenter of Nigeria. This status influenced the exponential migration of people of diverse cultural, sociopolitical and economic backgrounds into the area, including people from the northern parts of the country, who are generally called Hausa, though some of them are not really of Hausa stock. The presence of these Hausa migrants contributes to the socioeconomic development of Lagos as they mostly engage in numerous occupational economic activities, particularly those that require much physical strength. On the other hand, there had been a number of social problems associated with the presence of these migrants. In light of the foregoing assertions, this paper examines the socioeconomic impact of Hausa migrants in the state. The paper adopts a qualitative research methodology using historical approach to data collection and interpretation.

Keywords: Hausa migrants, socioeconomic development, ethnoreligious crises, Lagos State

Introduction

The history of man is dominated by migrations. In fact, settlements are established, ideas are dispersed and innovations flow across different parts

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of world as a result of migrations. Urbanised societies of the world are those that have benefited from the inflow of ideas and innovations from outsiders. Migrants are found of providing complimentary services which are important to the socio-economic trajectory of the host community. Migrant populations though often maintain affiliations with their communities of origin; usually turn the host community to permanent bode (Akinrinade & Olukoya, 2011:71-85). This is usually influenced by socio-economic convenience and acclimatisation. In many cases, however, crises, xenophobic activities and other forms of social problems could be associated with the presence of migrants within the host community. Many ethnic and communal clashes have occurred in various parts of the world owing to indigenes/settlers/migrants dichotomy. The continuous influx of migrant populations into an area could also create pressure on the existing social services and infrastructure such as water supply, transportation, health facilities, and housing (Olukoju, 2003). These pressures always occur due to inadequate town and urban planning, especially planning for expansion. In addition, the native of the host communities may be relieved of their jobs because migrants are mostly prepared to take up any available jobs, even at lower wages, a scenario which is typical of Hausa migrants in Lagos State.

In light of the above propositions, this study examines the place of the Hausa migrant labours in the socio-economic trajectories of Lagos State, particularly during the post-colonial period. The paper is divided into seven sections; this general introduction is the first section. The second section briefly traced the emergence of Lagos State as a melting pot in Nigeria. The third section clarified some of the related concepts. The fourth section traced the origin and pattern of Hausa settlements in some specific areas of Lagos State. The fifth section examined the economic activities of Hausa migrants in various parts of Lagos State. The sixth section analysed the social problems and challenges accompanying the presence of the Hausa migrants in Lagos State. The last section summarised the basic discussions in the paper.

Lagos State: The Melting Pot of Cultures and Civilizations

The emergence of Lagos State as an urban, industrial and cosmopolitan centre could be linked to its ability to accommodate and cross-fertilise civilisations and innovations from series of migrants who have made inflow into the State. In fact, the name “Lagos” reflects an element of initial migration to the original settlement. The name, which is etymologically derived from a Portuguese word, means “lagoon.” Lawal (1994:1) is of the opinion that Lagos was so named by the Portuguese migrants because it had physical and geographical characteristics which were similar to that of a small coastal lagoon town in Portugal, called Lagos. In addition, the native name for the area is “Eko” which has been identified as an Edo word meaning “war camp” by some scholars, though Lawal (1995:136) has also argued that the Awori account of Lagos history claims that “Eko” is derived from “oko” (a Yoruba word meaning farm). However, a careful analysis of the Awori account of the history of Lagos reveals that it is a making of the migrations of various ethnic entities into the original settlement.

From a small fishing and agrarian society during the fifteenth century, Lagos gradually transformed to the initial administrative capital and till-date the most active hub for industrial and commercial activities in Nigeria. It has continued to witness series of immigration from across the world. Thousands of migrants visit the State on a daily basis and virtually all ethnic groups in Nigeria have adequate representation in Lagos State (Agboola & Agunbiade, 2007). This historical and incessant inflow of migrants into Lagos is attributed to a number of factors. In the first instance, its geography and climate are suitable for convenient habitation and various economic activities. Also, the security provided by its creeks, swamps and lagoons attracted the early settlers into the area, laying the foundation for continuous inflow of people into Lagos (Ibrahim, 2017). Also, during the slave trade era, Lagos received quite a number of migrants because it served as one of the major centres where slaves were traded and exported to Europe and the Americas. This opportunity came majorly as a result of its being situated along the Atlantic Ocean. Even as at when slaves were to be returned back to the shores of what later

became Nigeria, Lagos was the first point of call. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the British imperial ambitions in Africa needed some form of political hegemony. In this respect, Lagos served as the nucleus of the British colonial rule in Nigeria. Therefore, migrants from various parts of the country moved into Lagos because of the attendant opportunities accruable as the administrative and commercial nerve-centre of the country.

After independence, people of diverse socio-cultural, economic and political backgrounds continued to troop into Lagos due to the presence of large industrial plants, sea ports, air ports, transportation networks, and educational institutions among others (Olukoju, 1994:34-38). In particular, the place of the sea ports that are located in some parts of Lagos State in the socio-economic relevance of the State cannot be underestimated. In addition, socio-cultural ties such as ethno-religious affiliations also account for the reasons for some migrations into Lagos. For instance, Lagos State has continued to host the headquarters of many religious associations and denominations particularly Christian and Islamic groups. In addition, Lagos has often provided a safe haven for migrants who were seeking asylum from crisis ridden areas of the country. The post-colonial federal civil service structure has also paved the way for the movement of civil servants and the arm forces to every parts of the country, especially to Lagos State. By and large, the fact remains that these migrations have continued to contribute to the socio-economic transition of Lagos State. Lagos State has therefore continued to serve as the melting pot for socio-cultural, political, and economic activities in Nigeria. On the other hand, the State has been confronted with numerous social problems such as incessant occurrences of kidnapping, man-stealing, rituals killings, armed robbery, shoplifting, public transport robbery, car-snatching, dilapidated infrastructural facilities, and existence of squalors among others, most of them arising from the uncontrolled influx of migrants into Lagos State (Osifodurin, 2007).

Conceptual Clarifications: Migrant, Settler, and Hausa

The terms “migrant” and “settler” are derivatives of migration and settlement respectively. Migration, due to its historical, economic, and socio-cultural perspectives, has always been subjected to a variety of interpretations which has tended to incorporate the “space” and “duration” dimensions. For example, Roseman (1971) focused on the spatial dimension when he asserted that migration is a situation whereby an individual or a group of people relocate their residence to another place. On the other hand, Fussell (2012) tried to incorporate the time/duration dimension into the definition of migration in her contention that migration is the movement of people, in whatever may be its length, composition, or motives. Migration is a global historical phenomenon which had continued to occur within or across the borders of countries, hence there is internal and international migrations. It could either be voluntarily, forcefully, or circumstantially motivated. To this end, a migrant could be regarded as a person who move from one area to another (mostly on a temporary basis) for various push and pull reasons. These reasons may include the search for economic opportunities; seeking for refuge or asylum with respect to natural disaster, religious crisis or political persecution; voyages for evangelism, facts finding mission, and explorations among others (Sharkdom *et al*, 2014:292-342). In essence, there are migrant traders, migrant labourers, migrant beggars, migrant hawkers, and migrant preachers among others.

Sequel to above, it can therefore be asserted that settlement is a product of migration. Unlike migration, settlement entails a lengthy period of occupation, acculturation, assimilation, and acclimatisation within the host community. Usually, it takes two or more generations for a settlement to have been entrenched. Therefore, a settler could be regarded as a migrant who had lived in the host community for a long period and in most cases had found comfort in his new community. It must be added that observations have shown that the settlers usually ensure that the socio-political structure of their community of origin is replicated within the settlement as much as possible (Veracini, 2015). In some cases, the settlers are very much integrated into the socio-political and economic

fabrics of the host community with some of them becoming land and title holders. Solaja et al (2013) refers to this kind of establishment as “Firm Presence.”

The term “Hausa” connotes a group of people who shared historical, ethno-cultural and political affiliations and are majorly found in northern part of Nigeria (Stride & Ifeka, 1971:81-89). The term could also be used to refer to the language spoken by this group of people. Hausa language is widely spoken in the West African sub-region and the original speakers constitute the major bulk of the autochthonous settlers of most parts of north-western and north-central zones of Nigeria (Cohen, 1961). It must, however, be emphasised that all migrants from the northern parts of Nigeria are usually referred to as Hausa in Lagos State and many other Yoruba cities, even though some of them are not really of Hausa origin. Hausa migrants, like their Igbo and Yoruba counterparts, are present in the nooks and crannies of Nigeria. Apart from Nigeria, they also spread across some other countries in the West African sub-region. Lagos State, as a result of its strategic and economic positions, has continued to receive the influx of migrants from northern parts of Nigeria. There is hardly a Local Government Area or Local Council Development Area in Lagos State that does not have a cluster of the Hausa elements within it. In particular, factors such as trade and commerce, religion affiliation, socio-cultural affinity and recently crises of insecurity in the north have overtime influenced the large migration of the Hausa people into Lagos State.

The Hausa population in Lagos State could be structured into the migrants and the settlers. With respect to the Hausa migrants, they are more or less wanderers who were perpetually moving from place to places in search of livelihood and greener pasture. Some of them are seasonal migrants who would only stay in Lagos during the dry season but immediately return back to their *Arewa* once the rainy season begins in order to continue with their farming activities. Some other maintains a semi-permanent stay in Lagos State whereby they stay in Lagos for about six to eight months and spend the rest part of the year with family at *Arewa*.

In fact, the money realised by these migrants during their temporary stays are used to boost their farming businesses. Apart from this set of Hausa population, there are also the Hausa settlers who or whose parents or grandparents had settled and had become integrated into some specific areas of Lagos. Most of the earlier Hausa migrants to Lagos State were kola nuts traders who later became permanent settlers and even landlords and are referred to as *Baranda*. To this group, there had been some sort of generational shift, they have acculturated and assimilated and some of them have become land owners and sellers in Lagos. For example, the first Imam of the Lagos Central Mosque is said to be of Hausa origin and his lineage has continued to be part of the houses that produce Imam of the mosque till date (Lagos Central Mosque). Though, this article focuses majorly on the Hausa migrants, some attention shall also be devoted to the settlers at least to aid our analysis and discussions.

Hausa Settlements in Lagos: Origin and Pattern

A number of historical records have substantiated the fact that several years before the advent of colonial rule and amalgamation of Nigeria, various component regions of what later coalesced into Nigeria had interacted on various levels (Lagos Horizon Newspaper, August 1989). Falola and Heaton (2008:61-84) established the fact that these interactions were, however, largely dictated by trade and commerce. To this end, the migration of the Hausa people into Lagos State could also be traced to the pre-colonial era. Cohen (1969) supported this view by emphasising that a significant amount of Hausa people had migrated into Yorubaland and even as far as Lagos prior to colonial rule. For example during the slave trade epoch, Lagos served as a viable centre for slave trading and many Hausa people were transited from Lagos to destinations in the Europe and Americas. In fact, at the inception of what later became Nigerian Police, (which was first initiated in the colony of Lagos) was the conscription of some runaway Hausa slaves in 1861 into what was then known as the Lagos Constabulary (Nigerian Army). In fact, Mahdi Adamu (1976) contended

that both Kings Adele and Kosoko of the pre-colonial Lagos used Hausa and Nupe slaves as the most important source of their military.

However, it suffices to add that colonialism added impetus to the inflow of Hausa migrants in particular, and generally other ethnic groups in Nigeria into Lagos and colony districts. Arising from colonial policies such as the introduction of taxes, construction of roads and railways, the migration of Hausa people into Lagos was increased. In the first instance, taxes were not only made mandatory, they were to be paid in the newly introduced coin currencies. The search for a paid job that could guarantee the payment of these taxes led to the development of migrant wage labour (Fasoto, 2014:37-52). Apart from the fact that these taxes were used to finance colonial administration; they were also mechanisms to lure peasants to produce cash crops to enhance the export of the local agricultural produce to Europe. Many Hausa migrants began to move to different parts of the country, including Lagos and environs, where they could exchange their produce and livestock for cash in order to fulfil their financial obligation towards the colonial government.

Construction of roads and railways was another factor that provided impetus to migration during the colonial era, particularly with reference to Hausa people's migration into Lagos and the colony districts. The Ibadan-Kano railway line which was completed in 1912 assisted to galvanise the movement of Hausa migrants towards Yorubaland (Gatawa, 2015:111-126). The line provided increased opportunities for the movement of goods, services, and migrants between the northern and southern parts of Nigeria. While produce such as groundnuts, grains, potash, and livestock were transported from the North, kola-nuts and European products were taken to the North in exchange. The chain of exchange was handled by both the Hausa and Yoruba migrant traders. The emphasis here is that the construction of railways and roads enhanced the commercial interactions between the North and the South thereby increasing the presence of Hausa migrants in Lagos and colony districts of Lagos during the colonial period.

Apart from the foregoing factors, another factor that has influenced

the continuous migration of the Hausa population into Lagos is the seasonal migration. Some Hausa people are seasonal migrant traders and labourers that venture into Lagos during the dry season when farming activities become tedious and less lucrative. Many of these seasonal migrants may eventually decide to settle in Lagos as traders of variety of wares. In summary, Hausa migrants have established themselves, either on temporary or permanent basis, into communities in virtually all parts of Lagos State. Generally, these communities were usually and initially called *sabo* meaning “a point of settlement for migrants,” a smaller community is called *sago* which literally translates to “a smaller shop” or “provisional store” in Hausa language. Notwithstanding, their presence in one area of Lagos seems to be earlier, more organised, and populous than the other.

Among the parts of Lagos which has witnessed the formation of Hausa migrant settlement is Orile-Agege. This community is said to have been established on a farmland which originally belonged to the Awori. Hausa migrants’ settlement in Orile-Agege started as a trading post where kola-nuts and cattle were exchanged between the Hausa migrants and their Yoruba hosts. Tijani (2008:173-180) opined that by begin of the twentieth century, the Hausa traders had begun to form residents in this area by constructing trading camps. This is in line with Cohen (1969) position that inter-groups relations between the Hausa and Yoruba became cordial in the twilight of the nineteenth century and that lands were allotted to the Hausa migrants by their hosts. Apart from trading, these Hausa migrants also began some farming activities on the allotted lands. Today, Agege area of Lagos has a good number of generations of Hausa population. In fact the physical appearance of the area demonstrates a sort of prolonged Hausa-Yoruba socio-cultural assimilation.

The historical foundation of the area which later became the seat of administration of Lagos State today could be traced to Hausa migration and settlement. The area which is currently located in the north-eastern part of the State’s capital is reported to have been established in the 1930s by a group of Hausa migrants led by Abdullahi Usman from Kano (Human Rights Watch, 2003). However, what this account failed to provide is

whether the group was the first people to occupy the area or whether the land they occupied was allotted to them by the earlier settlers. However, another tradition suggests that the area was first occupied by a group of Hausa refugees who requested for shelter from the early settlers (Lartey, 2005). The refugees were said to have accosted one Akiola who was a chieftain at Oke-Isheri Olofin for accommodation within his territory. Though he turned down the refugees' request, Akiola prevailed on his neighbours within the area to accommodate the refugees. Before long, the population of these migrants began to snowball into a community and was called Abule Tapa and later-on Alausa. Another source traced the historical origin of the Hausa settlement in the area to trade and commerce (Lagos Horizon Newspaper). It opined that the area emanated and became known as Alausa arising from the initial exchange of horses between the Hausas and their Yoruba hosts. Later the migrants were provided a space at the outskirts of the town and a leader known as *Seriki* was appointed to adjudicate on less serious matters among the Hausa migrants. However, the area was popularized majorly because many traders were coming to hire the Hausas as porters for their luggage.

Apart from Agege and Alausa above, another area which had emerged as a Hausa settlement in Lagos is Olodi-Apapa. This area is said to have been inhabited by a good number of Hausa population since the early twentieth century (Gatawa, 2013). Till date, Olodi-Apapa is still attractive to many persons of Hausa descent either as migrants or settlers. The Hausa community in the area started as a gathering where the Hausas engaged in trade and craftsmanship. Later, it emerged into a community where the presence of Hausa culture is conspicuously noticed, the Hausas had erected many large houses in this area. Typical of Hausa settlements in Lagos, the area inaugurated the institution of Sarki Hausawa (Leader of the Hausa elements). Beside the settlers, Hausa migrant workers constantly visit Olodi-Apapa. This group would stay in the area for a short period engaging in trade and menial jobs before returning to *Arewa* (Gatawa, 2013). In another vein, the origin of settlement in the Oshodi area of Lagos is credited to one Oshodi Tapa who was a Nupe man from

Bida. Oshodi Tapa is reported to have brought Ahmad Azare (a Hausa Muslim cleric from the North) to pray for the success of the reign of Oba Adele Ajosu during the late 18th century. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the settlements of the Hausa people increased in various parts of the state such as Alaba Rago, Okokomaiko; Obalende, Sabo Oyingbo; Sabo Ikorodu; Mile 12; Idi-Araba; Ojota and many others. While some of these Hausa people settled for prolonged period of time, others only engage in temporary economic and commercial activities and intermittently return to *Arewa* to meet with their families.

Hausa Migrants and Socioeconomic Activities in Postcolonial Lagos

The making of an economically viable Lagos State is a combination of different factors. It was also influenced by the contributions from various ethnic groups that constitute what is now Nigeria. Though, there is no doubt that the autochthonous and indigenous population provided the lead and accommodated people from different parts of the country *ab initio*, there is no gainsaying the fact that these strangers (other ethnic and subethnic groups) contributed significantly to the trajectory of economic development of Lagos as a state. For instance, the contributions from the Igbo ethnic extraction to the development of transportation from Lagos to other parts of the country cannot be underestimated (Salau, 2015). In the same vein, some Ijebu elements are said to have dominated the textile and fabrics trade in some parts of Lagos (Adedipe, 2010:441-446). The Uroboh, Egede, and Igbira people have also served as efficient farm labourers in many parts of Lagos, right from the period of colonial rule. The same situation is applicable to the Hausa migrants with respect to socio-economic development of Lagos State. In many sectors of the economy of Lagos, the Hausa migrant labourers are active participants, especially since Independence.

Trade and commerce is one of the major sectors of the Lagos State economy where a sizeable number of Hausa migrants are involved. To this extent, Hausa migrants are huge participants in virtually all the markets in Lagos State. The Mile 12 market which is reputed as one of the largest

foodstuff and grocery markets in West Africa is dominated by the Hausa migrants (Solaja, Atolagbe, & Soyewo, 2013). Many people from all over Lagos State and neighbouring States patronise this market on daily basis. The market which was moved from Iddo to its present location in 1976 houses surplus agricultural products from the North such as pepper, tomato, yam, onion, potato, orange, vegetable, rice, beans, corn, fruits, poultry products, palm oil, groundnut oil, and the like. The market is an important source of revenue for the Kosofe Local Government Council of Lagos State Government. Also, it is a viable source of employment for numerous “Lagosians” who derive their livelihood directly or indirectly from the daily commercial activities within and outside the market. In addition, the agricultural produce that is regularly brought to the market contributes to shoring up food security within Lagos State. The business of bringing these produce, wholesaling, and retailing them is largely handled by the Hausa migrants. The activity of off-loading baskets and bags of the agricultural produce from the big trailers coming from the North are also largely handled by the Hausa migrant labours. Some of the Hausa migrants are porters who help buyers to carry their loads to the parks. Nowadays, many of these Hausa migrants are now seen on the Lagos-Ikorodu expressway between Mile 12 and Owode Onirin hawking foodstuffs and produces inside the perennial traffics. In fact, the large presence of the Hausa migrants performing one activities or the other within the market has influenced the settlement of big Hausa communities within the area. Apart from the Mile 12 Market, the Hausa migrants also engage in similar commercial activities in the Alaba Rago Market in the Ojo Local Government Area, Sabo Market in Ikorodu, and many other markets across Lagos State. Nowadays, there is hardly a market in Lagos State that Hausa migrants are not performing one commercial activity or the other.

Street hawking and trading is another aspect of commercial activities that the Hausa migrants engaged in different parts of Lagos State. Varieties of wares such as clothes, clothing materials, leather materials (shoe, purse, belt, horsewhip etc.), wrist watch, agricultural produce, bedding materials, carpets and rugs, provisions, and many others are hawked on

the streets of Lagos State by the Hausa migrants. The hawking activities are not restricted to the urban areas alone, many of these migrants are found in the remotest areas of Lagos State trading one product or the other. Related to street hawking and trading are the numerous small shops that are established by the Hausa migrants in the different parts of Lagos. In every community they found themselves, the Hausa migrants usually establish small counter where provisions are sold. Before long, this counter may have turned to kiosk and could from there become a big retail shop. Selling of livestock such as goat, sheep, ram, and cow is also another major economic activity of the Hausa migrants in Lagos State. They engage in the business of transporting these animals from the North where they are reared in multitude to Lagos State especially during the *Ileya* festival. "Lagosians" also buy these animals during naming, burial, housewarming, wedding, *iwuye* and other ceremonies. In addition, some of the Hausa migrants are engaged by prominent persons to rear their cattle for them and from this *fura de nono* (raw animal milk) are extracted and sold by the female Hausa migrants. During the 2000s, many Hausa migrants usually push their wheel barrows to trade tubers of yam from the Mile 12 market to various parts of Ikorodu Local Government Area. Furthermore, many Hausa migrants engage in exchange businesses such as those in clothes, gold, and money. The business of exchanging used clothes for household materials such as cooking utensils, big kettles and cooler is generally called *paro* among the Yoruba people, is majorly handled by the Hausa migrants. In addition, the Hausa migrants used to dominate *bureau de change* business of buying and selling foreign currencies in different parts of Lagos State. They also buy and sell gold from place to place.

Artisanship and menial jobs are another form of economic activities that are carried out by the Hausa migrants in various parts of Lagos State. Many of them serve as shoe repairers, tailors, iron benders, umbrella repairers, basket weavers, rope makers, and so on. Though many have questioned the quality of work performed by these people and have regarded them as quack in the business, many of them are seen on the streets of Lagos on daily basis hunting for patronage. Compare to their

competitors in this business, their services are generally assumed to be cheaper. Apart from artisanship, there are numerous menial jobs that the Hausa migrants are engaged in Lagos State. In fact, the hardy and labour intensive jobs are usually reserved for the Hausa migrant labours. For instance, many of the Hausa migrants are used as farm workers to clear the land for farming, till the land for cultivation, harvest farm produce, and even to transport the produce to areas where vehicles would come and take them. Also, many Hausa migrants are used in the construction of buildings in Lagos State to clear the bush for foundation digging and serve as labourers for bricklayers, electricians, plumbers and others. They are also engaged whenever there is the need to collapse dilapidated buildings across Lagos State; in fact, it seems that these sets of work are reserved for them. In addition, sizeable numbers of Hausa migrant labourers are used in the construction of roads and other infrastructural facilities in Lagos State. Here again, the general opinion is that services rendered by these migrants are comparatively cheaper. Related to this is the involvement of many Hausa migrants in the supply of water to homes, restaurants, offices, and construction sites in different parts of Lagos State. The Hausa migrants that engage in this business were initially called *mai sonda or mai ruwa*, because they use gallons and wooden poles to fetch water to supply to numerous Lagos residents. Nowadays, many of the *mai sondas* now use trucks which have the capacity to carry about ten gallons to fetch and supply water to different homes. The prices of their water supply varies from places to places and is usually determine by the general economic situations within the country particularly the fluctuations in the pump price of the premium motor spirit (PMS) and at times due to prolong outage of electricity. In virtually all bus stops in Lagos State, Hausa migrants render porter services to people by assisting commuters to carry their luggage to destinations. These sets of Hausa migrants are called *Kaiya*. In another vein, many of the Hausa migrants perform laundry services to many people in Lagos State, especially the elites. Particularly, the Hausa migrants are experts in laundry of caps, guinea brocades, and *agbada*.

Security and transportation sectors of the Lagos State economy have also witnessed the participation of the Hausa migrants during the post-colonial period. Apart from the fact that the Hausa migrants constituted the root of what later became the Nigerian Police and Nigerian Army, their role in the security architecture of Lagos State during the post-colonial period cannot be underestimated. Precisely, many Hausa migrants are engaged as private security guard (popularly called *mai guard*) in many residences. The elites and well-to-do in the societies, particularly in areas like Ikoyi, Victoria Island, and Lekki, usually engaged the Hausa migrants to man their gates and also serve as night guards. Public opinion seems to suggest that the reasons why these people are preferably engaged in this regard are due to their trustworthiness and the belief in the efficacy of their talisman. In most cases, once a Hausa migrant is engaged in this kind of service he would permit some of his tribesmen to stay with him and may even establish a kiosk for provisions, confectioneries, and small wares. Coupled with this is the fact that many Hausa migrants are posted to different parts of Lagos State for official duties in the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Police and other Para-military forces. A number of them had assumed the post of Commissioner of Police in Lagos State while Major Gen. Buba Marwa was the military administrator (the Chief Security Officer) of Lagos State between 1996 and 1999.

The participation of the Hausa migrants in the transportation sector was initially minimal, but as the tempo increased owing to the expanded commercial inter-actions between the North and the South. Many of the trailers that transport livestock and agricultural produce from the North to Lagos State are not only owned by these Hausa migrants, but also driven by them. Also because of the position of Lagos State as the major sea port in Nigeria, large volumes of petroleum products are transported from the depots of the major oil companies from Lagos State to other parts of the country. The trucks handling those of the North are usually driven by the Hausa migrants. In addition, many of the Dangote trailers which are used to transport cement and other products across Lagos State are largely driven by the Hausa migrants. One of the major changes in the public

transport sector of Lagos State at the close of the twentieth century was the conversion of motorcycles into a popular means of transportation. Prominent among the major factors that warranted this is the consistent heavy traffics on Lagos roads owing to continuous increase of vehicles on the roads cum construction, re-construction, and rehabilitation of roads. The congestion that arises from this situation usually prompted commuters to always want to easily navigate themselves to their destinations using the motorcycles, popularly called *Okada*. Secondly, the continuous development of new sites which are warranted by rising cost of accommodation and scarcity of good accommodation has turned the tide of rural-urban migration and led to the emergence of suburban and peri-urban areas in Lagos State. Many of these new sites, due to lack of adequate town planning are lacking in motor-able roads constraining dwellers to the use of *Okada* as means of transportation.

The participation of the Hausa migrants in the *Okada* public transport was unnoticeable initially, but the trend has shown that the Hausa migrants are at the frontline of this business in the last decade. This upsurge in the participation of the Hausa migrants could directly be linked to the insurgency and banditry ravaging most part of the North. The spate of insecurity in northern Nigeria in the last two decades has frustrated many Hausa to move to Lagos State for safe haven. The insecurity has also caused disruption in the economic sustenance of many northerners as many of them could not carry out their farming activities successfully. Consequently, many of them began to move southward, particularly Lagos, in search of greener pasture. The continuous population upsurge in the North particularly with reference to the *al-majiri* syndrome is also a factor in the trooping of Hausa migrants to Lagos State. In essence, many of these migrants move down to Lagos to engage in the *Okada* public transport business. In fact, many of the Hausa migrants and their motorcycles are usually loaded in trailers and dumped in different parts of Lagos State. Though some of them had mastered the act of riding the motorcycles from home, the fact that it is quicker and easier to learn the act of driving them gave room for many of the Hausa migrants to get engaged in this

business. The Hausa migrants are also popular with the use of carts and wheel barrows to transport goods and other materials from one place to the other across Lagos State. They are seen at major bus-stops struggling to engage commuters to carry loads to destinations for different prices. Some use the carts to fetch and sell water to “Lagosians.”

Another aspect of the socio-economic trajectories of Lagos State that the Hausa migrants have participated significantly is the health sector. The use of herbal concoctions as remedy for health challenges is a common phenomenon among different African ethnic groups. Though the Yoruba are equally adept in the use of herbal medicinal practices, the Hausa migrants also make inroads into the provision of herbal remedy for the residents of Lagos State. There are Hausa migrant herbal experts who engage in dealing with ailments relating to the oesophagus (locally called *belu-belu*), some are experts in the drawling of blood from the body (i.e. cupping, locally called *gego* among Yoruba people), while others are involved in bone settings in different parts of Lagos State. These people use herbal and traditional medicines to attend to some of these health challenges. Though there are testimonies about successful operations, some people have criticised the practice base on methods and hygiene. Apart from that, many Hausa migrants hawk different kinds of herbal medicines for the cure of various ailments such as *jedi-jedi* (pile), malaria, and blood pressure amongst others. In addition, some of them are known for trading herbs that provide “man power” called *burutanshi* in Hausa language. The general criticisms of lack of precise prescription of dose to individuals, absence of pre-treatment test, and lack of necessary hygiene that are levelled against traditional medicinal practices are also levelled against the Hausa migrant medicines.

Another aspect of the health sector of Lagos State where the Hausa migrants have made inroad enormously is the environmental sanitation. In this regard, many Hausa migrants are found in different parts of Lagos State using wheel barrows and carts to collect refuse from homes, shops, offices, and restaurants to dump sites for different charges based on the quantity of refuse. With the introduction of the Lagos State Waste

Management Authority (LAWMA) and the government embargo on street/individual collections of refuse, many of the Hausa migrants are engaged by the PSP Operators in helping to pack the refuses into the refuse trucks. Related to this is the fact that many of the Hausa migrants usually engage in scavenging waste materials such as iron and plastics. The scavenging Hausa migrants are usually called *bola* by the local people and they are found of trekking several miles searching for these materials. Sometimes, the scavengers buy the wastes from their owners. Many of Lagos homes use the pit system (locally called *shalanga*) for disposing their faecal wastes and the Hausa migrants are usually engage in digging the pits. In essence, many of the jobs that the indigenous and other tribal elements in Lagos State would perceive as “dirty” jobs are easily done by the Hausa migrants. At their *sagos* and *sabos*, the Hausa migrants also offer barbing, manicure, pedicure services to some men by helping them to shave their heads and removing their finger and toe nails. Some of them even render these services by trekking from one place to the other. Those who engage in this trade are called *wanzamai*, a Hausa appellation for barber. Some commentators have condemned patronising these Hausa service providers on the basis that their tools are not adequately sterilized. One of the dynamics of the active participation of the Hausa migrants in the socio-economic activities of Lagos is that many of commercial and trading activities that are strictly confine to the female folks are performed by the male Hausa migrants.

Hausa Migrants and Socio-economic Problems in Lagos State

That the socio-economic transformations witnessed in Lagos State since the post-colonial period has been attended with series of challenges remain incontrovertible. Many factors have contributed to this situation and the continuous influx of people of diverse social and economic backgrounds into the State is a contributory factor. Like other ethnic and sub-ethnic groups domiciling in Lagos State, the presence of Hausa migrants has its challenges. Ethno-religious conflicts have been identified as one of the major problems associated with the presence of Hausa migrants in

Lagos State. There were occasions when the socio-economic interactions between the Hausa migrants and the host communities and even with some Igbo elements become sour owing to controversies that have economic, ethnic and religious colourations. For instance in November 1999, violence crises ensued within the Mile 12 Market and its environs between the Hausa migrants and their Yoruba host (Olubomehin, 2012). The root cause of the crisis was traced to the rivalry between the Hausa migrants and the Yoruba elements over leadership and control in the Mile 12 Market. While the Hausa migrants believed that they should be saddled with the leadership of the market because of their large population and prolonged stay within the market, the Yoruba elements believed that they were the autochthonous settlers of the area and that the market is located in Yoruba land and therefore they must maintain dominance over the market. In fact, the Hausa migrants claimed that they were the first set of people to move to the market when the administration of Gen. Muritala Muhammad ordered the relocation of the market from Iddo in 1976. The Yoruba traders were initially sceptical about the prospect of the new site and were therefore reluctant to relocate until they were persuaded (Lartey, 2005). During the violence clashes that erupted due to these controversies, several lives were lost, properties were destroyed and commercial activities were paralysed. The Odua People's Congress (OPC) which prime itself as the liberator of the Yoruba race during this epoch coordinated the Yoruba offences in the course of the clashes.

Apart from the Mile 12 imbroglio, several other ethno-religious crises associated with the Hausa migrants occurred in the post-colonial Lagos State. For instance in September 2016, a violent crisis erupted between the Hausa scraps collectors and their fellow Fulani cattle breeders in the Agege area of Lagos State (Folarin, 2016). The remote cause of the hullabaloo was the demolition of the shanties and shops constructed by the Hausa scraps collectors around the railway line by the Nigeria Railway Corporation. The scraps collectors lodged their grievances over the issue to the Seriki Fulani, the head of Hausa community within the area hoping that he would assist them to lobby the government to stop the demolition

but the leader was of the opinion that they comply with the position of the government. The Hausa scraps collectors felt the Seriki Fulani was in support of extermination of the Hausa community in the area and began to nurse grudges against the Fulani in the area. Matters came to its head when a Fulani man was reported to have physically assaulted a Hausa lady who he refused to pay for the food she initially served him. The harassment erupted into attacks and reprisal attacks from the two tribes during the middle of the night leading to killing of three Hausa migrants and sustenance of injuries by several Fulani men. In addition, the entire area was tension soaked for several days and business activities were paralysed within the area.

In another vein, about 15 shops were burnt into ashes on Thursday, 8 October 2020 as violence crisis erupted between some Hausa and Yoruba youths in Igbo-Olomu area of the Ikorodu West Local Council Development Area of Lagos State (Osunfemi, 2020). The crisis occurred as a result of controversies over minor issue relating to payment for okada and became escalated into an ethnic clash but for the immediate intervention of the leaders of the Yoruba and Hausa communities and the Nigerian Police. Apart from the injuries sustained by few people, the area was thrown into trepidation as the pandemonium ensued leading to suspension of socio-economic activities. In April 2021, some Okada riders, majorly Hausa migrants, clashed with the members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) around the Iyana-Iba area of the Ojo Local Government Area of Lagos State (Kwenta, 2021). The remote cause of the clash was the consistent extortion of the Okada riders by the Agbero (member of the NURTW) which was at its peak. The immediate cause of the pandemonium was the alleged beating to death of a Hausa migrant Okada rider by the Agbero. During the clashes, gun bullets were shot, stones were pebbled, the Iyana-Iba section of the Badagry international expressway was blocked from the passage of vehicles, and the commercial activities within the axis were paralysed.

On 18 August 2019, the Oke-Odo market which is located along the Lagos-Abeokuta expressway was agog with ethnic violence clashes between

some Yoruba youths and Hausa migrants (Okojie & Oguntade, 2019). The root cause of the crisis was the allegation from a Yoruba cultist group (popularly called the Awawa Boys) against the Hausa migrant scavengers of stockpiling arms in their huts. Therefore, around 10pm on 18 August 2019, the Awawa Boys (who were notorious for creating disturbances in the Agege area of Lagos) decided to invade the huts of the Hausa scavengers who immediately prevented their unauthorised invasion. This erupted into violence between the two groups and the Hausa did not hesitate to quickly invite their tribesmen from the Oke-Odo market to join the fight. Before long, the imbroglio was taken to the market the following morning leading to burning of wares and kiosks. Though there were no casualties in terms of deaths, the pandemonium left many people injured and caused traffic congestion in Iyana-Ipaja, and Abule-Egba. In addition, a violence clash which resulted into loss of life and destruction of property erupted between Yoruba and some Hausa migrants in Ikorodu township of Lagos State on 2 March 2016. Also on 3 March 2016, the Orile area of Lagos State witnessed violent clashes between Yoruba and some Hausa-Fulani youths. In the crisis that ensued, many persons (Hausa and Yoruba alike) and officers of the security forces were killed while homes, chattel, property, and places of worship were burnt down.

Apart from the ethno-religious crises however, another area where the presence of the Hausa migrants have contributed to the socio-economic problems confronting Lagos is in the area of the growing beggar and squalor communities. Unlike other mega cities across the globe, the number of beggars on Lagos streets has increased to quite an alarming and embarrassing rate. The fact that the Hausa migrants constitute a huge amount of this number cannot be controverted. There is hardly a street in Lagos State where a Hausa migrant beggar would parade begging for alms. In every towns and villages in Lagos State are portions where a cluster of Hausa migrant beggars resume on daily basis to beg for alms. Many of them with minor physical paralyses seized the opportunity to begin to beg for alms. A number of factors had been identified as promoting the continuous expansion of the Hausa migrant beggars. There is a school

of thought that asserts that these beggars are being sponsored by some privileged Hausa elites who sponsor their transportation to Lagos State and collect daily returns from them. Another school of thought opines that the proliferation of the Hausa migrant beggars in Lagos State is due to fact that they enjoy patronage from quite a sizeable number of “Lagosians.” This patronage is influenced by the belief by many of this people in the efficacy of alms giving towards making provisions for their late parents and as an efficient means towards the actualisation of their worldly desires. Apart from money that is given in alms, packages of food and used clothing materials are distributed to the Hausa migrant beggars. These are done on daily basis but especially on Thursdays and weekends and are enough incentive for the beggars to remain on the street. It is on these streets that the female beggars carry their pregnant and rear their children. In fact, some of their children are also initiated into the begging business right from childhood and are converted into street urchins.

A third school of thought acclaims that the protection given to the Hausa street beggars by the “power-that-be” in Nigeria make it extremely impossible for all efforts of the Lagos State Government to eradicate them on the streets were abortive. This is coupled with the facts that there is lack of adequate political will on the part of the Lagos State Government. Despite the construction of rehabilitation centres where these beggars could be kept and be given adequate attention and other policies introduced by the government, they have continued to litter various parts of Lagos State. Their clusters such as Ikorodu round-about, Okokomaiko section of the Badagry expressway, Iyana-Iba section of the Badagry expressway, Kano street in Lagos, Iya-Ipaja axis, and many other are usually untidy and close to the refuse dumps. Staying along the streets and highroads is also very risky as there could be accident at any time. In another vein, the contribution of the Hausa migrants to the development of ghettos and squalors in various parts of Lagos State is very huge. Unlike other ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Lagos State, many Hausa migrants are not accustomed to renting apartment for their shelters. Rather, most of them prefer sleeping inside nearby mosques, squatting

in the compound of a rich man, and some even sleep on the pedestrian bridges. Some construct shanties and huts along expressways while many others (particularly the scavengers) sleep very close to refuse dumps. A good example of these scenarios is what is obtainable around Alaba Rago section of the Badagry express way where the shanties are constructed on the road; they sleep, bath, toilet and do all sorts in the place.

A recent study conducted by the Lagos State Command of the Nigerian Police has revealed that Okada riders generally are a major part of the security threat to the State. The Hausa migrant Okada riders which constitute the major proportion of the Okada riders are also identified as part of the security threat in Lagos State. Many non-Nigerian riders have infiltrated the ranks of the Hausa migrant Okada riders and some of them are fully armed with weapons and charms which are used to terrorise Lagosians. These elements are used to carrying out nefarious activities such as kidnapping, man stealing, shops robbery, and snatching of phones and other items among others. Apart from this, the rate at which these non-professional riders plunged into accidents is quite alarming leading to loss of many lives and sustaining of injuries.

Conclusion

With their own distinctive settlement and economic patterns, the Hausa communities in Lagos State have contributed to the socio-economic transformations in Lagos State. Their activities in the areas of trade and commerce, particularly with reference to agricultural produce and manual labour cannot be underestimated. On the other hand, they also constitute some form of social problems, particularly in the areas of ethnic crisis and street-begging. Thus, this study espoused that Lagos as a converging point of different cultures and traditions exhibit the characteristics of a multi-ethnic society with its attendant socio-economic development and challenges. Differences in the source of migrations, ethnic identity, cultures and traditions of groups making up the component parts give rise to several skirmishes of violent behaviours. The spate of intrusion of the Hausa migrants into Lagos State is quite alarming and in order to check

their excesses in terms of creating nuisance and security, the need to begin to have a proper documentation of them cannot be overemphasised.

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Peace Building in Africa: Rolling Back Indigenous Non-Coercive African Traditional Model of Conflict Resolution in the Post-2017 Era

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Abstract

One of the greatest challenges facing African countries is the continuous escalation of violent conflicts. The paramilitary and military have been used in rather coercive manners to suspend several violent conflicts in different parts of the continent, but these have not in any way suppressed the conflicts. What this failure suggests is the total embrace of western institutions of conflict-prevention and resolution, to the detriment of traditional African conflict-resolution models. This work holds strongly that the non-participatory roles of traditional rulers in present-day governance as compared to their roles in managing and resolving conflict in precolonial times is, to some reasonable extent, accountable for the escalation of conflicts on the continent. This backdrop presents a compelling need to develop new architecture for continentwide peace-building. To achieve this, we examine traditional alternative dispute-resolution models, juxtapose these models with western models, and identify specific areas in which the application of traditional institutions of governance would have significant transformative impact on conflict prevention and resolution. In the final analysis, the work suggests how to integrate traditional authorities and traditional democratic political values into the modern governance structure in a dynamic manner to promote peace in Africa.

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Introduction

At the moment six African countries are experiencing violent conflicts in their countries, while some others are at the risk of experiencing similar crises. These countries include Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and Nigeria. Crises in these countries have made millions of people lost their life and properties and have become refugees in their countries (Six of the world's most neglected crises are in Africa (World Economic Summit, 2018). These African conflicts have deep-rooted causes, such as the legacy of colonialism which includes extractive patterns of economic development and lack of coincidence between nation and state; ethnic tensions and the suppression of minorities; the quality of governance; the way law and order are maintained; the equity of the economic and social systems; and issues such as ethnic discrimination chronic poverty and underdevelopment, etc. (Malan, 2005).

It is therefore apparent that one of the major issues which are of utmost importance in the aforementioned Africa countries is how to effectively and efficiently address these crises and how to avert occurrence of such crises in other countries on the continent. This as a resultant of the fact that extant literature is suggestive of the view that the post-colonial State emulation of western institutions of governance, which are often at odds with traditional African cultural values and the region's contemporary socio-economic realities have not achieve peace and stability which is one of the major reasons for the existence of the state (ECA, 2007).

Within the backdrop of the above position, the main concern of this paper is how to engage African traditional political institutions in the process of conflicts resolution and prevention, so that violence does not threaten the continued existence of the African continent (Tasie, 2005). Introducing African traditional political institutions into the matrix of conflicts prevention and resolution becomes very relevant considering the increase of violent conflicts in different countries on the continent and as stated earlier, occasional state failure in the maintenance of peace and order. It is a common knowledge that these indigenous African

political institutions and practices have not been fully recognised and have been sidelined with regard to political arrangements and conflict resolution in most of the modern African states (Ayittey, 1992; Chazan *et al.*, 1999; Tuso, 2000; Zartman, 2000). Yet some of the indigenous socio-political institutions as we shall see in subsequent sections of this work, can still play, both at the local and national level, key roles in governance and conflict resolution (Osamba, 2011)

Thus, the paper focuses on how to integrate formal western political institutions with the African traditional political institutions, so that they can complement each other in violent conflicts prevention and management. Harmonizing the two sets of institutions, in turn, requires reform of both in ways that would make them democratic and amenable to coherent and effective system of governance (ECA, 2007). Therefore, in order to adequately address thematic issue under discourse, I shall take an overview of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial African traditional political institutions, establish a theoretical framework for understanding the relevance of African traditional political institutions in conflict prevention and management, comprehensive assessment of how African traditional political institutions can contribute to the prevention and management of conflicts, an examination of how African traditional political institutions can co-exist with formal western institutions of governance especially for the purpose of conflict prevention and management.

Prevention and Management of Conflicts in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Immediate Post-Colonial Africa

Prior to colonisation, there were in existence in most African societies local administrative machineries founded upon traditional institutions. These institutions of traditional rulers were virtually the only institutions of governance which played critical roles such as custodians of customary law and communal assets, especially land and resources; guardians and symbols of cultural values and religious practices; dispensing justice, enforcing contracts and also resolving conflicts (Olaniran & Arigu, 2013).

During this pre-colonial period in Africa the art of resolving conflict is borne out of a belief that conflict which is inevitable could and should not be left alone, it therefore needs to be put under control by interacting with relevant parties to develop common principles and practices that would return cordial relationship against violence. During conflicts, traditional rulers in most of these African societies therefore undoubtedly played significant roles in managing these conflicts informally and arranging peace-making meetings when matters get out of hand. These governance institutions and structures were controlled by certain unwritten laws which formed part of the general social structure, and, its machinery of enforcing governance was well organized to manage affairs, administered justice and resolve tension in the society.

In traditional African societies, the law enforcement agents, traditional police and courts were responsible for ensuring compliance with the laws of the land. Disputants often take their cases to elders and neighbourhood mediators who can be depended upon to resolve conflicts with dispatch in local language, using familiar standard of behaviour (Ajayi, 2014). The methods of performing conflict resolution in the traditional African societies are as follows: mediation, adjudication, reconciliation, arbitration and negotiation. According to Ajayi Theresa (2014), these methods were effective in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, especially the intra-tribal conflicts in traditional African Society. We shall in the next paragraph at the risk of repetition briefly explain these methods for a better understanding of the conflict resolution process in African traditional societies.

Mediation involves non-coercive intervention of the mediators, called third party either to reduce or in some cases go beyond that and bring conflict to peaceful settlement. Mediators usually endeavoured that peace and harmony reigned supreme in the society at whatever level of mediation (Isurmona, 2005). As stated under the preceding section mediators are sought from within the communities or societies of the parties concerned. Their roles depend on traditions, circumstances and personalities, accordingly. These roles includes, pressurizing, making

recommendations giving assessments, conveying suggestions on behalf of the parties, emphasizing relevant norms and rules, envisaging the situation if agreement is not reached, or repeating of the agreement already attained (Bright-Brock, 2001). In traditional African society, adjudication involves bringing all disputants in the conflict to a meeting usually in the chambers or compounds of family heads, quarter heads and palace court as the case maybe (Olaoba, 2005). Reconciliation was the most significant aspect of conflict resolution. After the disputants have been persuaded to end the dispute, peace was restored. This restoration of peace and harmony was always anchored on the principle of give a little and get.

The reconciliation function is practiced by an authority figure that mediates between conflicting parties but is empowered to make binding judgments. The purpose is not to render a judgment in law but to reconcile the conflicting parties and its norms (William, 2000). Negotiation involved harmonizing the interests of the parties concerned in a conflict situation. Thus, even when the conflict involves a member against his or her society, there is an emphasis on recuperation and reinsertion of errant member back into its place in society (Olaoba, 2005). Though these methods were not practised in all pre-colonial African societies, but it remained a standard process for conflict resolution in most societies where traditional institutions and values were more entrenched. More over an understanding of these methods of conflict resolutions in African traditional societies depicts that there were formal processes of conflict prevention and resolution in pre-colonial Africa. Thus, pre-colonial Africa was not a dark continent as suggested by the colonialists and Western scholars.

However, colonialism brought about a role change as the roles and offices of traditional rulers were either usurped by the colonialist or their subjects. This new governance arrangement granted the colonialist easy exploitation and control of their territories (Olaniran & Arigu, 2013) The colonial State either demoted or eliminated African leaders who resisted colonization or rebelled after colonization (Busia, 1968). In the

British colonies traditional leaders who submitted to colonial rule were mostly incorporated into the colonial governance structure of indirect rule, which was designed to provide the colonial State with a viable low-cost administrative structure to maintain order, mobilize labour, enforce production of cash crops, and collect taxes (ECA, 2007).

As intermediaries between the colonial State and local people, chiefs were expected to maintain peace and order within their communities. Incorporation of African traditional institution into the British structure of indirect rule severely weakened both the formal and informal mechanisms of conflict prevention and management of traditional leaders by changing the power relations between chiefs and their communities (Ibid). Thus, though most of the traditional leaders under the indirect rule remained traditional or customary chiefs, their roles and most notably their relationships with their local communities were reshaped by the British colonial power (European Report on Development, 2009). Invariably, the traditional leaders were expected to maintain law and order through coercive rather than peaceful means of conflict resolution. In fact it was during this period that coercion became the most popular approach to securing peace and order in African societies.

It should be noted that the French, the Portuguese, the Germans, and the Belgians (in the Congo) did more harm to African traditional political institutions than what the British did through indirect rule in their colonies. In their respective colonies they exercised a highly centralized type of administration called “direct rule.” This meant that European rule was imposed on the Africans regardless of the existing political relationships among the African people. For instance the French colonies were governed directly from Paris through the governor. The French did use African chiefs but, unlike in the British colonies, these chiefs were appointed by French authorities, in large measure because of their support for French rule. These appointed chiefs did not come from ruling families and, upon appointment, were not posted to their native regions. They did not have any power or authority in the domain they were appointed to oversee. It is therefore an undisputable fact that the French, with few

exceptions, did not attempt to preserve pre-colonial African traditional political institutions in their colonies (Khapoya, 2012). Since these appointed chiefs did not have any power and authority in their domain, the task of maintaining peace were solely done by the French colonial masters through coercive means.

What the foregoing suggests is that colonialism had serious negative effects on the nature and roles of African traditional political institutions. One such impact aside those suggested above was the political centralization of territories having no central government or, where centralization already existed, the foreign powers take-over or domination of pre-colonial central government (Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman 2002). Though, the extent of political control varied from colony to colony, and often within colony from region to region, the fact remains that the colonialism seriously undermined the powers and functions of traditional rulers, especially on how societal peace is achieved through traditional means (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980, Ziltener & Kunzler, 2013).

African traditional political institutions did not in any way fare better during the immediate post-colonial era in Africa. This was due to the fact that, the new political elite, who inherited political power from the colonial masters became self-serving and autocratic, and were unable to tolerate the existence of contending points of power. Thus, some of these political elites in their respective countries banned the existence of traditional institutions and dispossessed chiefs of the bureaucratic positions they held within the indirect rule system of the colonial State. In some extreme cases some of these post-independence African countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and a host of others political elites attempted unsuccessfully to striped chiefs of most of their authority or even abolished chieftaincy altogether (McGovern, 2013). In some other instances, in their efforts to enhance their own legitimacy the new political elites, especially among the second generation of African leaders, attempted, with varying degree of success co-opt traditional leaders in new power arrangements (ECA, 2007).

In the literature various factors contributed to the attempted reduction

of the power, authority and functions of traditional rulers during the immediate post-colonial years in Africa. One of such factors is that some of these countries had large powerful centralized pre-colonial states, which had chiefs that were too powerful to be controlled by post-independence elites and which resulted in the attempt to reduce the power of these traditional leaders by the political class (Acemoglu et al, 2013).

More so, most of the traditional or customary chiefs roles and most notably their relationships with the local communities were reshaped by the colonial power during colonialism which in effect detached them from their values, norms and communities which to some extent made them irrelevant tools for administration during the immediate post-colonial years in Africa (European Report on Development, 2009). Moreover, where there was the most effective indirect rule in British colonies, the political integration of traditional institutions which that of the modern ones was more difficult, and the tension between old and new elites more evident. In contrary, where direct rule was most effective, the political integration has been easier and less obstructed by old elites (Ziltener & Kunzler, 2013). In such countries there were no rivalries for the control of state power between the political and traditional elites since the latter did not have any power during the French colonial era. These reasons clearly underscore Ekeh (1975) position that there was a transfer effect from colonialism to post-colonial politics.

Historical analysis under this section strongly reveals that although customary institutions survived colonialism, their capacities and influence were greatly reduced during that period and in many post-colonial societies, they existed outside the formal structure of governance and had no statutory recognition. The absence of a statutory framework governing customary institutions constrained their reach and effectiveness. They could not compete with statutory institutions which were backed with police powers of the state. They could not be effective outside the confines of the respective communities, and they no longer held the monopoly of power and authority to determine disputes with finality as those who were

not satisfied with their decisions could refer the disputes to the formal systems (Odhiambo, 2012).

Theoretical Framework

Thomas-Kilmann's model of conflict management forms the basis of analysis under this work. This theory shall provide us robust foundation for the explanation of processes involved in peace-building in Africa. Thomas-Kilmann's conflict's mode instrument explains strategic intentions that could be organised around the matrix of two factors (assertiveness and cooperativeness), which jointly produce five conflict management styles (avoidance, accommodation, competition, compromise and collaboration) (Black 1990; Borg 1992; Thomas 1992; Volkema and Bergmann 1995). The contemporary nature and forms of violent conflicts in Africa require a combination of approaches as well as a combination of institutions that can use these approaches under different conflict situation. This is in line with Akinwale's (2010) position that this combination is needed for theoretical and methodological support in the integration of traditional and modern conflict prevention and management strategies. This study is therefore anchored on how to apply the Thomas-Kilman's model for a better understanding of how to prevent and manage Africa's protracted violent conflicts through the combination of traditional and modern Institutions of government.

According to Thomas-Kilmann's model, assertiveness flows from concerns for self-interest, while cooperativeness is driven by concerns for the other party or the relationship (Thomas 1992). This position has opened up the stage for a discourse on the relevance of each of the institutions (traditional and modern institutions) in the prevention and management of violent conflicts in Africa, especially where self-interest of individuals and groups remains paramount. Assertiveness and cooperativeness are relevant in explaining how avoidance and negotiation or settlement can assist in preventing or limiting intra or inter group conflict. In this regard, existing strategies for the prevention and management of Africa's violent conflicts requires assertiveness and cooperativeness which can be better

applied by traditional political institutions than modern institutions considering the former's closeness to the people and the legitimacy derived from norms and values.

Basing analysis in this work on the fact that modern institutions' management of conflicts in Africa is very weak opens the need for searching for alternative approach(es). When conflicts erupt in most societies in Africa the application of coercive instrument of governance have mostly led to human rights violation and in some cases escalation of violence (Ibeanu, 2006). Thus, some societies under conflicts situation in recent time resort to unofficial strategies (vigilante, and communal solidarity). Nigeria is a good example where unofficial strategies of conflict prevention and management are increasingly becoming relevant. These unofficial strategies have assisted in preventing and resolving violent conflicts in some communities in Nigeria, especially in area with entrenched loyalty to African traditional institutions. Thus, contrary to general belief in western paradigms, every African community has capacities for promoting mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence (Lauer 2007). Integrating the traditional and the modern conflict management strategies in Africa would aid the stability and development of many African societies. In light of the foregoing, this study focuses on the possibility of integrating both traditional and modern conflict management strategies for peace-building and development in Africa, especially with the relevance of Thomas-Kilmann's conflict mode instrument as a tool of analysis.

Prevention of Violent Conflicts in Africa: The African Traditional Political Institutions Option

For the purposes of this work, the term *conflict prevention* refers to non-violent (or creative) conflict transformation and encompasses activities designed to defuse tensions and prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence. The work shall look at conflict prevention via the African traditional political institutions in two contexts, *operational prevention*, which involves measures applicable in the face of imminent crisis and *structural prevention* which includes measures to ensure that

crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not re-occur. It should be noted that the emphasis under this section of the work is how to avoid situation where disagreement descends into violence (ECOWAS, 2008).

Thus, traditional political institutions' mechanism for conflict prevention shall be examined within the context of what the United Nations terms UN broad range of actions that address structural risk factors, and prevent the escalation of tension into deadly and destabilizing conflict, in addition to preventing the continuation of conflict or its recurrence. This would encompass the entire timeframe of any conflict cycle and also embraces the concepts of conflict management, conflict resolution, peace-making, peace-building and post conflict recovery (Malan, 2005).

The positions of the paper as we shall see under this section is that current approaches to conflict prevention and resolution which are inherently state-centric in character need to be carefully re-evaluated, since they have failed in essentially preventing violent conflicts on the continent of Africa. Subscribing to Olaniran & Arigu (2013) argument most African countries today have no mechanism for managing and resolving conflicts between groups especially politically instigated conflicts except through the use of military force. It is prudent today for countries to assume that they are likely to have several types of conflict which their judicial systems cannot deal with and that resorting to the military may not be the wisest course of action.

What this position suggests is that violent conflicts would continued to be on the increase except there is a movement from current state-centric approaches to conflict prevention and management to the one that would give prominent roles to African traditional political institutions, especially in conflicts involving local communities and identity struggle (Jackson, 2000). It is important to raise the caveat that my position under this work is not a blanket substitution of the role of the state in conflict prevention and management but rather an examination of how governmental and chieftaincy institutions can forge alliances and complement each other in conflict prevention and management. As Bockstette et al. (2002)

argue modern institutions work better when there are strong traditional institutions to build upon.

The interventionist relevance of African traditional political institutions in conflict prevention and management shall be explained within the context of causes of various conflicts across countries on the continent. This stems from the fact that understanding the causes of violent conflicts gives us a better understanding of how to prevent future occurrence or how to manage existing conflicts.

The first area where the intervention of African traditional political institutions becomes relevant is in the prevention or management of violent conflicts emanating from the process of state-building. As Okafor notes, “coercive approaches to state-building fail because in the contemporary view of human rights, violent, coercive unification and repressive homogenization are morally and socially bankrupt” (2000). This position is premised on the fact that far from leading to long-term peace and stability, military victory in cases of internal resentment against the state, if attained, leads only to a temporary lull in violent conflicts, accompanied by intense resentment and resistance, which are likely to be followed by a new cycle of hostilities. By contrast, conflict resolution mechanisms through traditional institutions mechanism establishes peace and harmony in order which helps in preventing future feuds. This is true based on the fact that in resolving conflict the traditional institutions mechanism narrows the differences between protagonists. Animashaun Olateju (2013) attests to this fact when she argues that adopting local mechanisms for conflict emanating from state building facilitate ownership and have greater resonance in societies than Western conflict management approaches.

Furthermore, the traditional conflict resolution and consensual decision-making mechanisms can enhance state-building by creating possibilities for accommodating the interests of different sub-state entities and the protection of minority interests. Incorporation of traditional values also makes it possible for the adoption of power-sharing arrangements as a strategy of state-building. This strategy was effective in

the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. In addition, the traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms can be applied in order to deal with the growing problem of post-election inter-party conflicts. The coercive approach African States have adopted to suppress political parties often exacerbate the state-building crisis, as political parties often tend to have ethnic or regional affiliations (ECA, 2007)

African traditional political institutions can also be relevant in resolving civil cases involving land disputes, intra-communal clashes, inheritance disputes and marriage disputes. Traditional institutions are important in this respect since it is generally believed that chiefs are well versed in community customs and traditions and are reputed to have some degree of impartiality. A clear example of how traditional political institution can be relevant in resolving civil cases can be seen in Kenya where elders are informally involved in arbitration and reconciliation of disputants. In Kenya there is elders council in various communities who are volunteers and who are not paid for their services (time and effort), apart from a small token to purchase refreshments or meals during hearing of disputes. These councils of elders under the direction of government-appointed chiefs and assistant-chiefs mainly handle civil cases involving land, inheritance, and marital disputes. These councils have no jurisdiction on general criminal cases, which are referred to the government court system (Osamba, 2011).

African countries with highly centralised traditional institutions can set up an independent arbitration council for the prevention and management of resource based, boundary and ethnic conflicts. This council should be made up of first class traditional rulers from across the country. A secretariat and a pool of experts should support such a council. The state and the private sector, especially wealthy nationals of the country, should contribute and provide it with adequate finance. This council should not be just an advisory body as it is presently obtainable in some countries that recognise the existence of traditional councils in their constitutions. Rather, the council should be a body with a mandate to discuss issues that could lead to escalation of violent conflicts across

the country and a guarantee to enforce agreement as an essential method of resolving conflicts.

This council would be relevant in preventing conflicts with the use of the early warning method in conflict prevention. The ability of this early warning method for conflict prevention can be effectively done by the council because traditional rulers who are members of the council are closer to their local people than other formal governmental institutions. The attachment of traditional rulers who are part of the council to their local communities would easily allow the council to have knowledge of existing local challenges that could lead to violence. The coalitions that chiefs in the arbitration council could build among themselves in order to strengthen their own position vis-a-vis the State may also serve to reduce ethnic conflicts. It should be further noted that the moral authority of the council rather than the military force of the state should mostly back its decision. Military force should be used as a very last resort. The existence of this central arbitration council is without prejudice to council of elders that could also mediate in local crisis as suggested in the preceding paragraph. In fact, various communities based council of elders that I have suggested shall maintain channel of communication with the arbitration council and serve as resource pool for the latter.

My analysis so far under this section reveals strongly that traditional political institutions remain an enduring part of African heritage. It plays a critical role as the custodian of culture and traditions. Since traditional rulers are closely linked with the grassroots, and so understand the problems of their people, they remain veritable instrument in the search for peace, order and stability across the continent of Africa. In fact, traditional conflict-resolution mechanism has the potential to be effective beyond the local level, given an enabling political environment. Unlike government-appointed administrators, lower-level chiefs and village leaders live in conditions largely similar to those of their communities. They share common interests and think like their people. As a result, they are better equipped to represent the interests of their communities than are government-appointed or elected officials.

Resolution of Conflicts and the Maintenance of Peace: African Traditional Political Institutions and Modern Political Institutions' Synergy

The coexistence of traditional and modern social systems has a long history. Traditional methods of social control such as communal solidarity, traditional oaths, rewards, vigilantes, informal settlements, checks and balances, decentralisation, effective communication and good governance remain strong and have been informally used successfully for conflict management in many local communities across countries in Africa (Akinwale, 2010). At the risk of repetition I will state that to the extent that African traditional political values and customary laws are essential to the continent's transformation, the role of the authorities who are engaged in the practice and maintenance of those values is indispensable. Chiefs, especially those at the grassroots level, and elders in the decentralized political systems, are leaders in the practice of those values and they form an integral albeit informal part of the governance structures of rural Africa. In fact, traditional institutions had authority and legitimacy that post-colonial African governments are yet to attain. Clearly one of the effective means of capturing the minds of many Africans is to work through their traditional institutions. The British colonialists, unlike our postcolonial leaders understood this reality so well that they co-opted the strongest of these through the system of indirect rule.

As von Trotha (1996) notes, chiefs and village heads under civil chieftaincy constitute a forum where local interests are debated and articulated. Thus, they can constitute a valuable resource in conflict prevention and management as well as in mobilizing rural populations for active engagement, not only in development activities and the distribution of public services, but also in the national political process. For instance, the resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda has revealed that there is a rich body of traditional systems of law and justice that reflect principles of conflict management with both retributive and restorative elements where the objective is to reintegrate the perpetrators into their communities and reconcile them with the victims, through a

process of establishing the truth, confession, reparation, repentance and forgiveness. (Latigo, 2008).

Despite the importance of the African traditional political institutions as have been variously recognised under this work, they have not been adequately recognised by government in most countries in Africa. In some countries where they are given some level of recognition they lack any meaningful autonomy and only exist as appendages of the ruling political elites. I shall give few examples, especially in the Nigerian case where traditional institutions are given some level of recognition by the government to buttress this position. In Borno state, in the North-Eastern part of the country, the Governor of the state threatened that daring to grant audience to opposition political parties, all first class emirs in the state risk losing their seats, as the Governor vowed to sanction all traditional rulers who refuse to support his political party (Vanguard March 7, 2015). Similarly, the Governor of Abia state in South-Eastern part of the country in the year 2015 sacked five traditional rulers perceived to be sympathetic to opposition political parties in the state (The Sun Newspaper, March 20, 2015).

However, since large segments of rural Africans demonstrate allegiance to these traditional political institutions, the State has encountered intense resistance when it attempts to eliminate them or undermine their functioning. Therefore, considering the importance of traditional political institutions, especially in the area of conflict prevention and resolution, as well as the failed attempt of total eradication of this institution in post independent Africa, what becomes relevant therefore is the modalities for granting them adequate autonomy and how to integrate them into the modern system of governance across countries in Africa. The integration that is different from the creation of an upper house (house of chiefs) in parliament with a largely advisory role. I shall give few examples of these houses of chiefs and how they operate in some countries of Africa for a better understanding of what is obtainable in Africa at the moment.

In Namibia Council of Traditional Leaders in is an organ that advises the President, mostly on matters of utilizing communal land. Ghana's

House of Chiefs is also charged with advising any authority under the constitution on matters related to chieftaincy and customary law. Zimbabwe reversed its earlier policy of dismantling chieftaincy and created a Council of Chiefs in 1993. The House of Chiefs was restored in Zambia in 1996. In Lesotho and Malawi, chiefs constitute two-thirds and 30 per cent of the Senate respectively. South Africa's 1996 constitution provides for the creation of provincial and national houses of traditional leaders (Bank and Southall, 1996).

For remaining mostly advisory bodies the creation of these houses of chiefs by these respective countries in Africa could be possibly seen as a design to appease chiefs and to manipulate them into supporting the political leaders. Moreover, it is also irrelevant incorporating only the upper echelons of chiefs as it is done in almost the countries that have houses of chiefs, without integrating the traditional democratic values or the leaders at the grassroots level. This approach according to Economic Commission for Africa publication on the relevance of African institutions of governance (2007) is not very likely to lead to a dynamic harmonization of the fragmented governance structures of African countries. A new and more holistic incorporation of traditional institutions, including lower-level chiefs and headmen and the relevant aspects of customary laws and political values would be more effective.

Botswana, which has maintained an upper house of chiefs since 1965, has taken steps in this direction. It has maintained the traditional courts, with chiefs performing judicial duties. An approach which combines advisory and judiciary roles for traditional authorities and builds on democratic traditional political values and customary laws, as shown with the Botswana's example is likely to be more successful, especially in the area of conflict management (ECA, 2007). There is also a reasonable logic in the Ghanaian's example where there is a legislative and judicial decentralisation programmes "as a framework for integrating aspects of the existing conflict management methods and skills of the national government and the country's ethnic groups (Fred-Mensah, 1999).

Political life below the centre must be legalised and institutionalised to

build on local learning, to achieve insulation from the centre, which would in turn generate greater autonomy for traditional political institutions. With such relative autonomy these local political institutions can manage programmes, hear and settle civil cases, and raise local vigilante groups that protect communities (Wunsch, 2000). The fear has always been that local autonomy could well spawn the leadership and cohesion to challenge the state elite, just as it did during the late colonial era (Mawhood 1993).

This fear is however irrelevant. For instance in Nigeria traditional institutions have developed and flourished, though with little level of autonomy, with modern institutions of government. At the moment in Nigeria there are more “traditional” rulers today than at Independence of the country in 1960. One reason for this is that traditional rulers are often more trusted than local and state government officials during post-conflict situations, which are becoming extremely common. The works of Sklar (e.g. 1993; 1999a; 1999b; 1999/2000; 2003) and in particular his concept of “mixed government,” suggest the dualism and symbiotic relationship between traditional and state-derived institutions that characterises government in Nigeria and many other African countries.

However, it is needful to point out that the integration of the modern and the traditional institutions necessitates that the latter are attuned to the reality of modernization. As Odhiambo (2012) suggests, modernization of traditional institutions is important in order for them to adapt to new or changing environments. But for such adaptation to empower rather than emasculate traditional institutions, its content and pace must be controlled by communities themselves as the principal stakeholders. The role of policy and law as well as any external support has to be the facilitation of the process of adaptation through providing support by way of technical skills, comparative influences and an enabling environment (Odhiambo, 2012). This would involve some Constitutional imperatives critical for providing such an enabling environment.

In this regard, the Constitutions of Ethiopia, Kenya, Botswana and Uganda contain provisions that if properly used could support such adaptation. The Constitutions of these four countries have strong

provisions on decentralization/devolution of power to the local level, with stipulations for public participation in decision-making, that provide openings for customary institutions to play active roles in governance. However in order to guarantee that the positive constitutional provisions as exemplified by these four countries did not get watered down there is the need for appropriate implementing frameworks and formal institutions that would ensure that customary institutions are properly integrated in governance. Where implementation frameworks are established they often create modern institutions that operate on the basis of norms that embedded in tradition.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is no gain arguing the fact that post-colonial states in Africa have grossly failed in ensuring the peaceful coexistence of its people. A failure which cannot only be explained primarily within the context of past colonial experiences, but rather more on the failure of post-colonial states to build on existing structures and introduce structures which are suitable to the social and political realities of the continent. One of the wrong steps taken by post-colonial political leaders was the manner in which the pre-colonial political institutions were relegated to the background in the process of governance. Such missed step could be said to take the ownership of the process of governance from the grassroots. As we have variously explained under this work, the reduction of the powers and functions of African traditional political institutions and in some other cases their total abrogation can be attested to as one of the major reasons for the continuous increase of violent conflicts across the continent.

There is therefore the need for a total integration of African traditional political institutions in the process of governance. An integration that goes beyond the regular recognition of council of chiefs that primarily exist as advisory bodies to the government, to a body that has certain levels of autonomy in handling civil matters. The Botswana's model of the incorporation of the traditional institutions into the process of government should be adopted by countries on the continent. Botswana's legislative,

judiciary and governmental institutions have been modelled on European examples but adapted to Tswana tradition. Tswana institutions have been preserved at the level of local administration, where chiefs still exercise important judicial functions. Adopting the Botswana's model could lead to a radical change of the system and structure of government. Structural change in system whereby countries that have bi-cameral legislature comprising of the Senate and House of Representatives would abolish the House of Representatives and its place introduce an Independent Arbitration Council. Those countries with a one chamber's legislature would need to add this arbitration council as an organ of government.

This, Independent Arbitration Council should be made up of first class traditional rulers from the major ethnic groups in African countries. This council is expected to play critical roles in meditating in intergroup conflict and in violent conflicts against the state. They are also expected to negotiate how to settle existing conflicts and reconcile warring groups. A paramount traditional ruler is expected to maintain his membership of the council as long as he remains the head of his domain. This would allow long term membership of the council which shall translate to the building of bond among traditional rulers from different ethnic groups. The long term effect, especially in ethnically heterogeneous countries is the reduction of acrimonies among various ethnic groups, especially when it comes to the issue of resource allocation and question of self determination.

Council of elders comprising of community chiefs should be given the power to handle intra-group conflicts within their local areas. Members of this council are expected to have adequate level of economic resources to avoid being compromised in the process of the performance of their functions. This council is expected to mediate in intra-group conflicts, adjudicate cases when necessary and reconciles warring parties in a conflict situation. Such council is expected to have a formal link with law enforcing agents in situation where it becomes difficult for them to handle a particular conflict situation and in criminal cases which is expected to be handled by relevant institutions of government.

It is therefore important to underscore the fact that with a gradual embrace of various suggestions under this work there would be resolutions of existing violent conflicts and a safeguard against the increase in the rate of violent conflicts on the continent of Africa. It is however important to observe that the work is not suggesting the integration of African traditional political institutions into the process of governance as a fix it all approach to the problems of violent conflicts in Africa, but rather reflects on one of the major mechanisms for conflict management.

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State and Globalization in the 21st Century: Case of the Nigerian State

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Abstract

State is a social unit created for not profit realisation but to deliver necessary social goods to the general public. It is currently of note that globalisation has continued to question the principal responsibility of state within the economy. The state in Africa became restructured as a result of globalisation. The assertive and pervasive nature of this state was lost particularly in the management and allocation of resources in the economy. Africa has been most hard hit in this regard. No doubt African states with specific reference to Nigeria have actually been enmeshed in this very challenging situation. Thus, this paper tends to examine Nigerian state in the face of present globalising world with the adoption of various market reforms thereby reducing the role of state to a mere spectator within the structure and process of economy. The paper with the aid of interventionist state theory, argues for active and effective state participation to address developmental issues that bother on poverty among others. The conclusion of this paper insists on dominant initiative of the state to redirect the economy in order to improve the well-being of the people in all ramifications.

Keywords: Nigerian state, interventionist theory, economy, globalisation, market reforms

Introduction

The phenomenon known as globalization normally booms on western capitalism and imperialist tenets that usually offer two dialectically conflicting classes of losers and winners among nations. The attributes and structures of advanced capitalist nations hugely dominate and dictates

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the form and nature of globalisation. Globalisation is a process and structure, which is predicated on the political and economic predilections of the leading capitalist ideology. It is to this end that globalisation is labelled variously as westernisation triadisation, Americanisation and internationalisation, to symbolise its supposed skewedness and the associated conflicts prompted by this phenomenon.

Globalization is a contested concept that refers to shrinkage of time and space (Steger, 2009). For instance, McGrew (1992) sees the process of globalisation as the multiplicity of linkages and inter connection between the state and society. It describes the implications of specific decisions in a part of the world for institutions elsewhere. The influence of the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on the economies in the periphery depicts the dependence of the economies in the South on the economies in the North and the accompanying financial designs.

To Robinson (2012), the left and progressive forces are struggling to relate with the fundamental dynamics of globalisation. This phenomenon has elicited debate among diverse social and political movements on the globalising processes that shapes social action and the opportunities for popular change. To Robinson (ibid), the activists and scholars are seeking to understand the nature of changes occasioned by globalisation. He concedes that the globalising process has significant implications for human society, social analysis and the modification of extant paradigms. In corroborating this view, Ihonvbere (2002, p.5) insists globalisation is characterised by new ideas, speed, new strategies, technology and new mechanisms for penetrating foreign markets, higher volumes of movement of goods and skills and the shrinking of distances. According to him, it is clearly indicated that nothing is new about globalisation today other than speed which has become its carinal feature. The central notion here is speed and delivery of goods and services in all spheres. This is usually stressed without recourse to humanity.

To Stiglitz (2005), the process of globalization has been posed as unprecedented prosperity to the billions that are entangled in poverty for centuries. He notes however that globalisation engender resistance

especially in the developing countries. He insists globalisation is oversold to depict the “Washington Consensus,” which has been superimposed on adjusting states by international lenders. Stiglitz (ibid) insists the Washington Consensus replaced government provision with deregulated market and open borders, flexible exchange rate. He contends that the rules of globalisation are determined by the core capitalist states to the disadvantage of peripheral states. He posits that the implications of globalisation include ceding sovereignty, weakening of the state, lack of democracy at the global level, weakening social cohesion and local culture.

The nation-state had been critical actor in the globalisation process; this dominance is confronted with the increasing role of non-state actors that encroaches on the functions traditionally performed by nation-states (National Intelligence Council, 2007). The nation-state therefore shares its sovereignty with regional and global institutions.

This article examines the relationship between globalisation and the state. The pervasiveness of neoliberal reforms in the developing states affects the proficiency of the state to expropriate and appropriate values. The neoliberal ideology is based on the market to distribute resources amid the corresponding decline of the state in production and distribution activities. The state became less assertive and largely amenable to the dictate of the market and international financial agencies. The withdrawal of the state from social provisioning, production and distribution occasioned agitations by social forces to re assert the state as the most important player in the economy. This paper maintains that the recurring developmental crisis in developing states has renewed the struggle to recreate the state as assertive and interventionist state. It interrogates the developmental crisis that engenders the social struggles to restrain the forces of globalisation and strengthen the state.

Globalization and the State: A Historical View

There are two opposing arguments on the phase of globalisation; the first position affirms that the process of globalisation is a new phenomenon. The second strand of argument contends that the phenomenon is not

new and it merely reconfigures itself in different forms. It posits that the slave economy, colonial and postcolonial economic and political systems are rooted in globalisation. The new forms of globalisation should be understood within the historical trajectories of world capitalist development. The contemporary forms of globalisation points at the growing relevance of international financial hegemons in the construction of the global financial and economic architecture.

The debate on the age of globalisation is further discussed with a view to establish common trajectory. O'Rourke and Williamson (1999); Hirst and Thompson (2002) maintain that the global economy was properly integrated in 1913 demonstrating liberalisation of trade, economic and stability in finance. It must be furthered argued that they recognised globalisation origin in this given year with labour mobility as the example. The period was considered have integrated the world economy that the recent time. The work of Andre Gunder Frank (cited in Hirst and Thompson, 2002) stresses a world economy that is predicated on international division of labour and multilateral trade from 1500.

Jerry (1999), insists that before 1500 trade networks permeated virtually each region of Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa and large volumes of commerce encouraged specialisation of agricultural and industrial production. The phenomenon is also linked to 1492 and 1498 when Christopher Columbus discovered the America and Vasco da Gama went on expedition to Africa respectively. Janet Lughod (cited in Hirst and Thompson) describes global trade, which stretched from North Western Europe to China before 1350. Taking globalisation as capitalist expansionism, Harvey (2001) corroborated when he links the phenomenon to capitalism.

To Majekodunmi and Adejuwon (2012), the process of globalisation especially in the economic domain developed through the last five centuries. These scholars insist that globalisation is not a recent experience albeit it acquired more vigor over the last two decades. From the foregoing, the globalisation process is not a new phenomenon albeit with intent to deepen capitalism. The argument that links globalisation

to the cold war is more recent. The cold war on the contrary reflected the alternative socialist ideology, bi-polar politics and military rivalry between the superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of hitherto communist states in Eastern Europe engendered the dominance of capitalism and its accompanying liberal ideology to the extent that globalisation was further entrenched.

This analysis appreciates the dimensions of globalisation; but the economic context of globalisation is central to the arguments of this work. The concept of economic globalisation is not a fresh event. Between the years 1870 and 1914, the same process emerged which specialists of international economic relations have termed the first globalisation. It is often characterised by the increase in the exchange of services, goods and production factors, as well as an increase in the technology transfer, leading to the widespread of economic growth and tighter integration of national economies, whose result was the merging of world prices and wages (Lascurain and Villafuerte, 2016). Thus, the retreat of state involvement in the economy, the expansion of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) including the reduction of barriers, deregulation and liberalisation of markets, privatisation of assets, diffusion of technology, the deepening of production that exceeds local boundaries, integration of capital markets, opening of national economies to trade, capital flights and exchange of information indicate the fundamental attributes of economic globalisation. Indeed, it is the expansion of capitalist markets.

Prior to 1648, when the treaty that ended the 30 years' war was signed in Westphalia, the Holy Roman Empire was turned into battlefield as sectarian forces struggle for control. The catholic family dynasties particularly the Hapsburg (who ruled the greater part of modern Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) allied with Spain and the Papacy in Rome; and on the contrary, the German protestant princes formed coalition with the English. For thirty years, the whole of Europe was engulfed in sectarian conflict that claimed millions of lives. The modern state or the European state system emerged in Europe in 1648 as

response to the conflict that engulfed Europe and it served as mechanism to mediate the struggle for power and secure political stability.

The origin of the state in the developing countries including Africa differs from those of the states in Europe. This paper discusses the development and nature of the Nigerian state as basis to examine the nexus of the state and the market; and the responses of the state and social forces to globalisation. This state was created to formally and properly organise the exploitation of the colonised territory in the interest of the mature capitalist state. The emergent colonial state was not based on consent or rooted in the indigenous people; it emerged through military conquest. This state extracted income from the colonial people through taxation in order to sustain its structures. It was repressive of the colonised people and distanced from the populace (Olaitan, 1995).

The colonial state relied on taxation of the local populace including peasants to raise revenue to sustain the machinery of colonial government. The colonial administration was not predicated on the indigenous people, but it was found on the instrumentality of the colonial administration. The successive post-colonial state share attributes of the colonial state in terms of its repressive and alienating nature.

The state in Nigeria is not an instrument of a single social class since the social groups that seek to control the state are weak, underdeveloped, and lack the basis to develop autonomously. The state lacks a hegemonic class since the economy is controlled by foreign interests amid the intense struggles of fractions of the local dominant class to access and control state structures and institutions. This state is repressive, authoritarian, and lack consensus on its core political and ideological interests. The state is over bearing and it is perceived by the exploited and dominated social groups as alienating and malevolent. It is a contested terrain where the similar and dissimilar interests of the social classes are articulated, canvassed, and pursued.

Globalisation impacts heavily on the State - its policies, institutions and functionaries especially in Africa. The State is no longer the sole authority for protecting and promoting the interests of the weak and

vulnerable social classes. To this extent, the other institutions that coexist with the state assumed responsibility to deal with some of the disruptions in society. The impact of globalisation on the state varies to the extent of the implementation of market reforms, the social forces that contest the damaging influences of globalisation forces and the responses of state actors to the rampaging forces of globalisation.

Theoretical Anchorage

This study is premised on the interventionist state theory, which itemises the specific form of state that reflects high level of self-sufficiency and possesses resilient institutional capacity, both of which allow this particular form of state to carry out a set of fruitful state-interventionist measures in the process of objectives for developmentalism. The concept was coined by (Johnson, 1982:1-12) with reference to the Japanese state. In his seminal work, Johnson makes a distinction between two forms of state: developmental and regulatory. This theory posits that the Western industrialised states hardly intervened in the markets, but since the late nineteenth century these states adopted regulatory functions. The exponent of this theory submits that “in states that were late to industrialize, the state itself led the industrialization drive, that is, it took on developmental functions” (Johnson, *ibid*, 1-12). The difference between the regulatory and developmental states lies in their divergent rationales for state-market relations. The industrialized Japanese economy became a reality through a “planned rational” strategy, which negates the neo-classical notion that free market mechanism is the option to pursue economic development. The Japanese experience demonstrates that state-led development strategy could lead to accelerated industrialisation and high level economic growth for late developing countries.

Evans (2010 cited in Subira, 2011) insists on the strength of the state as critical to the developmental state. He notes the bureaucratic capacity of the East Asian developmental state as essential attribute of the process. Evans (*ibid*) refers to “embeddedness” as major attribute of the developmental state. This developmental state avoids experimentation;

it mediates the social backlash of market reforms, and predicates development on human needs. It substitutes technocracy with social policy to reduce social discontent and renew the legitimacy of the state (Leftwich, 1995; Mbabazi, 2005; Mkandawire, 2005).

To Leftwich (*ibid*), there are six defining characteristics of developmental state. These are determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; effective management of non-state economic interests, legitimacy and performance. Mkandawire (*ibid*), posits that the developmental state involves production, reproduction, distribution and protection of the people from the distortions of the market. He insists that the condition of production and protection of the weak social groups seeks to reverse the setbacks the social sector suffered as a result of unrestrained neo-liberal experimentation and the commercialisation of social provisioning.

Chang (2005, p.192-199) argues that the successful developmental state coordinates investment plans; articulates development vision; engages in building institutions to promote growth and development; and mediates conflicts occasioned by reactions and counter reactions to the trajectory of development between the winners and losers. The development state is visible in Africa despite the perception of the absence of mystical “oriental” institutions and culture, prevalence of patrimonial politics, and weak capital formation argues Mbabazi (*ibid*: 54; see also Mkandawire, *ibid* p.47-49; Oni, 2005; Cline, 2005). He disagrees with the “impossibility thesis,” which is linked to the vulnerability of the state to vested interests.

The developmental state theory negates the theory of market, which insists on the sanctity of the market in the management of the economy. This theory repudiates the monologue occasioned by neoliberalism and the accompanying arrogance of state actors on its inviolability. The developmental state is a leading player in the economy, which is imbued with the capacity for strategic interventions and effective bargaining in a sense that protects critical national interests. The developmental state is

therefore posed as alternative to neo-liberalism to redeem the state and roll back the forces of globalisation.

State and Market: Constructing options for Nigerian state

There is subsisting debate on the relationship between the state and the market especially in developing economies. It bothers on what should be the limit of the market and the purpose of the state. The adoption and implementation of market reforms in Nigeria led to the increasing role of the market and the decline of the state in the distribution of resources. To be emphatic, the social manifestations of the contradiction of globalisation are more glaring in the global south. Countries in this global divide are wallowing in indebtedness that has robbed the states their capacity for objectification in terms of social welfare provisioning and with consequent delegitimation. National assets are threatened through privatisation and debt equity swoop option revenue bases for government are eroded through TNCs insistence on creation of tax havens Akhaine (2002, p.3). This paper mediates the debate on the nature of the link between the state and market for developing societies.

The market reform is an integral element of economic globalisation. Economic globalisation delineates the nexus between the state and the market. It prefers the state decline and the market gains ascendancy. The notion of limited government or the withdrawing state deepens the role and purpose of globalisation. To Ibrahim (2013), globalisation introduces anti-developmental trends through making the state irrelevant or marginal to the developmental process. He argues that the development policies that focus on stabilisation and privatisation, rather than economic growth, development, poverty eradication, are campaigned by external donors thereby leading to increased poverty and inequality; and undermining the ability of the mass of people to participate effectively in the political and social processes in their countries.

Prior to the application of market reforms in Nigeria, the state was somewhat emphatic and it was involved in the production base. The state before the introduction of Structural Adjustment Program, SAP; replicated

a relatively assertive and noticeable state. The implementation of market reforms in many countries in Africa altered the nature of this state. The market reforms sought to reduce the size of government and concurrently heighten the status and relevance of the market. The pursuit of market reforms, however, provoked social forces that protested the social fallouts of neo-liberal paradigms. The state nature and character also assumed a new form in the sense that the somewhat benevolent state became less accessible and distanced from the working class and other social classes.

The market reforms became neo-liberal predicament that further crashed Nigerian economies that got involved relative to those that did not adopt it (Hoogevelt, 2011 cited in Usman & Bashir, 2018). The International Monetary Fund, IMF; vigorously pursued privatisation and liberalisation at a pace and in a sense that often imposed very real costs on countries ill-equipped to incur these (Stiglitz, 2005). Stiglitz (ibid) criticises the privatisation and liberalisation policies as aspects of the Washington Consensus; and he argues that the IMF articulates its plan from narrow ideological perspective. The privatisation component of market reforms in implementing states had been pursued rapidly and scorecards were kept for the countries making the transition from communism to the market. The states that fast-tracked the implementation of privatisation had high scores; the accelerated pursuit of privatisation often did not attract the gains that were pledged. The crises that emerged from these failures became antithetical to the notion of privatisation.

The actual quest of market reforms created impediment for social relations in Nigeria. The social class relations became altered as result and social antagonism ensued due to the anti-poor impacts of neo-liberal measures. The worst hit social groups are the working people, urban poor, middle class and the peasantry. These social classes became impotent as result of harsh and emasculating social and economic policies. The social struggles in the region in the middle of 1980s on market reforms underpinned the somewhat class nature of the struggles especially against the governing class that became arrogant and exhibited affluent lifestyles despite the growing social inequality, deprivation, and hopelessness.

To Stiglitz (ibid), the Washington Consensus fails to prioritise the distribution of “fairness.” This plan prescribes trickle-down economics that is not hinged on deliberate reallocation of wealth and welfare programs, the developmental advantages, therefore, hardly trickle down. The results of the policies enforced by Washington consensus for most countries embracing its tenets has been slow, and where growth has occurred, the benefits have not been shared equally. The crisis accompanying the policies has been mishandled and the transition from communism to market economy a discontent (Stiglitz, ibid).

The conflicts of market reforms discussed earlier have provoked the debate on the state and market. The criticisms of the state bother on its hijack by the international financial institutions and the local predatory ruling elite. The contradictions formed the rallying point of social forces to canvass alternatives to market reforms and globalisation. These groups insist that the state rather than withdrawal should play leading role in the development process.

This work argues for assertive and interventionist state to replace the weak and amenable state that characterise market reforms. The region has been impoverished and the people are pauperised as result of market oriented measures. The social structure has been altered, and the political system weakened as result of recurring conflicts, which are tied to poverty, denial and hopelessness. The state lost its *raison d'être*; which is the welfare of the exploited social classes. This state lost its legitimacy when it failed to deliver social services to the populace. The failure of the state in this respect led to the emergence of “alternative governments” especially at the local level, which are involved in social provisioning and attracts loyalty of the people.

This analysis posits that the level of underdevelopment and structural distortions engendered by market reforms demand a supervisory and interventionist state to intercede the development crisis confronting the region. The developmental state alternative is significant for these reasons. First, it appreciates the undeveloped nature of the region and the imperative to address pressing developmental issues. Second,

the failure of market reforms to address human imperative has been challenging. Third, it avoids experimentation that is linked to market reforms.

Concluding Remarks

The article examined the existing literature on the age and basis of globalisation. It noted that the literature largely agreed that globalisation is not a new phenomenon. The relationship between the state and the market in Nigeria was examined. This state was criticised for its declining relevance and legitimacy as a result of market reforms.

The study however argues that structural distortions and underdevelopment of Nigeria with the failure of neoliberal measures in the era of globalisation to mediate its economic crisis, generated the argument for the developmental state and canvassed that the fragile state prompted by market reforms should be rejected and replaced with predominant and effective state, which intervenes and plays critical role in the matter of development. Globalisation has largely ignored the human side in the development link; the interventionist state is equipped to fill this lacuna.

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Social Security Policy and Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria: Analysis of the Fourth Republic, 1999–2020

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview on the meaning and nexus between social security and domestic terrorism, and efforts of government in providing social security in Nigeria. The findings point out the glaring absence of social security in Nigeria, and advances the need to institutionalize and build on appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms through which social protection programs are implemented.

Introduction

In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the reform of social security systems in developing as well as in developed countries. In both cases, the debate has centred on the question of what kind of social security system is appropriate in a rapidly changing economic and social environment. Whereas, in the industrialised nations, more than 90% of the population is covered by various forms of state or market-organised social security systems, in developing countries, despite considerable effort on the part of policymakers, development institutions and donor agencies, well over 50% of the population remain uncovered against basic risks (Ginneken, 1999). Exposure to risk is, therefore, a major threat in the day-to-day life of people in developing countries. Illness, disability, death, widowhood, riots and natural disasters are some examples of typical risks

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which lead to fluctuating incomes and thereby affect the quality of life. The present threat, insecurity and terrorists' activities in the international system, no doubt, can be used to measure the level of social security in the world system; both in developed and underdeveloped countries.

The changing nature of the world socioeconomic and political system, has led to one form of violence to another. In Africa for instance, the prevalent nature of poverty and lack of social security for its vast population in the continent, has mostly metamorphosed into intractable conflicts like ethno-religious crisis, agitations for resource control, farmer-herders conflict, and the present terrorist activities distorting the peace of the region. In Africa, according to Imobighe (1984), domestic terrorism has a long history. "Early examples occurred during the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya from 1952 to 1959 and the Algerian independence struggle from 1954 to 1962." It was not uncommon for African independence movements and their colonial opponents to resort to tactics that, today, would only be described as terrorist in nature. According to Akanji (2009), Nigeria's political history is replete with acts of terror perpetrated by individuals, groups and organizations that are either indigenous or foreign.

The upsurge of domestic terrorism poses threats and insecurity to human existence in Nigeria. Nigeria is a state under perpetual internal security threat. The threat affects the nation's stability and well-being (Ogundiya, 2009). The issue of domestic terrorism in Nigeria has remained a major problem since the year 1999. This development had never been witnessed in any form throughout the years of statehood; the issues of banditry, armed robbery, ritual killings, and fraudulent activities at home or abroad perpetuated by Nigerians, unemployment, breakdown of law and order, poorly managed infrastructural facilities and corruption remain synonymous to Nigeria.

Within the North, there are conflict key indicators that are classified as evidence of domestic terrorism. First is the conflict between pastoralists and local farmers, which is quite common in the zone especially in Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau States. This is due to dwindling grazing

lands/grazing routes. The Boko Haram terrorist activities in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, which eventually struck on a number of occasions in Abuja, as well as Niger and Kogi States. The Jos crisis that continues to take human lives is attributed to ethnic and indigene-settler cleavages. The issue of banditry and kidnapping in Kaduna, Nasarawa, and some other parts of the north posed a serious danger to the security of the State. According Salawu (2010), the remote socio-cultural, political and economic reasons that propel the use of illegal force and violence in Nigeria show government's neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. Kwaja (2009) also identifies fragility of the institutions of the state in terms of their ability and capacity to manage diversity, corruption, rising inequality between the rich and poor, gross violation of human rights, environmental degradation, contestations over land, among others, as the underlying causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria. Also, the failure of governance is responsible for the recurring sectarian violence in Nigeria. Achunike (2008) opines that the wrong perception of other people's religion or faith, wrong religious orientation, the low literacy level of religious adherents, selfishness on the part of religious personalities, pervasive poverty, government involvement in religious matters, among others, are responsible for interreligious conflicts in Nigeria.

No country can withdraw from providing the basic services which constitute the elements of social security to its subjects without the consequences. Similarly, if the state withdraws totally and leaves social security to be bought, majority of the people will not have access to elementary social security. Those who are not having adequate means of livelihood cannot access and this will lead to an explosive situation that will affect the security, law and order which are essential for economic activities including investment and production. The paper therefore, identify conceptual analysis and theoretical framework, domestic terrorism and social security in Nigeria, factors responsible for social insecurity and domestic terrorism in Nigeria, impact of government social protection policy in Nigeria, 1999-2020, and conclusion.

Conceptual Analysis and Theoretical Framing

What is Social Security?

The social security concept has been changing with time from the traditional ways of security to modern ones. As societies became more industrialized as a result of industrial revolution in the 19th century and more people became dependent upon wage employment, it was no longer possible to rely upon the traditional system of social security. According to Awujoola (2004), the negative impact of industrialization and urbanization attracted the attention of policy makers to formalize social security system that addressed the emerged social issues. The concept of social security means any kind of collective measures or activities designed to ensure that members of society meet their basic needs and are protected from the contingencies to enable them maintain a standard of living consistent with social norms.

Social security is defined in its broadest meaning by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as:

The protection measures which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures against economic and social distress that would otherwise be caused by the stoppages or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, disability, old age, death, the provision of medical care subsidies for families with children (ILO, 1990).

Pocock contends that social security is the sum of all regulations within a society which aim to guarantee the individual or the group not only physical survival, but also general protection against unforeseeable risks which would entail the deterioration of their situation (Pocock, 2008). Konkolewsky (2008) perceives social security as an essential building block of a “good society,” something that supports the lives and aspirations of not only the poor but also the middle classes and the more prosperous.

According to ILO (1984), the term “social security” was first officially used in the title of the United States legislation – the Social Security Act of 1935. It later appeared in an Act passed by New Zealand in 1938 and was again used in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The ILO swiftly adopted the term impressed by its value, as a simple and arresting expression of one of the deepest and most widespread aspirations of people all around the world, undertook a formal process of codification of the concept between 1952 and 1982. Social security is a concept enshrined in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which states that everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Robert (2001) also refers to social security as the action programs of government intended to promote the welfare of the population through assistance measures guaranteeing access to sufficient resources for food and shelter and to promote health and well-being. Services providing social security are often called social services. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund (2005) argues that a functional social security system is also expected to provide income support to categories of people like the sick, disabled and retirees in addition to addressing short term employment needs. In the area of maternity protection, the scheme should be able to protect mothers against pre- and post-natal diseases and challenges.

To International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2007), in developing countries like Nigeria characterized by or facing enormous socio-economic, political and systemic challenges of gargantuan proportions, the presence of a comprehensive social security scheme could be a veritable tool to improve worker productivity, bridge income inequality, enhance social cohesion and engender national integration which cumulatively can impact positively on improving living standards, minimizing corruption and other social vices and promoting the development of a humane and caring society. Social protection schemes (providing insurance to

employers and workers alike against illness and unemployment and to entrepreneurs against flood or fire) are important enabling factors for business and work.

Nigerians do not enjoy comprehensive social security packages and benefits. Despite the fact that the nation is richly blessed with vast economic resources, the array of policy papers pertaining to social protection or social security, ratification of international conventions and the array of government agencies and programmes, it is just not good enough that there is no single all-encompassing social security legislation. Nigerians deserve to be benefitting from a concise social security scheme encapsulating diverse areas. If Ghana had a social security act covering pensions, invalidity, death/survivors, emigration and unemployment benefits as far back as 1965, then why can't Nigeria? (Dorkenoo, 2007).

The Concept of Terrorism

The term, "terrorism," was coined from terror derived from a Latin verb *terrere*, which means "to frighten." Alao (2011) in Campell (2001) observes that *terror cimbricus* was a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimri tribe in 105 BC. According to Tar, Conteh and Ukhami (2021), the concept of terrorism and its operationalization defies one universally accepted definition. Since the Sept.11, 2001 attacks in US, the concept of terrorism seems to be more problematic to conceptualize, because of too many ideological interpretations. One of such interpretations, that either give credence to terrorism or put it in negative light is the concept "one man's terrorism, is another man's freedom fighter." However, according to Stibli (2010), terrorism is an act of using unconventional tactics to achieve political goals through the use of violence, sabotage or threat to the state, organization or social group against civilians with the sole motive of producing psychological fear and intimidation. Annan (2005) described terrorism as an act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling

a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”

In modern times, terrorism has been adopted to mean a wide range of deployment of force largely targeted at civilian population by disgruntled elements within the society to direct the attention of government to their plight or to force a change of government. The difficulty associated with evolving an acceptable definition of terrorism leads Hoffman (1998) to observe that, if one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism. Regardless of the problem associated with the definition, certain attributes of terrorism manifest in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hostage situations and hijackings.

The study agrees with Cunningham (2003) that a wide variety of actors from individuals (Carlos Illych Ramirez -the Jackal; the Unabomber) to groups (Tamil Tigers, Provisional IRA, Hamas, Boko Haram) to institutions (Gestapo, KGB, SAVAK) and finally to governments and states (the Taliban,) practice what we define as terrorism. The involvement of America in Vietnam, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Egypt among others was seen as terrorist act. This goes further to justify that the definition is a function of individual perception. Hence, terrorism is not limited to non-state actors. It explains why there is no unified perspective of what terrorism is and it led Sick in Kegley (1990) to note that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

The fact that state and non-state actors engage in acts of terrorism informs the position of Falk in Kegley (1990) that it is futile and hypocritical self-deception to suppose that we can use the word terrorism to establish a double standard pertaining to the use of political violence. Terrorism, then, is used here to designate any type of political violence that lacks an adequate moral and legal justification, regardless of whether the actor is a revolutionary group or a government.

It is, therefore, essential to note that the *modus operandi* of

the Boko-Haram slightly differs from what is traditionally known of terrorists in line with the five characteristics identified by Cunningham (2003). First, the victims of terrorist attacks are usually civilians and not combatants. Terrorists do not usually target armed police or soldiers who have the capability to fight back. Recent attacks by the Boko Haram sect revealed that they attacked Police Headquarters at Abuja in 2011 and other security formations. For instance, on June 27, 2012 a police station was attacked at Gulak in Adamawa State as reported by the News Agency of Nigeria. Also, following the shooting and killing of twenty Deeper Life worshippers at Okene on August 6, 2012, a distress call was received by the Joint Task force from the same location the next day. On getting close to the destination, the terrorists shot and killed two soldiers.

Boko-Haram attacked a police station in Nigeria's northern state of Bauchi on 26 July, 2009. The incident led to a four-day armed struggle between State Security forces and members of the militant group, spreading to three other states (Yobe, Kano and Borno) and leaving as many as 800 dead. This type of confrontation is not characteristic of terrorist group. Like other terrorists, they do not recognize the rules and laws of war as their acts were in violations of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1949). Also, terrorist acts are by nature symbolic and not instrumental as the act itself may not be sufficient to bring about the desired change. The immediate victims of attacks were not necessarily the intended targets. For example, though the sect attacked churches and the UN building, the intended target was the wider audience. The reaction of the wider audience to the state of insecurity, fear and terror, are required by them to influence governments and citizenry in order to achieve their goals. Extant literature, however, notes that terrorism is motivated by larger political causes and the acts are symbolically carried out in order to further that cause (Alao, 2012).

Kydd and Walter (2006) define terrorism as actions focusing on harming some people in order to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or system on which civilians rely. However, the scope of the operation of the Boko- Haram sect has gone

beyond civilian targets since it also attacks government institutions including police and military establishments. This paper acknowledges that discussions on the subject matter might be value laden since it is a function of individual's perceptions. However, for the purpose of this paper, terrorism is viewed as violence perpetrated by individuals within or outside the government circle that is specifically directed against civilian or government institutions as a way of calling attention to perceived, real or imaginary injustices in a clandestine manner. This definition largely captures the modus operandi of the Boko-Haram sect as a domestic terrorist organisation. The challenges posed by Boko-Haram sect on the security of lives and property in Nigeria and the implications on corporate existence of Nigeria as well as its image internationally is worrisome.

Theoretical Framework: The Elites' Influence on Social Security Policy and their Role in Domestic Terrorism

The elite theory applies to this paper in analysing social security policy and domestic terrorism in Nigeria with focus on the disparity (economic, political and socio-cultural) that exist between the selected few (rich) and the vast majority (also known as the poor masses); and as it performs unfolding the scheming, manoeuvring and political machinations of the elites in the process of the acquisition and manifestation of political and economic affluence. Elites are in every spectrum of human institutions. Therefore, they manipulate the institution of government, economy and religion to their advantage and desires.

The elite theory, as popularized by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels, Wright Mills among others (Varma, 1975), no doubt vividly explains the Nigerian social security situation where the mass majority (over 70%) in the midst of plenty still wallow in abject poverty and the rich keep getting richer. Insecurity as a result of unemployment, poor health care, low standard of living, violence and crisis has largely been suffered by the vast majority of Nigeria who are poor, uninfluential and vulnerable. The elites do not suffer most of this security challenges

because they have what it takes to enjoy basic facilities of life; including armed security. The fact is that government programmes and policies aimed at ensuring social security, to an extent is subject to the cadre or elite manipulations; and not the poor themselves who do know the best way to meet their basic needs of life.

These manipulative devices of the masses by the elites according to the elite theorists exist because the elites are better organized and possess class consciousness when compared to the masses (Robert, 1976). In the Nigerian situation, the manipulative process is so alarming that it is now a threat to the survival of the majority population who find it hard to eat at least two square meals in a day. It is pertinent to state clearly that the reason why the issue of social security remains a paradox in Nigeria even with the vast resources possessed by Nigeria and various programmes and policies initiated by government since independence, is because those (elites) who have always been in the position to redistribute resources have always channelled it to themselves and their cronies.

This, in reality has led to hunger, malnutrition, poverty, low income earnings, low standard of living, and high mortality rate, among others. To this end, the multiplying effects of social insecurity in Nigeria has, in turn, led to frustration and other stimulating factors that have led to change in behavioural pattern; such that the elite could easily influence citizens' behaviour mostly in terms of electioneering process and to perpetuate violence to achieve an interest. One could see that some of the citizens (within the masses) could even die for the elites in the case of a failed election where their choice candidates who gave them money to buy their conscience failed. This has led to various chaotic environments as a result of post-electoral violence, ethnic rivalry, and religious bigotry.

The present terrorist activities, banditry, kidnapping and herders attacks on farmers in Nigeria, northern Nigeria in particular, most times, are seen to be fuelled by some powerful elites who sponsor some of the terrorists to carry out various attacks either to destabilise government, distract the people from the reality or make a political statement. Most times, when these terrorist activities are carried out, they

are being interpreted as either political or religious; but the economic situation of the society too could instigate violence, terrorism and submission to the whims and caprices of the elites' desires.

To examine the impact of social insecurity on democracy, it is pertinent to explain that the elite direct attention to the source of policy flow and whose interest public policies serve. The theory attempts a realistic explanation of the source of policy by predicating it in the elite rather than the masses. It also explains the nature and source of policies in Nigeria. Various policies in the public service can also be viewed as emanating from the Nigerian elite - the political, administrative and economic leaders. This is contradictory to democratic tenets that lend credence to participation, openness, accountability and freedom in all spheres of societal life. Elites are capable of setting the tone for society by coming out with policies of their choice. The level of stability and progress achieved in any society is a function of elites' initiatives. The civil unrest experienced in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the inclusion and activities of elites. The fact that Nigeria is oscillating between democratic stagnancy and governance backwardness is reflexive of elites' pursuit of personal aggrandisement and promotion of ego- centricism rather than altruistic policies, which are nationalistic and "people- centric" in nature. This contradiction is usually characterized by conflicts and antagonistic relationships between different segments of the society as germane in Nigeria since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999. In Nigeria, poverty and inequality have created immense social tension not only at the vertical level of "rich" versus "poor" but also at the horizontal level (between and among the poor themselves) culminating in motley of armed conflicts and political instability.

Domestic Terrorism and Social Security in Nigeria

The relationship between social security and domestic terrorism is too fundamental to be ignored. There cannot be development with insecurity put in place by domestic terrorism and, if there is development, the social security scheme and standard of living of the people will improve

tremendously. Domestic terrorism has seriously affected the living condition of the people in the affected areas and this has further deteriorated social infrastructure and living condition of the people.

One of the main social protection problems in Africa is coverage. The economic conditions are such that the prospects are bad for the introduction of tax-based social assistance schemes. Tostensen (2008) contends that the number of the poor is simply too large and the tax base too narrow. Contributory health insurance schemes suffer from similar problems, mainly because of the unpredictability of benefits and the adverse selection problem. The prospects are somewhat better with respect to contributory pension schemes. A convincing case can be made for the judicious extension of coverage in order to improve the financial base. More contributors mean greater revenue immediately while the payable benefits may be deferred into the future. However, the governance and management of public social security institutions are the main hurdles. There are deficiencies in record keeping and the processing of benefit claims.

The poor development status of poor and developing countries no doubt breeds atmosphere of frustrated expectations and foster widespread indignation on the part of those that are trapped in the vortex circle of abject poverty. Impotent poverty eradication programmes and conspiratorial neglect further aggravate the condition of hopelessness by the governments of these poor countries. In the face of this predicament, individuals and groups respond differently depending on situational factor and capacity. These responses are crystallized and find expression in various shades of antisocial behaviours including armed robbery, kidnapping, and insurgency among others. In the midst of all these, developing countries are confronted with daunting security challenges which include armed robbery, ethnic crisis, assassination, militancy, kidnapping and terrorism. The mass media present to the public a multi-varied image of dramatic acts of bombings with impunity and horrific portrayal of people burnt to ashes, maimed and property wantonly

destroyed by Boko Haram. Thus, everybody, especially in the hotbed of terrorism, lives in constant fear (Umaru, Pate and Haruna, 2015).

According to Eme (2011), this is also known as “political economy of violence.” Recent writings in the mass media across the globe and across political divide have laid much emphasis on the role of resources in generating conflict which is a major cornerstone of economic-based violence. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents. Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) contend that the social dislocation, social tensions, communal and family disruptions, mutual distrust, poverty, gender inequality, governance deficit and political instability and social inequality are major drivers of conflicts and terrorism in Nigeria. Statistical Analysis System has also show a strong association between social security and the emergence of domestic terrorism. As the standard of living of the people falls in term of access to water, electricity, means of livelihood, education, health services amongst others, the crime rates increase too as well as deviance to stated authority. Domestic terrorism, or even just the threat of armed violence, can lead to reduced foreign direct investment. This is particularly true where violence is politically motivated. Armed violence has a particularly important impact on tourism, whether it is political violence or criminality (Onimilusi, 2016).

According to Neumayer, over the long run, tourism is reduced by 25% when there are substantial increases in political violence, and in countries with small tourism industries the reduction tends to be substantially greater (Onimilusi, 2016). For instance, Boko Haram violence has led to the destruction of health facilities in the North eastern states of Nigeria, forcing health workers to either flee or shut down clinics. Onuoha (2014) states that this situation has compelled residents to seek medical attention in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in the host communities. Awortu (2015) also notes that education is a panacea for national development across the world. There is no society that does not give adequate attention to her educational growth and development. Apart from the paltry budgetary allocation

by the government, the Boko Haram insurgency has been an obstacle to educational development in Nigeria. The Islamic militants have serially attacked students and facilities in educational institutions in different northern states of the country. Over time, a lot of schools have shut down their academic programmes. This has drastically impacted the teeming number of students seeking admission into academic institutions at all levels.

In a country that is struggling with educational infrastructure and qualitative manpower to improve on the standard and quality of education, the Boko Haram insurgency is further compounding its challenges. Certainly, this is affecting adversely the present and future development of this country. Indeed, terrorism and other forms of militia activities can impose costs on a targeted country through a number of avenues (Joshua and Chidozie, 2014). As noted in *The Punch* (2012):

Investors are wary of coming to a country where their lives and investments are not safe: Nigeria has been on a steady decline in the Global Peace Index. Out of 158 countries surveyed, the country was 117th in 2007, 129th in 2008 and 2009, 137th in 2010, 142nd in 2011 and 146th in 2012. Even a country like Chad is more peaceful than Nigeria. Nigeria is only better than such countries as Syria, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, Sudan, Congo Democratic Republic, Afghanistan, Libya, Israel, Russia and Somalia pariah states or nations on war footing.

Agbibo and Maiangwa (2014) aver that a recurrent issue in the Boko Haram literature is the extent of relative poverty and inequality in the north which has led some analysts to argue that underdevelopment is the main reason why extremist groups like Boko Haram rebel. While Mahmood (2013) contends that today, the north of Nigeria is undoubtedly poorer than the south in almost every conceivable measure. Combined with limited resources and deteriorating environmental factors, such as a rapidly shrinking Lake Chad, parts of northern Nigeria are economically destitute environments. Poor leadership and corruption have contributed

to the socio-economic situation, and generated an environment lacking viable job prospects for large numbers of youth. Dasuki (2013) contends that the impact of terrorism on internal security in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized as citizens now live in fear of impending but unknown attacks. Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because of bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures, and escape from poverty. Kwaja (2013) observes that the huge governance deficit in the country has been one that people do not see as part of the state building project, under leadership that is unwilling to transform society and guarantee security for the people. Rather, emphasis is often placed on appropriation of power and regime security at the expense of good governance and human security. Indeed, as noted in International Crisis Group's Report:

Poverty is a product of bad governance, including a bloated administration. A bulging percentage of federal and state budgets is allocated to salaries, allowances, pocket money, foreign trips and temporary duty tours constraining capital and development projects. The federal government has been borrowing for recurrent consumption, not to invest in development. For many the name of the game has been spending, importing and looting. Terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. If a targeted country loses enough FDI, which is an important source of savings, then it may also experience reduced economic growth (International Crisis Group's Report, 2014; Joshua and Chidozie, 2014).

It is observed by Hilker et al (2010) that states often fail to provide adequate security for citizens or undermine democratic governance through acts committed in the name of security calls into question top-

down approaches to reducing violence. This ugly development has some implications. Governance in times of insurgency presents a challenge to economic progress where development is arrested because of the absence of peace. The cost of insecurity in Nigeria could also be seen on the percentage of annual budget allocated to security agencies on a yearly basis. Infrastructure and human capital development are almost foregone alternatives; hence, capital expenditure is struggling from the rear. As observed by Kantiok (2014), many governments justify excessive expenditures on security as intent to secure the homeland. Many governors, particularly in the northern part of Nigeria have justified their non-performance and lack of development of their states to the fact that they are fighting terrorism in their various states. Huge sums of monies are designated security votes and have been embezzled by these governors while failing to secure their various states. More often than not, they justify the expenditure on equipping the police and manning the various checkpoints in their states. The same thing can be said of the federal government in its huge expenditure on defence, yet not fully equipping the security forces with the needed equipment. That the insurgency sometimes outguns the security agents tells on the dilapidated equipment that they use in trying to contain the terrorism.

Also, the food industry in the north is under great strain over a number of reasons, with the main issue being human mobility. With the increase of Boko Haram attacks, those employed in the industry have decreased their movement outside protected areas over fears of attacks carried out by the insurgents. Many farmers in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe now fear being attacked while many local processing companies have lost workers after families opted to leave the conflict area. Traders have also limited their movements as Boko Haram militants have increasingly targeted major markets across the region. The agricultural sector has effectively developed into a target for those militants in need of supplies, with many stealing food, equipment and money. The heightened attacks across North- Eastern Nigeria have also made transportation of

food riskier and more expensive, which in turn has placed greater pressure on the economic output (<http://www.msrisk.com>).

Onuoha (2014) contends that the pace and intensity of Boko Haram's attacks, especially against civilian targets, dramatically increased after the federal government imposed a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states in mid-2013. Since then, and even more intensely since January 2014, the group has perpetrated almost-daily attacks on villages and towns, and laid siege to highways. In the attacks, Boko Haram has killed civilians, pillaged property, and destroyed schools, homes, and businesses, which were often razed to the ground (Premium Times, February 2, 2014). Added to this is the problem of worsening food insecurity caused by the destruction of livelihoods and social support systems, bombing of infrastructures, displacement of farmers and pillaging of livestock and foodstuff. Owing to worsening insecurity, farmers are no longer able to cultivate their lands or harvest their products for fear of being attacked by Boko Haram members. Also, cattle herders and households have lost their livestock to Boko Haram pillaging, further compounding the situation of severe food insecurity.

A good number of observers (Bello, 2004, Williams, 2008, Lake 2001, Leon and Walt, 2001), have pervasively argued that insecurity in a given state not only affect the growth and survival of democracy but also lead to high level of poverty, unemployment, high rate of crime, poor standard of education, high rate of illiteracy, poor infrastructural development, poor state of health facilities, among others. In consideration of these challenges, effective public policy implementation remains the only instrument and tool to tackle the internal security issues and problems in the contemporary Nigerian state.

Factors Responsible for Social Insecurity and Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

While Nigeria has always described herself as the giant of Africa, it is equally identified as one of the most poverty-stricken and insecure nations around the globe; the menace of which is most critical in its northern

part, despite bestowed unquantifiable human and natural resources in the region. Most often, the lack of social security in Nigeria, the north in particular, has led to insecurity and domestic terrorism. Social security is a shared care arrangement designed to meet contingencies and other conditions of insecurity due to either deprivations or contingencies. It is widely practiced globally. Nigeria has, over the years, tried various social security schemes and programmes to ensure that social security exists. However, according to Gbemre (2018), these have not been implemented satisfactorily and this has created gaps that have led to the existence of “several insecurity issues, alleged embezzlement/misappropriation of pension funds, long queues of pensioners to access pension funds and ultimately, stranded pensioners, amongst others in the area of pension fund management in Nigeria.” Some of the factors leading to domestic terrorism include:

- i. ***Bad leadership and corruption among stakeholders:*** According to Achebe (1983), in his work, “The Trouble with Nigeria,” the problem with Nigeria is bad leadership. There is no gainsaying the fact, that, Nigeria has been faced with the problem of leadership since inception, which has posed serious danger on the socio-economic development of the country. The challenges that hamper the social security in the country is not lack of viable policies but lack of political will to implement policies of government. Corruption is also, a cankerworm that has created wide gap between the rich and the poor; making the poor, poorer and the rich, richer. Corruption mostly in government, has made it difficult to implement government policies in the area of social security and poverty alleviation; rather, most individuals at the helm of affairs will prefer to enrich themselves with public fund meant for the people and leave the masses impoverished and socially insecure. According to Adesuwa (2017), when government officials engage in this kind of corruption, the poor and underserved populations within Nigeria are inevitably hurt. If large sums of money earmarked for development stopped going into government officials’ pockets, the Nigerian government could use that money to build up the country’s infrastructure-electricity, roads, running water and more.

- ii. ***Pervasive material inequalities and unfairness:*** Greater awareness of disparities in life is a major factor of insecurity in Nigeria. This is a rooted general perception of inequality and unfairness which has resulted in grievance by a large number of people. This perception stems from the perception of marginalization by the powerful elite, using government's development policies and political offices as a primary source of exploitation which creates disaffection and resentment. A large number of the Nigerian population is frustrated and have lost hope, especially the youths, and have now emerged to express their disillusion about the pervasive state of inequality (Osaghae, 2012).

- iii. ***Illiteracy and poor access to education:*** The Nigerian society is characterised by individuals who are either stark illiterates or half-baked literates. No country develop with quantum and high percentage of individuals that are illiterate. The reason for neglect and lack of responsibility on the part of government to provide social security in the country, is because of the ignorant of the majority of the citizens to truly know their rights. Nigeria is characterised with individuals who are illiterates because of poor access to education or lack of means to get educated because of bad governance, religious indoctrination, among other variables. Most times, it is these individuals that becomes veritable tools for manipulation in the hands of some politicians for their selfish political ambition; while some become notoriously engaged in suicide bombing, terrorism and maiming of innocent citizens as a result of religious indoctrination.

- iv. ***Infrastructural deficit:*** Infrastructural deficit in Nigeria has contributed immensely in increasing the level of social insecurity in Nigeria. The unavailability or inadequate infrastructure in Nigeria such as good road network, adequate power supply for self-employed individuals, portable water supply, strategic market locations, low or lack of access to technology can hinder innovation and networking strategy. Availability of needed infrastructure is an enabler of security, productivity and development, but in the absence of that, the society constantly breeds unemployment,

poverty and insecurity. For instance, the Ajaokuta steel industry in Kogi State would have been a source of employment and engagement for the people in the area, but because it is not functioning the way it ought to function, those who are supposed to be employed in that company are left unemployed or underemployed. According to Adesuwa (2017), an infrastructure that supports economic growth at every level is essential to pull people out of poverty. In Nigeria, economic infrastructure includes things like access to micro-credit that help farmers invest in their crops and entrepreneurs lift their businesses off the ground.

- v. *High cost of living:* High cost of living amidst, lack of infrastructure, bad governance, insecurity, unemployment, overdependence on foreign goods in Nigeria, is another cause of increased poverty in the country. In recent time, especially, during the Buhari administration, Nigerians have experienced hardship due to ineptitude leadership, depletion in the value of the country's currency, economic recession, increase in tariffs and fuel pump prices, over-borrowing and servicing of debt. All these led to high cost of living which eventually led to low standard of living. Income of the citizens did not increase or commensurate with their expenditure which kept increasing. The poor in this sense, are becoming poorer due the unfavourable policies and environment created by government.

- vi. *Ethno-religious configurations:* These have arisen from distrust among various ethnic groups and among the major religions in the country. Ethno- religious conflict was defined by Egwu, (2011) "as a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multiethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation. Frequent and persistent ethnic conflicts and religious clashes between the two dominant religions present the country with a major security challenge. In all parts of Nigeria, there exist ethno-religious conflicts and these, according to him, have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of

political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities” (Egwu, 2011). The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government, councils, control of markets and sharia among other trivial issues have resulted in large scale killings and violence amongst groups in Nigeria. The problem of ethno- religious crisis can be traced to the colonial era when the principle of divide and rule was adopted and the forceful amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorate by the colonial powers.

- vii. ***Weak security system:*** This results from inadequate equipment for the security arm of government, both in weaponry and training. This is in addition to poor attitudinal and behavioural disposition of security personnel. In many cases, security personnel assigned to deal with given security situations lack the expertise and equipment to handle the situations in a way to prevent them from occurring. This is due to inadequate human resources, development and bad management. And even when these exist, some personnel get influenced by ethnic, religious or communal sentiment and are easily swallowed by their personal interest to serve their people, rather than the nation. Thus, instead of being national watch dogs and defending national interest and values, and protecting people from harm by criminals, they soon become “saboteurs of government effort by supporting and fuelling insecurity through either leaking vital security information or aiding and abetting criminals to acquire weapons or to escape the long arm of the law” (Edoh, 2001). The Maitasine crisis, Niger Delta crisis, and the Boko Haram activities are cases for reference.
- viii. ***Decay of socio-cultural and communal value system:*** The traditional value system of the Nigerian society like most African societies is characterized by such endearing features as collectivism, loyalty to authority and community, truthfulness, honesty, hard work, tolerance, and love for others. “Mutual harmony and co-existence, and identification of individual with one another as well abhorrence for theft and high value for lives are no longer sustained. Stealing was considered extremely disgraceful and lives were also highly

valued)" (Ekundayo, 2013). However, all our endearing values and morals have been traded off for western values and this has created social disequilibrium.

- ix. ***Rural/urban drift:*** The inability of government to meet the social needs of the people at the rural, has subsequently led to rural/urban migration. The migration of jobless youths from rural areas to urban centres is also one of the causes of insecurity in Nigeria. Nigeria is one of the countries in the world with very high rural/urban drift. Most urban areas in Nigeria have grown beyond their environmental carrying capacities and existing infrastructure and this has resulted to increased poor quality of the living conditions in urban areas in Nigeria. Out of frustration, these youths are drawn into crime which will eventually lead to insecurity in the society.

Impact of Government Social Protection Policy in Nigeria, 1999-2020

One of the primary responsibility of government, anywhere in the world is security for its citizens, and social security is inclusive. No doubt, Nigeria's government over the decades since independence have had social security policies and projections but the question remains if they were ever implemented at all, or implemented in its fullness.

The first official social protection legislation in Nigeria was the 1942 Workmen's Compensation Act. After several amendments, the federal government enacted the Pension Decree No. 102 of 1979 for federal civil servants and the Armed Forces Pension Decree No. 103 of 1979 for the military leading to the establishment of the non-contributory defined benefit pension schemes based on final salary. A private sector benefit pension and gratuity scheme for employees was initiated in 1954 by the Nigerian Breweries. In 1961, the National Provident Fund was inaugurated and later replaced by the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) in 1993 (Aiyede, Sha, Haruna, Olutayo, Ogunkola, and Best, 2015). The returned to democracy in 1999 after a protracted military rule in Nigeria is a watershed in the history of Nigerian politics and policy

making. The reason is that, the interruption of the military in governance through coup and counter coup, affected the political stability of the State. The return of democracy since 1999, has brought a form of stability to governance, hence the importance of examining government social security policy in the Fourth Republic.

Since 2004 when the first draft of National Social Protection Strategy document was produced, social protection has featured as an issue of concern at both the national and state levels (Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012). The document organised social protection around four main themes: social assistance, social insurance, child protection, and the labour market. However, the government has not demonstrated significant commitment to social protection judging by the level of implementation. Nigeria is among countries that have focused more on growth in the hope that growth would eventually trickle down and translate into improved conditions for the poor (Hickey, 2008). The government established National Pension Commission as a social and economic institution through the Pension Reform Act of 2004. This introduced contributory pension scheme for the civil servants and thereby ensuring security in the pension scheme process in Nigeria. The Pension Reform Act 2004 established the National Pension Commission (PenCom) as the body to regulate, supervise and ensure the effective administration of pension matters in Nigeria. In compliance with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act of 2004, employees in public and private sectors of the economy have made significant contributions into their Retirement Saving Accounts (RSA). According to National Pension Commission (PENCOM) (2016), pension contributions into the retirement saving accounts of employees in private and public sectors rose drastically from ₦15.6 billion in 2004 to ₦503.92 billion in 2013, representing a 3,230.26% growth within a period of nine years. On sectorial analysis, the public sector contributions increased from ₦15.6 billion in 2004 to ₦278.5 billion in 2013, indicating a 1,785.26% growth. The private sector contributions surged by 978.81% from ₦23.03 billion in 2006 to 4225.42 in 2013. The total pension contributions into the retirement saving accounts of employees in private and public sectors

stood at 2,305.9 Trillion in 2013. The public sector accounted for 1,405.78 trillion, signifying 60.70% of total pension fund contributed, while the private sector accounted for 910.12 billion or 39.30% of the contributions. This programme was encouraging, but there is a great gap between social policy and implementation. It has been recorded that pensioners and retirees have been deprived the opportunities to access their funds, the process has been bureaucratized.

Prior to the establishment of PenCom, the government established National Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP). The programme is a 2001 programme by the Nigerian government aiming at poverty reduction, in particular, reduction of absolute poverty. It was designed to replace the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP). NAPEP and National Poverty Eradication Council (NAPEC) coordinate and oversee various other institutions, including ministries, and develop plans and guidelines for them to follow with regards to poverty reduction. NAPEP goals include (1) training youths in vocational trades, (2) to support internship, (3) to support micro-credit, (4) create employment in the automobile industry, and (5) help VVF patients. The programme helped lots of people through various initiatives especially the provision of the popular Keke NAPEP. The poverty alleviation programme too has been a failure because of the insincerity of government, change of governments and their personalised programmes, and corruption that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the Nigerian leadership.

Another social security policies in the Fourth Republic is the establishment of the National Health Insurance Scheme. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is a corporate body established under Act 35 of 1999 Constitution by the Federal Government of Nigeria to improve the health of all Nigerians at an affordable cost, through various prepayment systems. NHIS is totally committed to securing universal coverage and access to adequate and affordable healthcare in order to improve the health status of Nigerians, especially for those participating in the various programmes/products of the Scheme. Though the NHIS's stated goal is to provide universal health care access, sadly the percentage

of the Nigerian population with health care coverage remains stuck at around 10 percent. Part of the problem has to do with wording of the NHIS Act itself, which requires only federal government employees and private sector businesses with 10 or more employees to register with NHIS. Unfortunately, the majority of government workers work for state agencies, not federal agencies. Since the law does not apply to them, most do not opt to join NHIS. Another problem is that, in the private sector, many Nigerian companies do not register their employees with the government to avoid paying taxes. Employees who work under-the-table do not receive health insurance, so it is a losing situation for everyone except for the employer (NHIS, 2016).

The government also created the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) policy. NEEDS focus on four key strategies: reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth, and generating employment. It is based on the notion that these goals can be achieved only by creating an environment in which business can thrive; government is redirected to providing basic services, and people are empowered to take advantage of the new livelihood opportunities the plan will stimulate (NEEDS, 2004). In Nigeria, every administration that is in power comes up with a new policy initiative instead of building the previous one. For instance, late Yar'Adua administration dumped the NEEDS policy and birthed the Vision 20:2020 and the seven-point agenda. The Transformation agenda was introduced under Jonathan. One problem of the Nigeria leaders is their inability to understand that real reform requires systematic policy initiatives and that well thought-out and coordinated policy actions drive social and economic development. Due to this, the NEEDS policy could not achieve its policy (Ayorinsola, 2014). The expiration of the NEEDS policy plan left most Nigerians in poverty rather than out of it as it was one of the policy's thrust.

The government of Muhammadu Buhari initiated the N-Power programme. The programme was conceived to engage over 500,000 unemployed youths and divided into two phases. N-Power aspires to provide a platform where most Nigerians can access skills acquisition

and development. At this time however, the initial modular programmes in N-Power are designed for Nigerian citizens between the ages of 18- 35 years. Another social security of the Buhari administration is the Anchor Borrowers Programme. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in line with its developmental function, established the Anchor Borrowers Program (ABP). The Programme which was launched by President Muhammadu Buhari on November 17, 2015 is intended to create a linkage between anchor companies involved in the processing and small holder farmers (SHFs) of the required key agricultural commodities. The programme thrust of the ABP is provision of farm inputs in kind and cash (for farm labour) to small holder farmers to boost production of these commodities, stabilize inputs supply to agro processors and address the country's negative balance of payments on food. At harvest, the SHF supplies his/her produce to the Agro-processor (Anchor) who pays the cash equivalent to the farmer's account (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2017). Amidst this social security programmes, the gap between the rich and the poor in the country seems to be widened; and the country is still known to have the largest percentage of her citizens living in extreme poverty in the world. The issue of insecurity and the various crises including the terrorist activities and largely a product of the federal and state government failures to institutionalize social security ability in Nigeria. As mentioned before, the government and the elite manipulation of the national resources are responsible for the current social insecurity situation in Nigeria.

For the purpose of hindsight, some other social security schemes set up by the Federal Government over the years includes, Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF), Pension Scheme, Pension Reform Act (PRA), and Employee Compensation Act (ECA). Some of the actors/drivers of government social security policy includes the National Planning Commission, Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, the Ministry of Youth Development, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour and Productivity, National Directorate of Employment, Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund, Pension Commission, and National Health Insurance Scheme.

Conclusion

Social security programmes are usually established as a means of improving the well-being of the poor, reduce inequality within society and conciliate different social demands, but in the case of Nigeria, the reverse is the case because inequality and neglect has been the case. Hands on experience of wanting to help the poor in our society have been commandeered by the powerful elites. For the government and powerful stakeholders have not structured any articulate policy to assist the poor. Even the haphazard social security programmes organized by government have been manipulated and weakened by the powerful military and state officials.

There is no doubt that social security arrangements are collective remedies against adversity and deficiencies; ranging from pensions to disability compensations, death benefits as well as free quasi healthcare education and employment. A comprehensive social security in Nigeria has the potential to significantly reduce economic insecurities and enhance economic efficiency, equity, growth, and stability given the dismal socio-economic statics as captured by human development, human poverty, and the gender-related indices. However, insecurity, in Nigeria has increased poverty, unemployment, corruption, inequality, poor government policies, and weak judicial system and so on. Nigeria has been marred by social unrest, including domestic terrorism and herdsmen attacks just to mention a few. As a result of this unrest, the region ranked the highest in the area of insecurity in Nigeria. The impacts include devastation of agricultural production damage to public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and bridges and astonishing loss of life and mass displacement of people. Yet, security spending in the country's budget is high and the situation continues to worsen in the Northern part of Nigeria. As for the impact of the herdsmen attacks in the North, it is confirmed reports that farms have been destroyed, crops have been lost and the incentive to plant again in these areas has declined. These effects could translate to deepening poverty and food insecurity. Insecurity results in damage to critical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and bridges have become

a common feature. Furthermore, insecurity has displaced millions of people resulting in extreme pressures on those who have been displaced and on the federal and state governments that have provided some humanitarian assistance.

This is attributed to the failure of Nigeria state in honouring its contractual agreement to respect and sustain its social contract with the Nigerian people. As a result, this brought about total collapse of social security and consequently encourages insecurity. If the government fight against insecurity is to succeed, it must sit up to address the above problems or else the fight is going to be a mirage. There is need to institutionalise and build on appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms within the systems through which social protection programmes are implemented. It will also be important to encourage bottom-up systems of accountability. As social security programmes are rolled out, households and communities must be aware of their entitlements (and also why they may not be entitled) so that they can hold implementers accountable. Government should demonstrate good governance and political will which are the panacea for the insecurity challenge in Nigeria. The war against insecurity would be won only by raising governance standards that is, cultivating the culture of good governance where the government is responsible and accountable to the people. Security engagement cannot be separated from good governance. However, good governance is a function of effective, visionary, transparent, trustworthy and credible political leadership whose driving force is an improvement in the collective wellbeing of the citizens.

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Gas, Carrot and Stick Approach: Nord Stream 2, European Union, Transatlantic Partnership and African Alternatives

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Abstract

With the successful completion of the first string of Nord Stream 2, June 2021, the long-delayed pipeline project finally comes on stream. Nord Stream 2 pipeline sucks in diverse interests, generates controversies, provokes criticisms, and creates uncertainties among its many stakeholders. From Russia to the Baltic region to the EU, the US and Africa, the pipeline offers different realities; illusion, vulnerability, pragmatic nationalism, political conservatism, and economic development prospect. But, why is Nord Stream 2 intensely controversial? What strategic calculations and interests inform stakeholders' engagements with the pipeline project? This study seeks to provide a critical contextualisation of Nord Stream 2 in a thorough synthesis of extant literature. The paper argues that Nord Stream 2 is a geo-political and geo-economic energy infrastructure, with the different stakeholders involved in the project deploying a continuum of instruments and approaches in furtherance of a foreign policy issue. The study concludes that Nord Stream 2 will have strategic implication for EU's energy policy, significantly frustrate transatlantic partnership, and undermine the prospect of increased Africa's gas export to Europe.

Keywords: *Africa, energy security, european union, Nord Stream 2, Russia, transatlantic partnership*

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Introduction

No pipeline has generated as much controversy as the Nord Stream 2. Otherwise known as the Baltic Sea pipeline, Nord Stream 2 is defined by a convergence of diverse interests and stakeholders, high-wire, classical geopolitics, and energy security permutations. The pipeline is as much an economic enterprise as it is a geo-political project (Schmitt, 2021). It is reminiscent of cold war politics, unpacks decades-old alliance system, divisive in practicability, and highlights different economic realities especially in Europe. Expected to be operational in late 2021 following the completion of string 1 of the project, Nord Stream 2 will run alongside the already constructed Nord Stream 1 and will double the volume of gas being piped to Europe (Gazprom, 2021). Expectedly, the pipeline will ensure sustainable gas supply to Europe while providing Russia unfettered direct access to European gas market (Westphal, 2021). However, the fractured relationship between Russia and the West especially in the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the poisoning of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny on August 20, 2020, has heightened European scepticism about the project and the reliability of Russia in meeting her gas obligations (EU Parliament Resolution, 2021; Ellyatt, 2020). Nord Stream 2 is pivotal to Europe energy security, it is nonetheless a proxy for Russian hybrid warfare (Ratsiborynska, 2018).

Though the first string of the pipeline was successfully completed in June, concerns over security, environment and geopolitics remain (Russell, 2021). The core concern for Germany, Europe's biggest natural gas consumer, centres around the country's dependence on Russian energy, which could make her susceptible to external pressure and manipulation and the environmental impact of the project which has been vociferously articulated by the German Green Party. But Angela Merkel is quick to dismiss such security and environmental risks, maintaining that Nord Stream 2 is a diversification and long-term economic survival strategy for Germany (Westphal, 2021). Ukraine has got some reservations, too, but its unique location as Russia's gatekeeper to the EU gas market gave it a geostrategic advantage. By 2017, about 40% of Europe's gas consumption

was piped from Russia through Ukraine, with Kiev generating between \$2-3billion (3% of GDP) in transit fees annually from its role as a “middle-man” (Cohen, 2018). Attempting to bypass Ukraine which Nord Stream 2 seeks to achieve, amounts to weakening substantial geopolitical and economic leverage which Ukraine enjoys. Ending gas transit could considerably reduce Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) (EU Parliament Resolution, 2021). As much as there are concerns of Nordic security because the 1,230 kilometre pipeline criss-crosses the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Finland, Sweden and Denmark, the project offers significant mutual economic benefits. By December 2018, collectively, Finland, Sweden and Denmark had received 832 million euros in direct investment from Nord Stream 2, rising from 388 million euros in the previous year (Kruse & Berkahn, 2019). The pipeline is also fuelling worries in the U.S. and other countries that may be subjected to Kremlin’s pressure upon successful completion. Despite U.S. sanctions that halted construction for a year, Nord Stream 2 is finally on stream (Langrock, 2021). U.S. reaction may, however, not be unconnected with her resolve to contain further Russian leverage on the EU while growing her share of the continent’s gas imports. Accordingly, U.S. economic sanctions against Nord Stream 2 is partly a containment strategy, reminiscent of the cold war. The project touches on sensitive interests in many quarters, and differs widely among EU countries. Though a commercial venture, Nord Stream 2 will have high political and geostrategic costs, as well as present a challenge for energy diplomacy.

Within a regional and transatlantic context, this present undertaking critically examines the implication of the Baltic Sea pipeline. Successful completion of pipe laying for the first line of the project in June 2021, justifies a re-examination of the issues and concerns around the project. In this regard, the focus is whether the European Union’s energy security is promoted or Russian leverage on the Union is enhanced as a consequence of this new development, and the implication of the pipeline project for transatlantic partnership and alternative African gas markets. The latter consideration comes on the back of continuing Africa’s gas exports to the

EU through pipeline infrastructure, but there is a reasonable prospect of stagnation as a result of increased Russian gas supply to the EU through Nord Stream 2 despite emerging Russia-Africa energy rapprochement which is seen in accelerated Russian gas investments in Ghana, Mozambique, and other parts of Africa. In addition, political and economic challenges along Africa's gas corridors combine to frustrate the continent's capacity as a viable potential and real gas supplier to the EU. As it stands, the pipeline has morphed into an issue bogged down by a continuum of strategic interests and countervailing measures, carrot and stick approach, and soft and hard power diplomacy. Over all, the implication of Nord Stream 2 for Europe, U.S., transatlantic partnership, and Africa can be fully appreciated within the context of Europe's energy consumption mix.

Conceptual Clarification

A brief description of key concepts, such as Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and TurkStream (including TurkStream 2) is critical to a better appreciation of the focus of the study. It is important to note that these "streams" are gas pipelines connecting Russian gas fields with European gas markets, through different corridors. Nord Stream 2, as noted in subsequent sections of the study, is a pair of 1,230 kilometres (764-mile) pipelines that would transport natural gas from Ust-Luga, Russia to Greifswald, Germany through the Black Sea (See figure 1). Collectively known as Nord Stream 2, the two pipelines are expected to transport 55 bcm every year, double the capacity of the existing undersea route (the original Nord Stream), completed in 2012. The pipeline is expected to run alongside the already constructed Nord Stream. Like Nord Stream 2, Nord Stream also runs from Russia, Portovya Bay near Vyborg to Lubmin near Greifswald, Germany, through the Baltic Sea, with an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic metres of gas. Gazprom holds a majority stake (51%) in Nord Stream AG, the company handling the construction and operation of Nord Stream projects (Gazprom, 2021).

TurkStream (otherwise known as Turkish Stream) is a pipeline project connecting Russia with Turkey through the Black Sea. The pipeline project,

Russia's southern pipeline to Europe, includes both onshore (180km) and offshore components (910km) (Turk Stream, 2021). The first of the pipeline's two strings is destined for Turkey, while the second line delivers gas to southern and southeastern Europe, with each of the strings having the capacity to deliver 15.75 billion cubic meters per year (a combined 31.5 bcm per year). The TurkStream delivers gas to Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary (Turk Stream, 2021).

Europe's Gas Dependence: A Critical Overview

EU energy consumption comes from two sources; domestic production and imports. In 2019, 31% of EU energy consumption came from internal sources, while 61% was external (Eurostat, 2020). Of that mix, petroleum products accounted for 36%, while natural gas and renewable energy had 22% and 15%, respectively. During same period, nuclear energy contributed 13% to EU energy consumption mix, while solid fossil fuels recorded 13% (Eurostat, 2020). However, the shares of the different energy sources in the overall energy mix varied considerably between member states. Natural gas accounts for about a quarter of EU's primary energy mix and it's the second-largest energy source in Western Europe. In 2019, total EU gas imports by pipeline stood at 237.0 bcm, as against 211.3 bcm in 2020 (British Petroleum, 2021). The decline in EU gas imports in 2020, falling by over 8%, may not be unconnected with COVID-19 as the pandemic had a troubling impact on the global economy, including global energy markets. In 2020, Russia was the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, accounting for 45.5% of the economic blocs' natural gas consumption, followed by Norway, Algeria, and Qatar with 22.7%, 11.6%, and 6.1%, respectively (Eurostat, 2021). LNG imports to the EU enjoyed a sizeable share of roughly 18% (Eurostat, 2021). The five biggest consumer nations in the EU in 2020 were: Germany with 86.5 bcm, Italy with 67.7 bcm, France with 40.7 bcm, the Netherlands with 36.6 bcm, and Spain with 32.4 bcm (British Petroleum, 2021). Stagnating indigenous production couple with increasing consumption, driven primarily by the electricity generation sector and households, have heightened the need for increased

importation (IEA, 2020). With Norway seeking to expand its oil and gas production capacity in a new policy shift (Adomaitris, 2020), the EU may well have found a more reliable gas source in the Scandinavia. However, it will take a while before a marked policy departure commitment begin to yield expected outcomes.

There are a few other alternatives to the natural gas supplies from Russia. These include Nigeria, Algeria, Norway, the Caspian and Central Asia. Increasing imports from any of these alternatives would be a costly endeavour requiring huge investment in pipeline infrastructure because of internal and external political and economic constraints. Algeria's gas production is stagnating following a period of rapid growth from the second half of the 1990s, and coincides with increased domestic consumption of gas (Ouki, 2019). Hence, its capacity for export is seriously undermined. Russia, through long term contracts with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, is practically the sole outlet for Central Asian gas to Europe, though China's incursion into the region is undermining Kremlin's hold and influence across Central Asia (Pirani, 2019). Such lopsided contractual arrangements coupled with subservient policy measures are employed by Russia to counteract independent European access to Caspian energy. In the near term, therefore, EU's consumption of natural gas will rise, and the union will look increasingly further afield to Russia to meet this need. From a practical point of view, the diversification of gas imports is constrained by the fact that the lion's share of imports (85%) comes via pipelines, a contractual arrangement which tie up both the supply and the demand side for years in advance. In a situation of high energy prices and a seller's market, the EU is obviously in a weaker position, regardless of how gas prices are indexed under the long-term supply contracts (Kavalov et al, 2009). Altogether, these facts and trends are exerting growing pressure on the EU, and Kremlin's energy assertiveness in the EU is expected to increase with the successful completion of ongoing pipeline projects, such as Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream.

However, increasing EU reliance on LNG imports from the United States may pose a threat to Russia's dominance of the EU gas market, at

least in the long run. For now, the concern is the extent to which U.S. LNG will compete against Russia's gas to maintain their market share of EU gas market and to avoid driving price too low. U.S. quest to expand her share of EU gas imports does provide significant insights on why the country is paying so much attention to developments around Nord Stream 2. As the paper shall point out, economics of gas is a crucial element in transatlantic relations, and an important driver of US-Russia gas dispute, with the EU energy dependence providing a vista for "cold war" politics. Washington-Kremlin rivalry is further strengthened by the latter's proclivity to use its natural resource as a malign tool to undermine national leadership, create social upheaval, and effect regime change in a target country. Russia's annexation of Crimea between February and March 2014 was driven by Kremlin's desire to cripple Ukraine's gas diversification strategy anchored on Crimean's 4-13 trillion cm estimated gas deposit (Umbach, 2014). Such aggressive geo-strategic moves are implicated in the complicated relationship between the US and Russia. For now, a highly gas thirsty and dependent Europe is a beautiful bride of Russia and the US, two key gas exporters keen on maintaining, and possibly expanding their gas strongholds in Europe, either by "carrot" or "stick," or a combination of both.

Russia's Gas Exports to the EU and the Troubled Russian-Ukraine Corridor

The EU is a major market for Russian gas, with 40% of the bloc's gas imports from Russia transported through pipelines that cross Ukraine (Pifer, 2021). However, there have been increasing concerns over Russia's reliability as an energy exporter since the 2006 gas dispute with Ukraine, which resulted in Russia cutting off gas shipments to Ukraine and Ukraine siphoning off Russian gas destined for Europe (Hubert & Irina, 2009). Russia had sought a higher gas price in the new supply contracts, which Ukraine rejected. The development resulted in a temporary mid-winter interruption in the EU gas supply, only for deliveries to resume after Russia had warped under immense pressure from Western Europe.

The hope that Western Europe could remain undamaged from the conflict about gas transportation was shattered in January 2009. Like the 2006 gas crisis, the parties in the January 2009 hostility became so ingrained that Russia stopped the supply of gas completely to prevent Ukraine from using the gas supplies destined for Western Europe to supplement its own reduction in supply, but the southeast European countries which have no alternative supply routes available to them were badly hit by the crisis (Kovacevic, 2009). The impact of the conflict on the northern countries was less pronounced because, among others, they receive a share of their gas imports from the Yamal pipeline through Belorussia (Belarus) and Poland (Pirani et al., 2009). However this route is also by no means secure. After the completion of the Yamal pipeline, relations between Russia and Belarus deteriorated considerably, and like Ukraine, Belarus also resisted any adjustment of its import prices up to the international level (Kovacevic, 2009). When Belarus diverted gas from transit pipeline in February 2004, Russia completely stopped supplies. Consequently, recipients located further to the west, especially Poland, Germany and Russian enclave of Kaliningrad were cut off completely before the crisis was resolved (Pirani et al., 2009). There have been gas disputes between Russia and Belarus since then; in 2016 and 2020.

Both transit states, the Ukraine and Belarus, have abused their strategic positions in the transport system in order to get significant concessions with regard to their own gas imports (Hubert & Irina, 2009). Hence more than a quarter of the gas export profits have flown in the past as rents to the transit countries due to their strategic position in the existing transport system (Balmaceda, 2013). Such a burden on the transit system has reduced the willingness to invest in the development of new gas fields and is also shared in the long term by the consumers in Europe in the form of higher prices for Russian gas. Against this backdrop, the construction of Nord Stream 2, bypassing existing transit corridors is seen as a way of checking incessant crisis along the transit routes and undue influence of the transit states.

Again, in 2014, another gas dispute erupted. On 16 June Russia had turned off gas supply, after complaining that Ukraine had failed to pay off its debts, estimated at \$5.3 billion (Reuters, 2014). The crisis was complicated by the invasion of Crimea same year. Ukraine responded by embarking on a reverse flow supply from neighbouring EU countries, namely Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (Kirby, 2014). Though Russian gas, these imports are purchased from traders on the market. Despite tense legal and political relations and construction of “bypasses,” Ukraine remains an important export route for Russian gas to Europe. Though Gazprom is seeking to lower its reliance on Ukraine to transport its gas to Europe, coming on the back of a new five-year gas transmission agreement whose negotiation was facilitated by the EU Commission, and accelerated by the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Nord Stream 2 (see details below), Ukraine will earn \$7 billion in revenue as a transit state in the next five years (Bloomberg, 2020). Russia had earlier proposed a one-year gas agreement with Ukraine following the expiration of the last agreement in December 2019, instead of five years eventually agreed on (Pirani & Sharples, 2020). Russia’s earlier stand should be seen as a time-buying strategy to see Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream become fully operational before Gazprom finally end gas transit via Ukraine. The economic consequences of a near end to Ukraine’s strategic position viz-a-viz Russia’s gas supply to Europe feeds into Moscow’s overarching plan to add Ukraine to its circuit. Nord Stream 2 could contribute to the isolation of Ukraine from potential European allies and make it more vulnerable to Russian aggression. Long term economic viability of Ukraine will depend on the outcome of the resolution of the gas dispute. While it looks likely that the US will concede to successful completion of the pipeline project, the faith of Ukraine hangs in the balance.

The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline

Nord Stream 2 (see Fig. 1), the largest offshore pipeline in the world (Kruse & Berkahn, 2019), is a pair of 1,230 kilometres (764-mile) pipelines

that would transport natural gas from Ust-Luga, Russia to Greifswald, Germany through the Baltic Sea (Gazprom, 2021). Collectively known as Nord Stream 2, the two pipelines are expected to transport 55 bcm every year, double the capacity of the existing undersea route (the original Nord Stream) which was completed in 2012, and they will pass through the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of five countries: Russia, Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, who have granted all permits necessary for construction (Gazprom, 2021).

The construction of Nord Stream 2 is being handled by Nord Stream 2 AG, a joint venture of five major international finance partners: Gazprom (Russia), Anglo-Dutch Shell (British/Dutch), Uniper and Wintershall Dea (Germany), Engie (French), OMV (Austria), with Gazprom providing 50% of the project funding (Gazprom, 2021). Upon completion, Nord Stream 2 would have gulped a whopping 9.5 billion euros (\$11.6 billion) (Nord Stream AG, 2021). Initially expected to begin operation late 2019, the project was frustrated by U.S. sanctions that stalled the pipe laying activities of Swiss contractor Allseas Group SA.



Fig. 1: Nord Stream 2. Source: Gazprom

Legal Context of Nord Stream 2

Though a subject of legal interpretations and debates especially regarding its status viz-a-viz EU's Third Party Package (TEP) and Gas Market Directive (as amended), Nord Stream 2 derives its basis from international conventions and treaties. Article 79 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) provides that "all States are entitled to lay submarine pipelines and cables on the continental shelf [of another state]" (UNCLOS, 1982). The coastal state may not hinder the laying of pipelines *per se*, but enjoys the prerogatives to ensure that "reasonable measures" are taken to protect the environment, and the demarcation of the pipeline "is subject to the consent of the coastal state" (UNCLOS, 1982).

In addition to UNCLOS, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, commonly known as the Espoo Convention, signed in Espoo, Finland in 1991 and entered into force in 1997, sets out an obligation to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of any project "that is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact, including large diameter oil and gas pipelines" (Espoo, 1991). The EIA, prepared by the Nord Stream 2 consortium, included "possible alternatives to the proposed activity, including a no-action alternative" (Espoo, 1991). In this regard, Nord Stream 2 AG submitted an application in 2019 to the Danish Energy Agency for the 175 kilometre-long alternative route passing through Danish EEZ to the north-west of Bornholm (Danish Energy Agency, 2020). Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany are referred to as Parties of Origin to the Espoo Convention, as the pipeline passes through their EEZs, but Russia is only a signatory power, not a party to the Convention. However, she took part in the EIA process. Construction permits were given by Parties of Origin following approval of the EIA procedures.

The Espoo Convention seeks to "ensure environmentally sound and sustainable development" (Espoo Convention, 1991) through the prevention, reduction and control of significant adverse transboundary environmental impacts from proposed activities. The Convention assumed that addressing environmental issues early in the planning

process through international cooperation will improve the project's final environmental performances. In its preamble the convention affirmed the "need to give explicit consideration to environmental factors at an early stage in the decision-making process..." (Espoo Convention, 1991). This position is also reinforced by the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), which provides that the EIA process should be applied "as early as possible in decision making." (IAIA, 1999) to ensure that its objectives are met.

Nord Stream 2: Promoting Russian Leverage or EU's Energy Security?

Does the Baltic Sea pipeline promote EU's energy security or enhance Russian leverage over the Union? Expectedly, the Baltic Sea pipeline will reduce uncertainty in the EU market over the reliability of Russian gas supplies, allowing Russia to export its gas directly, and in greater volumes, to Europe (Gazprom, 2021). It will not only eliminate transit fees payable to Ukraine and Belarus, but also reduce Russia's dependence on those countries for gas exportation, to the economic benefit of both importer and exporter (Kruse & Berkahn, 2019). Moreover, as Russia invests billions in this pipeline, Kremlin will have strong incentives to keep it full and profitable (Bouwmeester & Oosterhaven, 2017). Transit fees from gas crossing through Eastern European countries will no longer be factored into the price that EU countries pay for gas, thereby making it cheaper (Kruse & Berkham, 2019). However, the countries of Central Europe, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary will lose some transit revenues that supplement their national incomes and strengthen their economies (Fischer, 2016; Bouwmeester & Oosterhaven, 2017). Overall, Nord Stream 2 will enhance EU's energy security, which is particularly advantageous to Germany because it would make Germany the primary distributor of Russian gas in Europe. In light of the installed total capacities of the project, even a complete breakdown of supply through the Ukraine and Belarus would barely have any consequences on the supply to north-west Europe. But the pipeline could also detract from long-term EU goals, including reducing reliance on hydrocarbons and

enhancing financial stability in the newer EU member states (European Parliament, 2021).

The pipeline will promote mutual dependence between the EU and Russia though, Western Europe's dependence on Russian imports will grow only to the extent that Nord Stream 2 supplies additional natural gas from Russia and not just redirects gas from other transit routes (Lang & Westphal, 2017). The pipeline would create, in fact, mutual dependence akin to a relationship between parties in a contractual commercial gas agreement. This argument is reinforced by the fact that unlike liquefied gas, natural gas cannot be transported to a destination other than the given pipeline (Stern, 2017). It is therefore possible that this interdependence might be used to enhance the EU's ability to secure greater Russian compliance with the rules and norms of the global energy market. The foregoing argument has implications for broader EU-Russian economic relations. Europe needs to deepen its economic relations with Russia in order to ensure amicable relations. The hymn should be "engage Russia" to create harmony. Nord Stream 2, from this stand point, should provide much needed platform for renewed economic rapprochement between the two parties, and hence, peaceful coexistence.

Nord Stream 2: "Gazpromizing" European Energy Security

Increased Russian gas export to Europe offers significant benefits, but there are more daunting negative consequences, such as greater "Gazpromization" of European gas market and lack of comparatively cost-effective energy market diversification, with the end result being increased Russian leverage over the EU. Furthermore, Moscow has demonstrated authoritarian and assertive posture in its domestic and foreign policies. Russia spearheaded the creation of a "gas-OPEC," which would include Iran and Turkmenistan. Such a cartel would control the world's first, second, and fourth largest gas reserves, which together house 73 percent of total natural gas reserves (Finon, 2007). This, no doubt, would have significant influence over the LNG market especially. Though the likelihood of a gas cartel in the mould of the Doha-based 12-country

Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) being able to exercise control over all gas movements worldwide in a manner comparable to OPEC seems unrealistic due to the unique nature of the gas market and the inability of major gas producers to evolve a consensus price-setting institutional mechanism. For instance, two major gas exporters, US and Australia, are not GECF members, while Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, the remaining major gas exporters in the organisation, are currently burdened by US economic sanctions (Mammadov, 2019). Hence, the effectiveness of such a gas cartel is already seriously undermined. However, LNG market is vulnerable to manipulation; and could decide to prevent excess supply through delivery optimisation and use of destination clauses (Wagbara, 2007).

In times of shortages, Russia will have to prioritise among its consumers and choose between the larger states of the continent or the smaller states within the former Soviet territory with which Russia's relations are unsatisfactory. There are reasons to believe that states with strained relations with Russia will have to stand back in their imports of energy. This has been the case within the Baltic region and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Hedenskog & Larsson, 2007). Practically speaking, this decreases the bargaining position of the EU-member states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, but also Belarus and Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia. When the level of sensitivity and vulnerability of already weak members increases, this has at least two consequences. First, their interests in seeking alternative (non-Russian) fuel sources are boosted, i.e. they devote more interest to domestic fuel sources such as shale oil and coal, something that goes against the EU's ambition of decreasing usage of fossil fuels and non-renewable resources. For instance, Ukraine signed a \$10 billion (6 billion pounds) shale gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell in 2013 in a major step away from dependency on Russian gas imports (Zhdannikov, 2013). Secondly, when relatively weak states lose power vis-à-vis Russia, an actor that has previously acted coercively, their ability to act as security providers in the region is reduced (Zhdannikov, 2013). Nord Stream 2 improves Germany's rather than the EU's energy security, at least

as long as Germany has a cordial relationship with Russia. However, the project undermines energy security for several other members, which in turn undermines the EU's development towards becoming one united actor. Russia's inclination to put pressure on its neighbours in times of crises cannot be ruled out, as Russia has previously resorted to this practice – even against EU and NATO members (Lepesant, 2014; Adomeit, 2011).

Naturally, Russia's ability to control the gas flow will also increase with regard to states that depend on the pipeline; Germany, and possibly, the Netherlands, the UK, and Belgium. They might become more sensitive to Russian pressure. It is difficult to see them becoming vulnerable to the same extent as the weaker states of Eastern Europe. However, if there are technical possibilities for Russia to tamper with the flow of gas to individual states without affecting the supply to others, there are tangible threats to the importing states, especially when something happens to trigger a crisis. This does not seem to be an imminent problem, since Russia is keener on preserving good relations with these states than with those of the CIS or Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, Germany should not exaggerate its special role vis-à-vis Moscow. During the 2007 Russia-Belarus energy dispute, Russia cut some of the supplies to Belarus, which eventually also affected Germany. Russia had its reasons for cutting supplies, but it is noteworthy that Germany was not given any prior notice (Mammadov, 2020). Even without Nord Stream 2 Russia already provides as much as 40% of EU gas needs (see Eurostat, 2021) and once that goes online, increased dependency of EU on Russia with the attendant vulnerability of the bloc to Russia's blackmail is an instant reality. It is therefore not surprising that President Donald Trump described Germany as a "captive of Russia" at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels (Kluth, 2020).

It is true that Russia has traditionally been a reliable gas supplier to the "West" and therefore no need for Western Europe to be anxious about Russia's reliability (Stern, 2005). However, are not Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland parts of "the West" today? The new and prospective EU members have been targeted by aggressive Russian foreign policy to a greater extent than Western parts of Europe (Stern, 2009). Even the

slightest risk of having supplies cut for political reasons as in the Russia-Belarus gas dispute of 2010 intended to arm-twist President Alexander Lukashenko to join a new customs union led by Russia, moves the project into the security realm even for the EU. Without recognising the priorities and vulnerabilities of the new members, the EU loses legitimacy in its northern axis and the process of integration loses impetus (Stern, 2005).

United States and Nord Stream 2: Strategic Interests and Countervailing Measures

Why is the United States interested in Nord Stream 2? And how has successive U.S. governments responded to the project? The U.S. conceives of Nord Stream 2 as a geopolitical project (Blinken, 2021). Otherwise, as observed by energy policy makers in the U.S., the ideal would have been, at least from the standpoint of economic and commercial viability, to connect the pipeline to existing gas infrastructure that transit Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. As it turned out, the project would divert gas from existing gas pipelines especially from Russia's western neighbours thereby by-passing Ukraine and denying Kiev much needed revenue accruable from its position as a transit state. Nord Stream 2 is a new pipeline, but may not deliver new gas to Europe (Meredith, 2021). In this regard, Washington considers the project as a critical component of Russia's multi-layered gas policy designed to project Kremlin global assertiveness (Blinken, 2021), with the potentials of undermining transatlantic partnership and US' geostrategic and economic interests in Europe.

Moreover, the project is vividly demonstrative of the way in which Russia uses her energy (including critical energy infrastructure) to project rising regional and global influence, roll back the progress of the West in its battle against resurgent global authoritarianism, undermine western electoral processes through cyber-attacks and disinformation strategies, and institutionalise state-sponsored corruption and influence of "ghost money" in western democracies (Branford, 2017; Blank, 2021). In addition, "on a marginal cost basis, the pipeline project is a circumventing strategy against competitively priced U.S. LNG" (Goldthau, 2016). It offers a

formidable competition, and enjoys a considerable market share which the U.S. LNG has to grapple with.

For the United States, very important issues of US-Germany cooperation and its potentials for addressing global challenges of climate change and COVID-19 pandemic, Europe's energy and national security interests, Ukraine's long-term economic and strategic stability, and security of the Baltic region and transatlantic alliance are critical in formulating a national policy response to the Russian gas pipeline project. In response to the threats of Nord Stream 2 to U.S. strategic interests therefore, successive U.S. governments, from Barack Obama through Donald Trump were opposed to the implementation of the project, as both chambers of Congress on a bipartisan basis, despite repeated assurances to European investors that the U.S. would not use the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act against any Russian energy export pipelines initiated before August 2, 2017 (Hackenbroich & Liik, 2021).

Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the U.S. was intensely against the completion of the project, with the President applying sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and its management team (Gardner & Daphne, 2021). During this period, the Congress also made several attempts at halting the pipeline through sanctions which targeted the shipping industry as well oil and gas technology. The U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2020, the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) sanctions had targeted pipe-laying vessels involved in Nord Stream 2 (McDougall, et al., 2020).

However, from his initial opposition to the project; a continuation of Trump's approach which was widely applauded by overwhelming majority in both Chambers of the Congress, President Joe Biden has chosen a less combative approach to Nord Stream 2, loosening sanctions on the project and initiating sanction waivers. Joe Biden's policy stand finds justification in Ambassador Daniel Fried's argument. Fried had observed in Hackenbroich & Liik (2021) that:

sanctioning a German-Russian project is possible, but would be too costly. Doing so would not be in line with...a guiding principle of

US foreign policy: America may have the power to take a certain action, but it sometimes needs to privilege cooperation with allies where it really matters...

This runs contrary to Secretary Antony Blinken's vow during Congressional confirmation hearing to frustrate the project and prevent its successful completion. Blinken's expressive pledge resulted in Biden's Administration initial imposition of sanctions to stall the construction of the project by imposing sanctions on the entities involved in the pipeline construction. In the aftermaths, several Russian companies were affected, including Koksokhimtrans, Mortransservice, the Samara Heat and Power Property Fund and the Russian Marine Rescue Service, while 13 Russian ships were blacklisted (Langrock, 2021). But the measures exempted the Russian-backed Nord Stream AG in the "national interest" of the United States (US State Department, 2021), a decision which drew the anger of Congressional members across party divides, and despite the State Department acknowledging that the company and its chief executive, Matthias Warnig, had engaged in "sanctionable behaviour" (US State Department, 2021).

As noted by the US State Department (2021), Nord Stream 2 is "a bad deal for Europe" though, Biden's Administration is not inclined to deploying extraterritorial sanctions in resolving issues with Europe, at least for now. Whereas Washington appreciates the enormous impact of Nord Stream 2 on EU and Ukraine's energy security, there is a preference for a less belligerent approach in the emerging US-EU rapprochement. In what could be considered as a major historical twist, Antony Blinken who had hitherto expressly vowed to frustrate the completion of Nord Stream 2 is now the leading figure in the resolution of the crisis which the pipeline project had created for transatlantic partnership. The Biden administration had chosen to issue sanctions waivers in exchange for a package deal which would guarantee Europe's energy security by reducing its dependence on Russia's gas, and Ukraine's connection to European gas infrastructure at the expiration of the new five year gas deal between Kiev

and Moscow (Shalal, et al., 2021). There are doubts as to the viability of the deal and its ability to assuage the concerns of Washington on Europe's energy security, but there should not be any ambiguity as to the likelihood of such sanction waivers weakening US containment strategy against Russia especially in relations to Europe.

U.S. policy flip-flop under President Biden; a carrot and stick approach towards Nord Stream 2, is a confounding reality in some quarters, and a series of well-judged actions in several others, but it is suggestive of U.S. uneasiness and uncertainties around the project. In a wider context, the US approach especially under Biden could be seen as part of the grand strategy to strengthening transatlantic security especially in the wake of rising Chinese and Russian influence in Western Europe. Rebuilding U.S-German relationship will also be critical to addressing shared global challenges, such as climate change and COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, the resolve of Biden to abandon Trump's unending belligerent grandiloquence toward Angela Merkel's government and reversed his call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Germany. President's Biden's decision to re-enter the Paris climate change Accord should also be seen as part of this grand transatlantic relationship building agenda.

Nord Stream 2: Prospects for renewed transatlantic partnership

Nord Stream 2 presents an enormous strategic challenge for European countries, individually and collectively, and the United States. How would Europe and America build a partnership in a way that respect and accommodate diverse and divergent perspectives? Nord Stream 2 is divisive; it circumvents Ukraine thereby undermining European unity and solidarity. But for Germany, a traditional U.S. ally, led by an acclaimed Atlanticist in Merkel, geo-economic considerations are critical in an emerging competitive environment where trade is considered a key weapon for economic development (Gens, 2019). So, Germany's interests may well be markedly differentiated from the U.S. strategic politico-economic considerations in relations to Europe. Not only does the pipeline sucks in diverse interests, it makes a reconciliation of competing interests

extremely difficult on European turf. Interestingly, Germany, again, is caught in the web of super power rivalry, much like the cold war political environment. Though today's environment is markedly different from the 90s, Germany yet creates a theatre for super power rivalry and geopolitics.

Nevertheless, the bigger strategic challenge for both Europe and the U.S. arising from Nord Stream 2, lies in rebuilding decades-long transatlantic alliance in a way that fosters mutual benefits, and provides the sturdiness, oneness and robustness needed in dealing with an economically assertive China. But Russia poses as much a strategic threat as China. It is therefore important for the transatlantic partners to work out an effective compromise to address the grey areas around the pipeline through a robust approach that speaks to the critical issues of mutual benefits and threats.

Nord Stream 2 highlights a sovereignty problem for both Germany and Europe. Trump's economic coercion against Europe sought to exploit Europe's dependency on trade and the interconnections of the global trading regimes (Hackenbroich & Liik, 2021), but the threat of economic blackmail could undermine the continent's ability to take economic decisions without external pressure from an Atlantic partner. Illegal American extraterritoriality which U.S. economic sanctions on EU portends, could engender a tit-for-tat, result in a full blown trade war, and tear apart already frayed alliance (Stelzenmuller, 2021; Hackenbroich & Liik, 2021). Importantly, how Germany and Europe respond to U.S. economic threats will send signals to authoritarian states like Russia and China (Hackenbroich & Liik, 2021). The threats posed by the "decade of China," and Russia's energy assertiveness in EU should arm-twist the US in making concessions towards rebuilding the transatlantic partnership. But such concessions should safeguard the interests of existing European transit corridors that are likely to come under significant economic burden following the completion of a new gas bypass.

Legislating on Europe's energy security issue, which the U.S. Congress unwittingly seeks to achieve with the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act, could be counter-productive. While the US may have strong reasons

to kick against Nord Stream 2, economic coercion and sanctions from Washington undermine the very essence of diversifying away from Russian gas, and does little to strengthen Washington's continued solidarity with the EU. Nevertheless, there are reasons to be hopeful of a compromise between the U.S. and Europe, despite the political pressure on both sides. The laying of pipeline for line 1 of the project has now been completed; given this reality, the Biden administration needs to undo significant damages visited on EU-US alliance by President Donald Trump, while addressing the risks posed by the pipeline project to all its stakeholders. There is a greater need for the U.S. to reconnect with Europe and recommit to the transatlantic partnership to provide a moral compass for driving continental unity and promoting transatlantic relations. This realisation became the highlight of President Biden's speech at the Munich Security Conference held in February 2021.

Beyond Nord Stream 2: Examining African Alternatives to Russian Gas Exports to the EU

Diversifying gas import to Europe is critical to EU energy security (European Parliament, 2021). This quest not only promote energy security, it reduces the vulnerability of the bloc to the geopolitical constraints associated with heavy reliance on Russian gas (Stern, 2009). Several alternatives to Russian gas export to the EU already exist, but challenges, such as geography, cost, supply security, and politics frustrate their viability (Stern, 2005). Though a new energy industry expansion policy is in place in Norway, the country's gas production has peaked already (Norway's Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2021). The Netherlands' situation is not different from Norway, and her situation is further complicated by government's decision to halt Groningen gas production by 2022 (Meijer, 2019). In addition, Russia yet exercises significant influence on Ashgabat and Baku, exploiting her strategic military and security agreements with the Eurasian countries (Ramani, 2017). As noted earlier, the US is a net exporter of LNG to Europe. Even where there is necessary infrastructure to liquefy its gas, US supplies to the EU are 30-40% more expensive than Russian piped gas (Kutcherov,

et al. 2020). So, logistics and cost are formidable challenges to US LNG inroads into Europe.

How much of a reliable alternative is African gas to Nord Stream 2? The EU already imports a sizeable volume of its gas needs from North Africa, with Algeria providing 12% of EU gas consumption (Eurostat, 2021). Suffice it to say that all imports from Egypt and about 45% of the Algerian volumes arrive in Europe as liquefied natural (LNG) (Lochner & Dieckhoner, 2011). With the political turmoil in Libya at the start of the decade, the Greenstream pipeline from Libya, which supplies 10bcm of natural gas to Italy each year, stopped operations (Locher & Dieckhoner, 2011), denying the Italian gas market of significant volumes. Algeria is marred by security threats. The four-day hostage crisis in January 2013, highlights security concerns in North Africa's largest hydrocarbon producer. In addition, Algeria's natural gas production and exports have seen significant fluctuation since 2005 (Ratner, M; Belkin, et al. 2013).

The Nigeria-to-Morocco (NTM) gas pipeline provides yet another alternative to Nord Stream 2. The project, a joint venture between the governments of Nigeria and Morocco, was signed in Rabat, Morocco, in 201, and it is driven by the need "to create a competitive regional electricity market with the potential to be connected to the European energy markets" (Reuters, 2013). The NTM pipeline will transport Nigerian gas through the West African gas pipeline (WAGP) to Tangiers in Morocco before reaching Cadiz in Spain (Reuters, 2013). The WAGP, a 421-mile (768-km) pipeline, runs from Escravos in Nigeria's Niger Delta through Badagry in Lagos to Takoradi in Ghana, and already connects Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana (WAGP, 2020). The alternative to NTM is the \$12 billion, 2,485-mile (4,000-km) overland Trans Sahara Pipeline (TSP). Proposed in the 1970s, the TSP was designed to transport Nigeria's gas across the Sahara Desert through Trans-Mediterranean pipeline (TMP), to connect gas stations in Spain and Italy. However, security challenges resulting from the activities of Al-Qaeda in Algeria and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Sahel region, as well a lack of market opportunities have combined to frustrate the TSP project (Conan, 2011). But like the TSP, NTM pipeline faces significant challenges,

including security, vandalism and supply disruptions (Newman, 2021). The WAGP has been frustrated several times by energy-maritime criminal activities of the Niger Delta militants, preventing Nigeria from honouring gas supply agreements with neighbouring states (See Obanijesu & Macaulay, 2009). However, as domestic demand for gas continues to grow across West Africa, it may be expedient for NTM gas pipeline to preference domestic consumption over external needs.

The African alternatives to Russian gas exports to Europe remain marginal especially given the volume of Russian gas currently piped to Europe. Much as Europe currently imports parts of her energy needs from Africa, in the event of significant disruption to Russia's Nord Stream 2, the block may have to look further afield the U.S. and Central Asia to meet rising demands. As it stands, Nord Stream 2 will further alienate African gas producers from the EU as Russia will offer a more comparatively reliable and steady supply. LNG offers a more reliable alternative pathway to EU energy security though, and Nigeria has a comparative advantage in this regard over other African gas suppliers, accounting for half of the continent's current LNG production capacity (Africanews, 2019). But Nigeria's NLG supplies to Europe will face stiff competition from US and Qatar.

Conclusion

It is clear that EU countries cannot at this moment achieve energy efficiency on a level that will substantially reduce demand for fossil fuel. Attaining greater energy security through access to deliveries of fossil fuel is, therefore, of utmost significance in both the near and medium term. However, it will be a great loss to the EU if it allows this approach to lull it into a false sense of energy security and bind itself too closely to a Russia whose energy resources are often deployed in furtherance of national interests. Upon full operations of Nord Stream 2, significant economic benefits will accrue to Russia and the EU. However, these benefits will be partly offset by attendant increase in Russia's ability to use her energy resources to project influence into its former spheres of influence. It is the

view of this paper that, Nord Stream 2 is a medium-term energy solution and, if not supplemented by longer-term solutions, will impose great political and economic consequences.

Whereas Nord Stream 2 will diversify supply routes and promote security of gas supply, EU's increased dependence on Russian gas and the accompanying economic power of Gazprom will prove to be the inevitable consequence. This situation will provide a platform for Russia to be more powerful and possibly, more assertive in its relations with the EU. The development will also embolden Russia in her relations with the US. Germany's endorsement of Nord Stream 2 undermines transatlantic relations and EU solidarity and quest for a common energy policy. In some quarters, the Russo-German gas deal is considered as Germany's endorsement of Russian annexation of Crimea, a perception which strengthens the ember of disunity in Europe. In the light of this and foregoing analyses, this paper, while recognising that Nord Stream 2 creates a bypass option in the event of future conflicts with the transit states, submits that, the pipeline project represents a smokescreen for enhanced Russian leverage over the EU. This submission is reinforced by the realisation that Russia's energy policy has sought to counteract independent European access to other sources of energy particularly the Caspian region. The overall agenda is to consolidate Russia's dominance as a gas exporter and strengthen her hold over European energy supply. Russia's lead in the quest for the formation of the Gas-Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) should be seen as critical to this grand objective. However, the U.S. response to the pipeline project should not be seen entirely from the prism of pragmatic altruism viz-a-viz EU's possible disadvantaged position in relations to Russia. Rather, it should be considered a case of economic patriotism. Any country seeking significant inroads into Europe's energy market would, inevitably, see Nord Stream 2 and Russia's Gazprom as threats. Increased Russian advantage over EU's energy market which the pipeline guarantees, undermines U.S. quest for an accelerated expansion of her LNG exports to Europe. Nord Stream 2 may have signalled

the dawn of a “gas war” between the U.S. and Russia, which will further complicate already fractured relationship between the two.

Overall, this paper has argued that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline will only change the transit route for the transportation of Russian gas to Europe but not the source of gas. The project undermines regional unity and significantly frustrates Africa’s gas export prospect to Europe. In dealing with Russia, therefore, a more formal framework is required to coordinate and streamline EU energy policies. A common energy policy will enable the European countries to develop a common and united front in their relations with both Russia and the US, with the realisation that closer collaboration can head off disagreement and foster mutually beneficial energy transactions.

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The Interface between Crime and Disease: A History of Lunacy Management in Colonial Lagos, 1907–1954

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Abstract

Lunacy management in colonial Lagos was largely situated within the contexts of crime and disease. This was in spite of the enactment of the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916 which stipulated the processes and legal framework for the management of lunacy, whether in the aspect of crime or as a disease. However, a major challenge during the period, which apparently became a controversial issue, in the management of the lunatic vagrants, was the question as to whether these lunatics were “criminals” or merely “sick people.” The theory of social inclusion is adopted in this paper to illuminate the extent to which services were provided for the mentally ill. Using the qualitative historical methodology, which involves the evaluation and presentation of data derived from both primary and secondary sources, this study examines the early colonial developments, legal enactments and implementation, patients and confinement in Lunatic Asylum, and the nature of the management of “criminals” or “lunatics.” It shows that most lunatics who have been tagged civil or criminals were mainly kept in the prisons. It further notes that the nature of the management of lunatics during the period was that of confinement or custodial care. It concludes that in spite of the enactment of 1916, little was done towards the improvement of services for both criminal and civil lunatics. Inevitably, in 1954, the Aro Mental Hospital, Abeokuta, was established to complement that of Lagos and those already existing in the country to help cater for lunatics with violent and non-violent dispositions.

Keywords: colonial, crime/criminality, disease, lunacy, Lagos

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Introduction

The menace sufferers of mental disorders posed to the Lagos society since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prompted the colonial intervention in this matter. (Ademilehin, 1972). This situation sparked a controversy, throughout the colonial period, between the Medical and Prisons Departments as to the proper nosology, treatment or confinement of the mentally ill. This was against the backdrop that the colonial government responded to the growing swarm of vagrant lunatics in the urban centres by founding asylums for their confinement. (Sadowsky, 1999, p.2). The question as to whether these lunatics were “criminals” or “sick people” became a controversial issue during the period. Succinctly, the interface between crime and disease should be placed within the context of those who suffered from a disease of mental illness and had been adjudged by the authorities to have committed a crime in the process of irrationally displaying their sickness. The new colonial administration had consequences on the maintenance of law and order in Lagos which had by now become an emerging microcosm of Nigeria and the major administrative centre of the colonialists. Essentially, health institutions in Lagos were important for the welfare of the diverse ethnic populations inhabiting therein. Inevitably, there was an urgent need for an asylum to take care of the lunatics on the streets of Lagos since some of their families could not be traced. Thus, these lunatics became the responsibility of the government.

The Yaba Lunatic Asylum, Lagos Asylum, and Yaba Asylum are used interchangeably to refer to the Lagos institution for the management and care of lunatics. Similarly, the terms, mentally ill, mentally deranged, psychotics, and lunatic vagrants refer to both civil and criminal lunatics of varying degrees. Generally, the mentally ill or lunatics refers to persons suffering from all such health problems like depression, epilepsy, stress, schizophrenia, delusions, hallucinations, dementia and obsession among other behavioural and emotional disturbances. The social inclusion theory (Pocock, 1975), applies in the study as it reveals the dynamics of the support, challenges and interventions involved in the accommodation of the mentally ill in the Lagos society. Few historical works give insights into

some of the developments witnessed in the nature of care and services provided by health practitioners and institutions for the lunatic vagrants in Lagos and Nigeria at large. Sadowsky (1999) has argued however that these mental institutions, which were created in response to the public security threat posed by untreated lunatics on the streets of Lagos and Calabar, actually became the scandal of the colonial administrators themselves. This connotes that the institutions were not well managed by the colonial government. Vaughan (1991) had already noted that in Africa, colonial asylums were primarily places of restraint which were little different from their equivalents in Britain especially in the areas of understaffing, inadequate space for inmates' accommodation, and so on. Thus, Vaughan expressed that in colonial Africa, there was no such "Great Confinement" of the mentally-deranged. In essence, the establishment of lunatic asylum at the time could not be regarded as a major instrument employed by the colonial administration for social or political control. (Sadowsky, 1991). Vaughan was of the opinion that since the criminally insane were difficult to deal with and that their peculiarities were different from the other non-violent lunatics, then, a lunatic asylum became inevitable in Lagos (Vaughan, 1991).

Early Colonial Developments

Aside from the infamous "Adeola Scandal" in 1888 which involved a case of a suspected female lunatic vagrant who was denied treatment in the colonial hospital, arrested by the colonial authorities, and subsequently died as a result (Akinfemiwa, 1964). Madness was not particularly regarded as a threat to the society as there were only few cases of the menacing effects of lunatic vagrants in Lagos prior to the 1890s. However, there was an apparent increase from the last decade of the nineteenth century. Although it has been argued that there was no epidemiological evidence to show that there was an increase in the prevalence or incidence of mental illness in the region as at the period, the perceived increase was, according to Sadowsky (1999), caused by the growing influx of migrants from the hinterland. He contends that as a result of the influx of migrants, the mentally ill among them consequently stretched the limits of the

effectiveness of available traditional health care methods. As a result of the menacing condition of the mentally deranged on the streets of Lagos during the 1890s, as well the concomitant social problems, the emerging press in Lagos at the time began a strident campaign against the inadequacies of colonial facilities in the improvement of psychiatric services. A notable newspaper in this crusade was the *Lagos Weekly Record* (1907, April 6). The paper lamented the inadequate efforts of the police in quelling the violence sometimes perpetrated by violent lunatic vagrants in Lagos. Similarly, events that happened especially during the 1890s were such that the issue of confinement of these lunatics became a debate in the press as there were calls for and against their confinement, and the practice of traditional healers in their treatment. (Sadowsky, 1999).

Particularly, in the area of the menacing social problems associated with the mentally ill, the *Lagos Weekly Record* (1907) was of the notion that although the police could not be blamed for the existence of vagrant or criminal lunatics in the society, it was their duty to ensure that they did not cause havoc in society. Similarly, an excerpt from another newspaper reporting the menace posed by lunatics on the streets of Lagos during this period stressed the urgent need for a lunatic asylum since the condition of the lunatics in the town was most disgraceful and deplorable. (Ademilehin, 1972). It needs noting that during this period, the mentally ill were given derogatory names such as invalids, sufferers of mental affection, and mentally ill persons. By the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, the colonial press, as pointed out above, lamented the problem of mad Nigerians roaming the streets of Lagos, and called upon the authorities to preserve the public order and to take pity on deranged Africans. A lunatic ward at the Lagos prison became quickly overcrowded, and public madness became more visible by the early twentieth century. It then became inevitable for the government to establish more specialised mental institutions. (Keller, 2001).

Legal Enactments and Implementation

The first medical legislation in Lagos was the Lagos Hospital Ordinance of 1881. This was followed by a more comprehensive legislation, the

Hospitals and Dispensaries Ordinance in 1889 (Akinfemiwa, 1964, p. 100). Under the Hospitals and Dispensaries Ordinance, the colonial surgeon, as the Chief Medical Officer was designated with the responsibility of the control and efficient working of the hospitals and dispensaries of the Lagos Colony. This enactment emphasised that the primary objective of every hospital was to provide medical and surgical aid for such persons belonging to the poorer classes as shall be unable from want of means to procure themselves proper professional assistance at their homes. From 1906, when Lagos became an administrative capital for the newly amalgamated Colony and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, lunacy management in Nigeria was faced with series of difficulties for the rest of the colonial period. These problems ranged from the lack of specialist psychiatric personnel, insufficient accommodation for patients, to general lack of welfare facilities. In 1907 the Lunacy Ordinance which provided for the establishment of the Yaba Asylum or mental institution in Lagos was enacted. This Ordinance which was titled “An Ordinance to Make Provisions for the Care and Custody of Lunatics in the Colony and Protectorate” was published by the then governor of Southern Nigeria, Sir Walter Egerton. This resulted in the opening of the Yaba Asylum in 1907 for the confinement of the mentally ill in and around Lagos (Egerton, 1907). Originally, the buildings assigned for this purpose were those from the former headquarters of the Nigerian Railways. The first 14 lunatics were admitted on Oct. 31 1907 (Boroffka, 1985).

Another major colonial legislation in respect to lunacy management was the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916, titled, “An Ordinance to Provide for the Custody and Removal of Lunatics” (Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria, 1974). Up till this time (and even afterwards), mental patients in Nigerian asylums were muddled-up and detained in deplorable and grotesque conditions. In most cases, violent lunatics were tried and confined by the colonial court of law in Lagos prisons if found guilty. Coupled with this arrangement was that the prisons, as well as asylums became overcrowded. This invariably led to the general inadequacies witnessed in the accommodation and welfare of lunatics during the colonial period. It could be said that the provisions of the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916 was more

of welfare consideration through detention than confinement of lunatics. For instance, Section 10 of the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916 stipulated laws relating to the temporary detention of a suspected lunatic at the instance of a Medical Officer, who, if “he considers it expedient that such a person should be placed forthwith under observation in an asylum” may grant a “certificate of emergency (Brown, n.d). In the same section, it was provided that no suspected lunatic should be detained for more than seven days without the authority of a magistrate. Section 15 of the Ordinance, stated that “any magistrate before whom suspected person may be brought may detain such a person in safe custody for the purpose of inquiring as to his state of mind for a period not exceeding one month.” (Brown, n.d). However, the implementation of these provisions encouraged the overcrowding and deplorable conditions of the lunatic asylum in Lagos, as well as in other parts of the country during the colonial period.

Patients and Confinement in Yaba Lunatic Asylum

Aside detention, through the use of mechanical restraints, little was particularly done regarding the actual care and treatment of lunatics in colonial Lagos. And since it was an “acute embarrassment” (Vaughan, 1999, p. 122) on the part of the colonial government to harbour cases of European insanity, special arrangements were made for European lunatics. It was the duty of the Yaba Lunatic Asylum and the selected prison wards to admit lunatics of varying degrees. It was apparent that most patients confined were those who had suicidal or homicidal tendencies. During the colonial period most patients who were placed under confinement were not brought in voluntarily by themselves or their families, but involuntarily by police or other relatives or strangers (Sadowsky, 1999). Meanwhile, family members of the mentally ill sometimes wrote letters to administrators or government requesting the release or confinement of their mentally ill wards. Thus, during the early 1930s, the asylum recorded a decrease in the number of inmates as many Nigerians preferred to care for insane relatives at home or with traditional healers (Sadowsky, 2004). Nevertheless, the in-patients in the Yaba Lunatic Asylum since its inception ranged from those suffering from chronic

schizophrenia, organic psychotics, to the mentally retarded (Esema, 1987). Welfare services like infrastructure, food, drugs and clothing for inmates were significantly inadequate. By 1954, single cells were converted into dormitories or rooms for lunatic habitation. These rooms were left for very excited and aggressive patients. There were also twelve cages for the violent psychotic patients. (Boroffka, 1985).

Sadowsky (1999) was of the view that letters by family members requesting for the release of mentally ill patients to traditional healers were more than those requesting the government to confine them. Harmless lunatics were however mostly favoured to be released from confinement. Moreover, if someone took charge of a lunatic who was not considered a criminal or constituted public danger, the release of such a patient was granted even when the symptomatic manifestations and behaviour were still present. Whatever the case of confinement and release of mental patients, it could as well be said that the issue rested generally on the inadequacies of the colonial government to adequately treat the mentally ill successfully. Furthermore, there were other cases in which criminal lunatics were released to their relatives for no clear-cut reason. Other categories of lunatics, especially the civil lunatics, were arrested and detained by the police or other authorities for being vagrants or public nuisances. These included people who walked naked in public, urinated or defecated in the open, or threatened people for no reason. (Sadowsky, 1999).

The Management of “Criminals or Lunatics”

As soon as the Yaba Lunatic Asylum was established in Lagos in 1907, psychiatric service was simultaneously faced with the problem of management and the inability of the colonial officials to fund this branch of medicine. Meanwhile, apart from the perceived huge estimate on the extension of the asylum, the Senior Sanitary Officer, the Medical Officer in charge of Lagos Prisons, as well as the Director of Prisons, Southern Provinces, discarded the idea of detaining criminal lunatics. In fact, the Medical Officer and the Director of Prisons alerted the government about the medical contradictions inherent in the incarceration of the mentally

deranged. He condemned the practice whereas lunatics were kept within prison walls and be treated on a par with felons and criminals. In addition, the prisons were overcrowded and very little was achieved in depopulating it. This was in spite of the constant co-operation between Lagos and Calabar asylums in a bid to ease the problem of overcrowding (Ikpe & Ekpo, 2004). Generally, welfare conditions in both institutions were inadequate. Asuni's assessment of conditions existing at Yaba during the 1930s showed that little was generally done towards the development of the psychiatric sector. He observed that since there were no wall-fences around the Yaba Asylum, inmates were exposed to the ridicule of passers-by. The inmates could not be regarded as patients because there was no active treatment for their mental diseases. Perhaps, this reflected the general perception that there were no internationally recommended, absolute efficacious medications for the treatment of mental disorders before the mid-twentieth century.

The observation by Asuni confirms the fact that lunacy management in Lagos as at the 1950s was inadequate. Meanwhile, the Yaba Lunatic Asylum established a link with the emerging Aro Mental Hospital after the Second World War as it admitted some repatriated Nigerian soldiers from the war with mental illness. This transfer was mainly due to the overcrowding experienced in the Yaba Asylum. (Sadowsky, 1999). This problem had reached a disturbing proportion such that efforts and plans to expand the Yaba Asylum, a criminal lunatic ward was proposed for either the Asylum or Lagos Prison compound. Hence, twelve cells for criminal lunatics were built within the prison yard. The extent of diagnosis was however not clear since patients showed essential characteristics of mental disorders such as schizophrenia, which included hallucination and delusion. (Sadowsky, 2004). Similarly, other lunatics who were uncared for by their relatives or due to the overcrowding of the asylums, alongside other vagrant lunatics roamed the streets as violent criminals, beggars, and imbeciles. According to the *Nigeria Annual Medical and Sanitary Reports for The Year 1927, (1929)*, it was as a result of the need to address the menace and inertia experienced in the provision of adequate psychiatric care that the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, Dr. Alexander, notified the colonial government in

1926 on the need to appoint an expert otherwise called an Alienist. Such an expert was expected to understudy the inadequacies of psychiatric services and thereby make some recommendations where necessary.

Hence, with the appointment of Dr. Bruce Home as the first Alienist for Nigeria in 1927, psychiatric services received a little more attention from what it used to be. He was however not called a “psychiatrist” but rather an alienist. This was because the title reflected the climate of opinion towards lunatics who were considered to be alienated from the rest of the community. (Asuni, 1967). Apart from the ubiquitous sight presented by the lunatic vagrants in Lagos and Calabar, Dr. Home also observed that facilities in cells where lunatics were detained were inadequate. (Lunacy in Nigeria, n.d). He also carried out a study to ascertain the number of lunatics and traditional healers who specialised in psychiatric services in the country. Talking with P. Esegale and F. Kehinde (personal communication, May 4, 2019) it was learnt that the mentally ill were taken care of within their families. Vagrancy among the mentally ill on the streets was also reported in Lagos. Perhaps the inability to immediately address the problem of the rising number of vagrant lunatics on the streets of Lagos was the fallout of the Indirect Rule system which supported the administration of issues concerning indigenous peoples by the Native Authority. Keller (2001) discovered that it was a crucial aspect of British policy to be concerned more with the economic benefits of the colony with minimal intervention in local traditions. However, by the mid-1950s, the Governor-General, Sir John Stuart Macpherson was of the opinion that the only action required in mental health care was to improve the facilities in the Yaba asylum. (Lunacy in Nigeria, n.d).

Imperatively, on his assumption of duty as Medical Officer in charge of the administration of psychiatric services in Nigeria, he discovered that, insane persons in the country were approximately 20 per 100,000 at a ratio of three males to one female. He identified that no ethnic group or race was exempted from suffering mental illness. He expressed that mania, (a form of mental disorder) was most common among Nigerians, and that sufferers could easily fall into the hands of the police, instead of seeking medical attention. Perhaps, Dr. Home’s most startling discovery

was that there were more lunatics wherever there were interactions or contact between Europeans and Africans. (Lunacy in Nigeria, n.d). Going by Dr. Home's discovery, one could suggest that perhaps, the complex and pressure on the Africans in conforming to the new or emerging socio-political and economic structures of Lagos, established by the colonial administration, could have precipitated a form of mental imbalance (on Africans) in the form of anxiety, frustration and depression. The resultant effect therefore was a rise in the number of mentally disturbed male and female Africans during the period. Home however argued that it was to forestall the menace of mental destabilization of non-Europeans who come in contact with whites that the British introduced the Indirect Rule system. Meanwhile, Home made some recommendations to the government on the improvement of psychiatric services in the country at large. These recommendations included, among others, the appointment of trained personnel such as matrons, attendants and occupational therapist, as well as the call for a new Lunacy Ordinance which would emphasize care and treatment of the mentally ill, among others. However, to what extent Dr. Home's discoveries were accurate remain to be scientifically or socially probed and explored further. Interestingly, his recommendations, which were based on his observations and study on lunacy management, were unimplemented. Various reasons could have contributed to the non-implementation of Dr. Home's recommendations. Perhaps, these included colonial government's inactivity, the principles and practice of colonial administrative system, for instance, the lack of financial commitment, financial constraints, and the Economic Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s among others.

In 1930, the colonial government sought the services of Cunnyngnam Brown to see to the issue of lunacy in the country, as well as all British West African colonies. Thus, in 1936 when Sir Walter Johnson became the Director of Medical Services in Nigeria, Brown made some revelations pertaining to the care for, and treatment of the mentally ill. Here, Brown discovered that culture, beliefs, and habits, among others were crucial in the causes and treatment of the mentally ill. He also observed that the traditional healers recognised insanity as a disease of the brain. In 1935, 290

persons (247 males and 43 females) were brought under official colonial notice as suspected lunatics by Brown. While some were detained, others were discharged. (Brown, n.d). Brown observed that many cases of insanity were not officially recorded or brought to the notice of the government except criminal cases. Also, he observed through personal examination that most cases of early lunacy were not reported on time. Objecting to low official figures presented, Brown maintained that it did not reflect the true picture. He disproves the colonial ideology as propounded by Dr. Home which basically connotes the psychological effects of “clash of cultures” between Africans and Europeans as responsible for most of the insanity in Lagos, Nigeria. Brown lamented that since the main aim of admitting lunatics in Nigeria was for detention and not treatment, psychiatric services in the country could not be compared to international standards which had gone far beyond mere custodial care to therapeutic and medicinal treatment. He noted that the situation in Nigerian societies was that chronic cases of lunacy or mental disorders were taken to the asylums and subtle and emerging cases were kept at home for family treatment and care. Thus, unlike his predecessor, Home, Brown also advocated for more humane and expanding services treatment for the mentally ill. (Brown, n.d; Sadowsky, 1999). He observed also that most affected members of society were males, putting the ratio at five males to one female. However, he insisted that men were no more prone to lunacy than women. Perhaps the difference in the margin was due to the fact that many of the men lived and worked in areas accessible to the colonial administrators in the city than women. In essence, since there were more men than women, there was bound to be more of the former suffering from the disease than the latter.

Brown discovered a wide range of mental disorders during his visits to asylums, hospitals and prisons. He also inspected the services of traditional healers in mental disorders in Nigeria with the assistance of indigenous residents, traditional chiefs and rulers as well as other officials. It was discovered that imbecility, epilepsy, acute mania, chronic mania, chronic delusional insanity, paranoia, acute and chronic melancholia, secondary dementia, schizophrenia, manic depression were common in the country

at large. (Brown, n.d). Furthermore, he discovered that reported cases of patients with schizophrenia, paranoia, and chronic delusional insanity all together formed about 69.8% of asylum inmates. But Brown in his report lamented that these were serious cases which would be hard to treat since they had actually gone out of hand. Hence, he called for the establishment of special wards or institutions for criminal lunatics. It should be mentioned at this juncture that the Director of Medical Services was antagonistic to the idea that a separate institution or ward be given to criminal lunatics, noting that the prison was the appropriate place for them. Brown was against the application of the anachronistic mechanical restraints on patients. This method which had been abandoned in England since the nineteenth century was the use of leg irons to restrain the movement of patients. (Brown, n.d).

After a thorough assessment the management of the mentally ill in the country, Brown advocated a new asylum which should be built within Lagos or a place with easy access and communication to Lagos, such as Ibadan or Abeokuta. The idea behind this was to enable majority of the citizenry benefit from all kinds of medical specialists available in Lagos. It will be recalled that this recommendation was quite similar to that of Dr. Home. An important aspect of Brown's recommendation was his advocacy for adequate infrastructure and the employment of recovered patients. Perhaps, these were to serve as occupational therapies for the recovering patient. Brown acknowledged the significance of traditional medical healers and cultural inclination. Thus, he stated that Nigerian communities should exploit the family system in the care and treatment of the insane. This was a system which would involve the treatment of a lunatic with the participation of his family members and relatives. Also, he recommended the opening of outpatient departments and clinics in asylums and general hospitals. On the aforementioned controversial issue of the detention of criminal or violent lunatics in prisons or medical institutions, the Colonial Advisory Committee on Penal Administration in 1939, had cause to look into the question of the retention of civil or criminal lunatics in colonial prisons. During the period also, the situation in asylums was such that reflected inadequacies in the management

of psychiatric services as there were no nosological classification of in-patients. Coupled with the aforementioned was the controversy between the Medical Department and the Prisons over whose responsibility it was to take care of criminal or violent lunatics. It must be noted that the problematic issue about whose responsibility it was for the care of criminal lunatics lingered up to the post-independence period.

Meanwhile, colonial officials during the period vilified Brown's report pertaining to the care and treatment of the mentally disordered in the country. His recommendations for institutional care were regarded as not very extensive and lacked adequate or necessary criticisms of the existing domiciliary care of the majority of lunatics. However, officials acknowledged Brown's report, noting that it could be adopted. On this same issue, the Alienist, Dr. D. Cameron, who was transferred briefly to Lagos in 1946 argued that mental health care in Nigeria was at its infancy stage and cannot be compared with that of the United Kingdom since it had taken the latter over a hundred years to achieve relative success. He however acknowledged the fact that other branches of medical care had been developed far more than that of lunacy. (Cameron, 1946). Cameron further suggested a "Broadmoor" type institution for criminal lunatics. This type of institution was a high security hospital in Berkshire, England for criminal lunatics. It should be noted however that the idea of "Broadmoor" had been objected to during the same period by the Prisons Department and the attempt at establishing it had also been lackadaisical. This became clear as the Secretary of State for Colonies maintained that whether or not they had committed a criminal offence, lunatics should be treated as mental patients who needed medical care in suitable institution and never a prison. (Cameron, 1946). He further argued that under existing laws in Nigeria, a criminal lunatic was meant to be detained and the period of detention was based not on medical consideration but on security grounds. He explained the term "asylum" as a prison or any other suitable place of safe custody. By this, he saw no justification for these persons to be under the Medical Department. According to him, even when criminal lunatics were accommodated in Medical Department

Asylums, the Director of Prisons continued to correspond about them. (Cameron, 1946).

Thus, with the inception of the regional system of administration, as well as the political and constitutional re-organisation of Nigeria, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, on the one hand, gave responsibility to the regional government in the handling of health services. On the other hand, prison services remained the responsibility of the federal government. Thus, the debate arose between the regional and federal governments since most of the lunatics (civil and criminal) were in the prisons. Central to this acrimony between the Medical Department and that of the Prisons was the issue of who to finance the care and management of lunatics during the period. It was in the wake of the acrimony that the Inspector General of Medical Services, Dr. Samuel Manuwa, solicited for another expert (from the Colonial Office) in lunacy. The problem of implementation was the major cause for this, as Brown's comprehensive inquiries and recommendations were not implemented. It has been observed that perhaps the lack of funds and inadequate officers on the spot were the major constraints to the efficiency expected in the management of lunatics during this period. By 1955, the colonial government made fresh efforts to revisit the problems associated with this branch of health care service.

Conclusion

Apart from the enactment of the Lunacy Ordinance of 1916, there was little or no other major government developmental policy towards the improvement of services for violent or criminal lunatic vagrants. Moreover, the Ordinance was at the time expedient since the Nigerian press alongside the general public was dissatisfied with the colonial neglect of lunatic vagrants who presented a ubiquitous and menacing sight in colonial Lagos. Hence, in a bid to save itself from embarrassment, the colonial government had to embark on the establishment of confinement centres in prison wards and the Yaba Lunatic Asylum where only custodial and not curative management of the mentally ill could be practised. It has been shown earlier that most civil and criminal lunatics

were kept in prisons. Lunacy management also involved the certification of the suspected mentally ill persons by the medical supervisor. Whether the patient was to be certified a lunatic and suitable for detention depended on the extent or disposition of his ailment. Ironically, both civil and criminal lunatics were still not given adequate custodial care, since the mental institutions were improperly managed. Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructural facilities became the order of the day as the colonial government complained about inadequate financing of psychiatric services. However, by the late 1950s and the post-independence period, more humane, therapeutic and medication-oriented psychiatric treatments evolved. Thus, the British colonial government endeavoured to extensively improve mental health delivery in the country as a whole. This nevertheless led to the establishment of the Aro Mental Hospital in Abeokuta in 1954 to complement that of Lagos and those already existing in the country. (Ayorinde et al., 2004).

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Corrupt Followership versus Corrupt Leadership: A Stereotypical Analysis of Political Corruption in Nigeria

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Abstract

Several studies on corruption in Nigeria identify the leadership as the bane of society. The media in its various manifestations often focus on the degree of corruption among the elite, paying little or no attention to the followership. It is the position in this paper, however, that corrupt leadership is the consequence of corrupt followership and vice versa. The paper is an examination of the evolution of corrupt leadership from corrupt followership. The prevalence of corruption in all its ramifications stems largely from the followership because leaders do not just appear. They emerge by elevation from the followership. This work therefore examines the culture of corruption as the foundation for corrupt leader using the Nigerian situation as case study. Using two corruption theories: public choice and bad apple as investigatory tools, this research reveals that faulty morals and the quest for acquisition of material wealth by the generality of the citizenry (from among whom tomorrow's leaders will emerge), produce corrupt leadership.

Keywords: corruption, corrupt followership, corrupt leadership, sustainable development, Nigeria

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Introduction

The financial and economic conundrum being experienced by Nigeria is largely a function of the prevalence of corrupt practices within the country. Corrupt practices have placed Nigeria among the top most corrupt nations of the world (Transparency International, 2017:5). This ranking indicates that the abnormal has become the norm, the illegal has become legal, and the aberrant has become the standard. In fact, given the unbridled looting of the treasury with impunity, it is assumed that corruption is official in the country (Joda, 2011:24 and *Daily Sun*, August. 9, 2016:8). Cases of looters of government treasury who live and enjoy their loots freely in the society without being jailed abound. The stench of political corruption has continued to pollute the national atmosphere and attract the derision of international community. Political corruption has become topical issue of discourse on both the electronic and print media. Most debates and discussions tend to bemoan the corrupt leadership style as a factor for massive corrupt practices by politicians. Corrupt leadership has been crucified for corrupt practices. Corrupt followership has received little or no criticism for the upsurge of political corruption in Nigeria. All triggers are pulled at corrupt leaders, forgetting the fact that the leaders had once been followers. Becoming a leader does not entail cleansing from negative values. A corrupt follower is a potential corrupt leader while a corrupt leader can negatively influence a follower. This paper seeks to examine the making of bad leadership from bad followership and vice versa. The work reveals that political corruption is promoted by both leadership and followership and not the preserve of the former. It demonstrates that the fight against corruption should be targeted at both the leadership and followership.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

For a better understanding, the following concepts shall be explained: corruption, political corruption, corrupt leadership and corrupt followership.

Corruption: This is an illegal, vicious and fraudulent intention to evade

the prohibition of the law. The act of an official or fiduciary individual who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his or her position, power or character to acquire some gains for himself or for another person, contrary to duty, the right of others, and to the law of the society (Black's Law Dictionary, 1968:311). The black's law dictionary described corruption as a form of dishonest or unethical conduct by an official entrusted with a position of authority often to procure personal benefit. It includes any form of behaviour that deviate from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtues by any person or group of persons, no matter their status in the society (Joda, 2011:14). The World Bank defines corruption as the misuse or abuse of public office for private gains (Balboa and Medalla, 2006:4). Corruption comes in various forms and a wide array of unlawful conduct, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, speed money, graft, nepotism, pilferage, theft, embezzlement, kickbacks, campaign contributions, falsification of records and influence peddling (Klitgaard & Fedderke, 1995:359).

Corruption is classified into two categories: spontaneous and institutionalized (or systemic). Spontaneous corruption is prevalence in societies observing strong ethics and morals in public service, while institutionalized corruption is common in societies where corrupt behaviours are perennially extensive or pervasive (Balboa *et al*, 2006:4). Corruption takes place when an individual, irrespective of position or status, act against basic norms and regulations. For example, a man or woman who drinks bottle water and throws the container on the street or conceals the truth for his personal benefit is guilty of corruption. An officer who uses public funds, meant for community development for his or her personal interest or a head of department of an institution who deducts a part of his or her subordinate's training grant for personal gain is involved in corruption.

Political or government corruption: This is the use of powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain (Yuki, 2006:32 and British Broadcasting News, 2007). An unlawful action by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the action is directly related to their official duties, is carried out under colour of law or involves trading in

influence. The misuse of political power for purposes such as, repression of political opponents, rigging of election and general brutality is considered political corruption. A state of unrestrained political corruption is known as Kleptocracy, literally meaning “rule by thieves” (BBC News, 2007).

Corrupt leadership: Researchers define leadership in many ways. Leadership is defined broadly in terms of (a) influencing individuals to contribute to group goals and (b) coordinating the pursuit of those goals (Bass, 1990:20 and Yuki, 2006:18). Leadership is building a team and guiding it to victory. Leadership is the process of guiding and directing the behaviour of people in the work environment. Leadership can be described as an influenced relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect the mutual purposes.

Corrupt leadership is someone with responsibility over a group of people, organization, community or state, and thus abuses the leaders-followers relationship by leaving the group or state in a worse-off condition than when he or she first found them, (Blake, 1994:34). Corrupt leader or leadership could also be referred to as toxic boss, little Hitler, manager from hell and boss from hell. The leadership style is both self-disruptive and ultimately corporately harmful as they subvert and destroy organizational structures (Blake, 1994:34). Corrupt leader or leadership puts own needs first above organizational or state interest, micro – manage subordinates, behave in a mean – spirited manner, display poor decision –making, divert organisational or state financial resources to private or family account and deliberately refuse to listen to his people or subordinates (*The Washington Post National*, 2011:9). Corrupt leadership is generally considered to be insular, intemperate, glib, operationally rigid, callous, inept, discriminatory and aggressive (Kellerman, 2012). Corrupt leaders fail in the provision of basic needs of the people. Their style entails mismanagement and embezzlement of fund.

Corrupt followership: Followership, to start with, can be described as adherence to a leader. It is the virtue of supporting and helping leaders to direct or lead well. (Jehn and Bezrukova, 2004:44) asserts that followership is a people-oriented behaviour and this behaviour builds relationship

between leaders and followers, provide an environment that makes all organizational members to focus on a common goal. In the authors' submission, followership disposition determines successful leadership. Good followers can help bring about good or trustworthy leaders or leadership.

Corrupt followership or followers are individuals whose illegal or unlawful activities are synonymous with those of corrupt leadership or leaders. According to Robert Kelley (1988:52), corrupt followers are individuals who are passive, not committed to the organization or team, selfish in relating with other citizens, and praise corrupt leadership. Corrupt followership can be referred to as an individual or group of people who indulge in criminal activities or any act contrary to the rule of law.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts two theories: the “public choice theory” and the “bad apple theory” in its analysis. Both theories focus on the respect for material wealth and defective human character respectively. Public choice theory is often used to explain how political decision making results in outcomes that conflict with the preferences of the general public (Caplan, 2007:46). Public choice emphasises the special interest of politicians and government officials in embarking on projects that are not the desire of the overall democracy or the interest of the general public. Politician's special interests accrue financial benefits that open the door to future wealth. Proponents of public choice theory such as Bryan Caplan, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky claim that democratic policy is biased to favour “expressive interests” and neglect practical and utilitarian consideration and that politics is plagued by irrationality (Caplan, 2007:46). Bad apple theory on the other hand, focuses on the level of the individual corrupt agent for the causes of corruption (Cusson 1983:67). This theory places the cause of corruption on faulty (moral) character. It emphasises the causal chain from bad character to corrupt acts, defective human character and predisposition toward criminal activity (Cusson 1983:67). Causes of corruption are rooted in human weakness such as greed

and selfishness. To proponents, people are assumed to act on the basis of moral values, and “wrong” values cause corruption. (de Graaf,2003).

The Emergence of Political Corruption in Nigeria

Political corruption can be traced to the pre-colonial traditional society. It persisted in the colonial period, precisely from the second quarter of the 20th century. Before the alarming rate of the “monster” called corruption, colonial masters while administering Nigeria, had claimed to be laying the foundation for a modern and viable state that would one day emerge as a great nation. In fact, Margery Perham, who had travelled widely in Nigeria in the 1930s, recalled the possibilities of building a new Nigeria from the bottom up (Perham 1969: 238). In 1939, Governor-General Bernard Bourdillon reiterated Perham’s view that Nigeria had the potential to build “a sound United State” (Bourdillon cited in Ellis, 2016:56). The dream of a sound united and developed state became a farce right from the onset, especially with the arrival of educated elites from the West and their subsequent involvement in politics. Though the British officers were not free from corruption, but the appointments and elections of Nigerians into public offices increased corruption drastically (Ellis, 2016:56). Political corruption before the arrival of Nigerian elites had been at its lowest ebb, as there were occasional cases of dishonesty (NARA 11, 1944; cited in Ellis, 2016:56). To Ellis, the civil service, in its early days, was almost immune from *awuf* (bribery).” British officials who manned the key posts saw to it that “*awuf*” was reduced to the barest minimum. The British government had effective legal instrument to punish corrupt officers. Hardly anybody caught on corruption charges escaped going to jail (Liman, 2017:2). According to Liman, many top ranking officials had their careers unceremoniously terminated for their involvement in corrupt practices. The system eschewed corruption, and had zero tolerance for corrupt individuals. However, following the gradual replacement of the British officials by the Nigerian educated elites, the incidences of “*awuf*” increased (Amadi, 1982:88). The increasing nature of corruption became worrisome under the Nigerian officers who occupied senior positions in

the federal civil service. In 1946, a senior British official wrote in a circular letter that the government was “appalled” at the extent of corruption and bribery “throughout the African civil service. It appears to permeate practically every branch and seems to be rapidly undermining the activities of government” (Ellis, 2016:56) To prove that western accusation were void of superiority on the part of British officials or from crude racism, similar statements were made by Nigerians themselves. According to Ellis, in 1950 the Northern politician, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa caused a sensation by referring to “the twin curses of bribery and corruption which pervade every rank and department” of government. Another Nigerian corroborated Balewa’s statement as he noted: “when the British colonialists brought the public service apparatus, it did not take much time before Nigerians successfully prostituted these agencies and negated the ideal of service for its own sake into service for what I can get for myself” (Labanji, 1975:6).

It is worthy to note that some Nigerian politicians before independence made their personal financial ambitions known, even before starting their political career. Some of these politicians saw political participation as a means of self-enrichment. For example, on the new year’s eve of 1937, Nnamdi Azikiwe swore an oath to become rich. He repeated the oath in a letter he wrote on 21 November 1943 (Booth, 1981:49). In addition, an astute critic discerned in the autobiographies of both Zik and his great rival Awolowo, a complete identification of their own personal prosperity with that of the nation (Booth, 1981:53). The ambition to acquire wealth was not just a personal trait of prominent politicians such as Awolowo and Azikiwe, or even of the political class as a whole but a general tendency throughout the society. Material wealth, with the power associated with it, rather than the science, philosophy nor even religion of the west, most impressed the politicians.

In the ensuing political activities of the second half of the 20th century, higher levels of government were reported to be “marked by great corruption” (Report on corruption, 1953, cited in Ellis, 2016:57). Elected politicians were consumed with the control over men and resources rather than ideological projects. Through public office, politicians could

use government resources for their own private or party purposes, a trend that continued unabated to date (Ellis, 2016:56). In 1955, there was a gruesome case of abuse of government funds in the Eastern Region. The government in Lagos took action by setting up an official tribunal headed by Stafford Foster-Sutton, Chief Justice of Nigeria. The main target of its enquiries was Nnamdi Azikiwe, the then premier of Eastern Region, on account of his involvement in the affair of African Continental Bank, an institution that he created and continued to dominate (Ellis, 2016:56). Azikiwe was accused of using his control of the Regional government to prop up his own bank and his business. According to the Foster- Sutton Tribunal, Azikiwe did not sever his connections to ACB when he became a minister but continued to use his influence to further the interest of ACB while he was in government. Similar incidence occurred earlier in 1953 in the Western Region, where senior members of staff of the National Bank of Nigeria were leading members of Action Group. In collusion with its leader chief Obafemi Awolowo, the party members used its control of the Region and the National Bank of Nigeria to utilize government funds for the benefit of itself and its own directors (Sklar,2004:254).

Following the attainment of political independence in 1960, politics in general and tenure of public office most especially, became the key site for self-advancement, as the fortunes of businesses, communities and households in Nigeria hinged on governmental favour, and political influence. “Nearly all businessmen were politicians because the state had become the main source of both finance and contracts; and nearly all politicians were businessmen” (Ellis, 2016:58). The culture of grandiose self-advancement brewed by Nigeria’s foremost nationalists, politicians and public officers were bequeathed to the post-independence practitioners. Political corruption is not just the practice of old politicians but also the mastery of post-colonial politicians. Post-independence politicians who were once followers of pre-independence politicians over the years imbibed the corrupt value system and thus perfected the art to an unprecedented level. In fact, the discovery and exploration of oil in the 1950s and 1960s necessitated a more worrisome corrupt practice

among politicians and government officials. Nigerian politicians are more concerned with ego-centric interests, the building of personal wealth instead of nation building. The building of financial pyramids from state resources has become a common practice among corrupt citizens including followers (Joda, 2011:19).

In early 1970s, under General Yakubu Gowon, a certain commissioner of agriculture in the defunct Northwestern State was reported to have informed a panel of investigation how huge tractors and farming implements disappeared (Liman, 2017:2). Abubakar Liman further asserts that at the federal level some super permanent secretaries and commissioners were involved in corruption related cases. Corruption continued under General Olusegun Obasanjo's first tenure, 1976-1979, but with a low index.

Under Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the first Executive President of Nigeria, corruption took a leap forward. Despite the participation of competent hands and experts in key positions of the technical sectors, there were reckless and thoughtless white elephant projects, misplacement of priorities, nepotism, capital flight and mismanagement of public resources. Bangura (1986:31) described Shagari's administration as "the government of the contractors by the contractors and for the contractors." The disturbing level of corruption in the second republic necessitated the return of the military junta to power by toppling the civilian government. General Mohammadou Buhari who succeeded Shagari through a coup d'état initiated War Against Indiscipline (WAI), to clean the Augean stable of corruption in both the formal and informal sectors of the Nigerian economy. To Liman, Buhari's greatest undoing was his obsession and doggedness as he indiscriminately treated both culprits and innocent individuals as suspects, and his promotion of human rights abuses.

In 1985, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida toppled Buhari's regime. During Babangida's administration, there was mindless institutionalization or rather palpable personalization of public funds (Liman, 2017:3). Corruption became part and parcel of Nigerian culture. Honesty, sincerity and hard work became less appreciated, as these

qualities no longer paid anybody. Corruption was raised to the level of state policy and was used as an instrument of regime legitimation and stability (Gboyega, 1996:5). According to Gboyega, some jailed corrupt politicians were released, and their ill-gotten wealth and properties earlier confiscated by Buhari's government, were returned to the offenders. This was done under the Forfeiture of Assets (Release of certain Forfeited Properties, etc) Decrees No 24 and 50 of 1993 (Ogundiya, 2009:287). Worse still, in a bid to sustain the regime's legitimacy, Babangida embarked on massive pay-offs to various groups of people and organizations in the civil society. These included: Ecumenical Cathedral Abuja, 50 million naira; Obafemi Awolowo Foundation, 30 million naira; Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria, 20 million naira; Zik Hall Zungeru, 40 million naira; Arewa House Kaduna, 35 million naira; Yakubu Gowon Centre, 30 million naira; Nigerian Union of Journalists National Secretariat Abuja, 30 million naira; Nigeria Labour Congress Secretariat Building Fund, 50 million naira among several others (Committee for Defence of Human Rights, 1999:35). In 1993, it was reported that 400 million naira was wasted on the Better Life Project, and \$200 million siphoned from the Aluminum Project (*The News Magazine*, 1993:20) Babangida's cronies headed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspired Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP), and other special outfits in the public sectors such as Better Life Programme, National Directorate for Employment, Community Bank, Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) and Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI). These institutions were conduit pipes which drained the nation's resources. The billions of naira sunk into these programmes which were geared towards empowerment and poverty alleviation did not yield the desired results. One gruesome case of corruption which will never be forgotten in the history of corruption in Nigeria is the disappearance of \$12 billion Gulf war oil windfall. According to Sahara Reporters online (2012:1), Pius Okigbo, a former Nigerian economist detailed how Babangida and his cronies fraudulently depleted the windfall. Further deduced from Liman submission, under Babangida's administration, the clergy from the

main religious bodies, that is, Christianity and Islam were politicized and financially corrupted.

General Sani Abacha and Abdulsalami Abubakar did not significantly depart from Babangida's profligacy. They maintained the corrupt status quo. For example, Abacha's loot was estimated to the tune of N218.3 billion (*Vanguard*, Wednesday, August 31, 2016:5). After his death, he forfeited six ultra-modern buildings worth billions of naira. His family was asked to return about 75 million British Pounds, 100 million naira, while 250 million naira and 96.9 million naira were forfeited to the Nigerian government by his sons – Mohammed Sani Abacha and Abdulkadir Abacha respectively (Ogundiya, 2009:287). According to Erhagbe (2017:2), the Swiss government revealed another Abacha's loot of about \$321 million. The money was part of the estimated \$5 billion allegedly looted by late General Sani Abacha between 1993 and 1998. Like Babangida, General Abacha nursed and promoted corruption in order to hold on to power. He made several pay-offs and gave undue rewards to some politicians, which included Chief Anthony Ani, DM30 million and \$3 million; Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, \$5 million; and Alhaji Abdulazeez Arisekola Alao, 100 million naira (Ogundiya, 2009:288). Abdulsalami's short tenure was not void of allegations of corruption, especially his administration's transition programme which was alleged to be an avenue for self-advancement for the leader and his cronies (Liman, 2017:4). Irregularities marred the vote, and Chief Olu Falae, the defeated candidate, challenged electoral results and Obasanjo's victory, but to no avail.

President Olusegun Obasanjo, the winner of the 1999 presidential election, established anti-corruption institutions such as Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). It did not take long, for these institutions to become hounds for witch-hunting political opponents. Associates and friends of the government were immune from scrutiny while opponents are targets of ICPC and EFCC. During Obasanjo's administration, cases of corruption abound in the Senate and House of representatives. For example, Chief Evans Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo and

Adolphus Nwabara were impeached on account of mismanagement and corrupt enrichment. According to Senator Idris Kuta led panel, Okadigbo was involved in the inflation of the street light project to the tune of 173 million naira; authorized the payment of 37. 2 million naira to furnish the Senate president's residence, an amount above the approved 25 million; installed and commissioned a 100KVA generating set at the Senate president's residence at an inflated price of 15 million naira. Adolphus Wabara was guilty of receiving bribe of 55 million naira from Professor Osuji (former education Minister) to inflate the budgetary allocation to education ministry, while Senator Chimaroke Nnamani faced about 124 count charges of fraud, conspiracy concealment and money laundering totaling about 5.4 billion naira (Saturday Vanguard, 2008:16). Madam Patricia Etteh, the first female Speaker of House of Representatives resigned from the position for her involvement in the misappropriation of public funds in multiple contracts of 628 million naira (US\$5million), for the renovation of her official residence and the purchase of 12 official cars (Ogundiya, 2009:289). More shocking and disheartening was the Atiku's saga over the Petroleum Technology Development Fund. The Senate Committee pronounced Vice President Atiku Abubakar guilty on the allegation that he diverted \$145 million PTDF to unauthorized accounts. According to Ogundiya, the report reads: "the Vice President abused his office by aiding or abetting the diversion of public funds in the sums of \$125 million and \$20 million respectively approved for the specific projects of deposits in banks, some of which were fraudulently converted as loans to NDTV, Mofas Shipping Company Limited and Transvari Services Limited." Another gory scenario of corruption was the report of the Auditor General of the federation in 2003 which revealed pervasive financial irregularities, over invoicing, scam and colossal waste of public resources in the 2001 Federation Account (Ogundiya. 2009:289).

President Umaru Yar'adua who succeeded Obasanjo could not fight corruption for health reasons. His failing health condition provided opportunity especially for members of his kitchen cabinet to siphon government funds. After his death, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's

government was characterized with corruption. Jonathan's administration can be compared to the regime of Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida. Like Babangida, Jonathan was indifference to corruption. According to Liman, under Jonathan, stealing by government officials was not corruption. Government officials helped themselves with so much recklessness. Institutions responsible for tackling corruption cases such as the ICPC and EFCC were rendered ineffective. The trend of living above one's means by government officials and employees augmented. The egunje (kickbacks) syndrome reincarnated in the formal and informal sectors. Within the various sectors, exchange of money became pre-requisite for files and humans to move from one office to another. The oil industry experienced an unprecedented level of corruption. The industry was wrecked by sacred cows like Diezani Alison Madueke who used government funds to acquire mansions in western countries (Liman, 2017:4) A more worrisome corruption under Jonathan was the case of Sambo Dasuki, the National Security Adviser, who was supposed to have helped the nation procure sophisticated military equipment to prosecute the war against Boko Haram but decided to embark on "expressive interests" of thieving politicians. Dasuki brushed aside the idea of purchasing military equipment and shared the earmarked sum of \$2.1 billion (like birthday cake) among some governors, ministers, political stakeholders and other politicians (*Saturday Sun*, April 16, 2016:20). More than ever before, political appointments became the surest passports for self-enrichment in Nigeria. Low income earners like clerks in government offices were alleged to own estates in Abuja and other posh urban centers across the country. Jonathan's government created a new class of spiritual merchants that became rich through "political prophecies" (Liman, 2017:4). Some spiritual leaders or merchants bought private jets from government funds. To Liman, Jonathan and members of his family got entangled in the web of inconceivable financial waste.

In 2015 presidential election, Jonathan was defeated by General Mohammadu Buhari, thus bringing to an end the 16 year-old Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) government. Nigerians were tired of the

unspeakable and alarming rate of corruption and therefore voted for a change. Upon his election, Buhari promised zero tolerance on corruption and immediately started the fight against the monster. However, his approach has been trailed by controversy. From different quarters, Buhari's corruption crusade has been criticized for not being holistic enough, in that the war targets mainly the recalcitrant PDP members. The anti-corruption war is slanted because most politicians around Buhari that carpet-cross from PDP to All Progressive Congress (APC) were not affected by the EFCC arrest (Liman, 2017:5).

At present the power of money is placed above all other powers. The race for illegal acquisition of money is on the increase. Financial (money) power has informed different levels of corrupt practices among the citizens (followers) who are prospective leaders, such as, ritual killing, kidnapping and armed robbery, advanced fee fraud, sale of human kidneys abroad, and so on. Going by the level of corruption among followers and leaders, one can say that corruption trails corruption, that is, the next man (follower) to take the baton from the about-to-leave leader, is corrupt and a product of corrupt practices and system.

The Making of Corrupt Followership in Nigeria

The emergence of corrupt followers in the country could be traced to the unconscious institutionalization of a corrupt culture by the pre-independence politicians. There exist several theories responsible for the evolution of corrupt followership such as, bad apple, frustration-aggression, and relative deprivation (Okeke, 2014:25). These theories explain the institutionalization of corrupt culture in Nigeria. Corrupt political culture was promoted by first generation politicians including but not limited to the following: Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe, Premier of Eastern Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Premier of Western Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the Northern Region, Mbanu Ojike, the Finance Minister for Eastern Region, Chief S.L. Akintola whose daughter Omodele, a staff of Leventis, made the company to be deeply involved in the finances of Western Region; Festus Okotie-Eboh, Minister of Finance,

Mohammadu – Defence Minister and Inua Wada – the Minister of Works (Ellis, 2016:58). This group of politicians and other public officers, who were once followers under the leadership of the British, bequeathed a corrupt system to succeeding politicians and public office holders, who have been under their unstructured and informal tutelage as followers.

It is glaring to discerning observers that corruption has easily spread to daily life. It has become experiential in virtually all facets or spheres of human endeavours. From the 1960s, knowledge of corruption that regularly occurred in relation to government contracts was “no longer confined to a few top civil servants, but seeping downwards to the small towns, cities and villages in Nigeria” (NARA 11, 1964; cited in Ellis, 2016:57). For example, in the educational sector in the Western Region, some principals were involved in illegal collection of fees for variety of services to students such as, requiring parents to pay for their children school books (NARA 11, 1966; cited in Ellis, 2016:57). In Port Harcourt, some students were reportedly dropped out of rural schools for their inability to pay a “dash” of sixty pounds to the relevant local government councilor (UK National Archives cited in Ellis, 2016:58). In addition, the present excessive numbers of local councils in some states today is not a new phenomenon. Regional governments were involved in the creation of excessive number of local councils in order to satisfy local interests and opportunities for graft, and to build a constituency for parliamentary candidates, who at election time could secure the votes of the councilors whom they helped (NARA 11, 1966).

The perception of politics as a source of self-advancement or miraculous benefits is the creation of early politicians in the 1960s, as some supporters or followers of politicians were not perturbed by the self-enrichment games of their leaders. Ministers’ houses were often flooded by supporters who regarded them as public places (NARA 11, 1964). In 1962, the Coker tribunal that inquired into corruption in the Western Region arrested Obafemi Awolowo in the presence of a huge crowd of his supporters. These followers (supporters) as they were referred to as “wanted Awo to take a lot more of public funds for himself as he was their son and his money was

their money” (Onyeachonam, 1983:13). It is not surprising that in present day Nigeria thieving politicians live freely within the society and are highly celebrated by their supporters. The corrupt practices of politicians rob-off or have great impact in the lives of the followers. Corruption becomes contagious as followers are easily affected or influenced. There is an unending list of criminal politicians or government officials, living in affluent of their ill-gotten wealth without being arrested or molested by the general populace. A more painful scenario is the art of using the stolen funds, in the event of being prosecuted, to employ the services of a large number of smart lawyers (who claim to be doing their job) to take advantage of the legal technicalities to get freedom.

In Nigeria, the provision of social amenities in some areas depends on patronage of politicians or political allegiance. For example, a water distribution system was completed in Ondo in 1965 but was not put into operation in order to remind the people of Ondo of the consequences of supporting opposition party (NARA 11, 1966). What is more, early politicians bequeathed violent politics to the new generation of politicians. According to Ellis, (2016:58), in 1964, Samuel Akintola, leader of Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) a splinter party from the Action Group, in preparation for Western Region elections hired thugs in the market-place for 10 shillings per day, plus bonuses. The implication of the above event was that, first generation politicians “took” corruption and violent politics to the door steps of their supporters/followers; they became mentors to their supporters; they were major actors of the proliferation and entronement of corruption in Nigeria; corruption has become a hydra-headed monster; and today the old corrupt followers are now corrupt leaders, producing a vicious circle of corrupt followers – corrupt leaders, and so on.

Presently, a large number of the population ranging from children to adult, men to women, unskilled and skilled workers, uniform men, conductors, clerks, office workers, professionals, and other groups that constitute followership, are deeply involved in corruption in one way or another. It is a common practice for contracts to be awarded to those who

give more money during bidding; to offer bribe to police officers to ensure that one's relative or friend is favoured against another person in a case; for a teacher or lecturer to receive bribe before a student could have high score; to use government or company's equipment to build one's house or run one's personal business; for aspiring politicians to offer money and food items to supporters and the electorates for their votes during election; for office clerk to ask for bribe before he or she can attend to your file; for police constable to collect bribe and even kill for failure to give; for "agbero" (garage tout) to collect illegal money from commercial bus conductors for themselves, their chairmen, and for some police officers (interview with Adeyemi Segun 2016). Also, for market women or men to adjust or tamper with her or his measure and scale devices to dispense less produce at the same price; and for a student to become a cultist, armed robber, kidnapper and advanced internet fraudster (interview with Agwu Johnson, 2016). This group of followers, it should be noted are the prospective future leaders. The next session of this work will briefly discuss the making of corrupt leadership.

The Making of Corrupt Leadership

Nigerian leaders are citizens of Nigeria. They were at one point or the other followers of other leaders. Like the popular adage, "children are the leaders of tomorrow," followers are the leaders of tomorrow. Corrupt followers turn out to become corrupt (successor) leaders (Olson, 1965:78). The prevalence of corruption in Nigeria stems from the followership with a gradation to the leadership.

The state of corrupt leadership is a buildup of corrupt practices indulged in by followers. For example, an "okada" (motorcycle) rider who specializes in using his motorcycle for robbery joins a political party as one of the thugs and after several years of loyal thuggery, he is sponsored to become a local government councilor. A man who could barely afford 3 square meals a day, a few years back, suddenly becomes the owner of duplexes, expensive flashy cars, and fat bank accounts. This former robber, turned councilor could have colluded with like minds (including

the local government chairman) to embezzle council money. Similarly, a cultist who goes abroad to further his studies and end up being wanted for criminal activities, returns home with a “Toronto”- (forged) certificate and later vies for a political position with his illicit wealth, rigs his way through and then becomes a leader.

Corrupt student union executives, lecturers, students, principal officers in universities, business men and women, bus conductors and drivers, fathers, mothers, children, cronies and supporters of corrupt politicians, and other categories of skilled and unskilled workers are potential corrupt leaders, especially when they persist in corrupt practices before elevation to leadership positions. Based on faulty morals/defective human character and greed for material wealth, this group of people and many others which constitute the followership, indulge in corrupt practices while in leadership positions (Caplan, 2007:35).

Effect of Political Corruption in Nigeria

Political corruption, especially massive looting of government funds is a major precipitating factor for the unprecedented stage of underdevelopment in Nigeria. It affects the provision of social amenities/infrastructures, and the creation of jobs for the unemployed graduates and other youths. It impedes economic growth and development.

Political corruption promotes criminality and militancy/insurgency. For example, the restiveness in the Niger Delta is due partly to the inability of the government and leaders of the region to account for the estimated 40 billion dollars accrued to the Niger Delta region between 2004 and 2016 (*Daily Sun*, August 31, 2016:14).

A more worrisome effect of political corruption is the destruction of Nigeria's image internationally. Nigeria was in the early part of 2016 described as a fantastically corrupt nation, by the British Prime Minister David Cameron (*Saturday Sun* May 14, 2016:16). Corruption-related cases, such as, James Ibori's jail term in the United Kingdom; Late Diepreye Alaymeseigha's disgraceful ordeal in London; and reports of foreign accounts with huge deposits, and several mansions in Europe and America

owned by Nigerian politicians, are tantamount to image destruction. The discoveries of money in sundry places, such as septic tanks, burial grounds, shops in market places, uncompleted buildings, airports, and special safes, among others demean the nation's image.

Corruption destroys the social values of the society. It entrenches negative values among the different ethnic groups. Citizens, especially youths, now see the abnormal as normal; the involvement in crime as a means to successful life; and the value and love for materialism as paramount, above all other virtues.

Measures to Curb Political Corruption in Nigeria

All segments of the society, including agents of socialization (the family, school, religious institutions and mass media), civil societies and the government should sincerely cleanse themselves and work together to redress the situation. They should extol virtues such as hard work, chastity, honesty, integrity, positive thinking, creativity, innovation, discipline, trustworthiness, dependability and reliability, humaneness, devotion/dedication to communal work and interests. True heroes of the country rather than corrupt politicians should be venerated or celebrated. Success through perseverance and hard work should be eulogized.

In the traditional society, there were no police, but the reality of punishment forced many to conduct themselves appropriately. The government should be prepared to bring violators to book through the courts, and appropriate punishment meted out against such. The fight against corruption should be void of favouritism and nepotism.

Citizens should see themselves as enforcers and protectors of societal values and be ready to expose and condemn violators. Importantly, the youths should rethink and shun crime in any of its forms and follow the path of honour, integrity, hard work and moral rectitude in pursuit of their goals.

Parents, teachers and “men of God” should exhibit impeachable conduct in order to positively influence their children, students and members of congregation respectively.

Conclusion

Since followers are potential leaders and corrupt followers are future corrupt leaders, discourses on political corruption should address both the former and latter. The crusade against corruption or corrupt practices should be all-encompassing, in that, it targets all sectors of the economy, the (governed) citizens and political office holders. Against the perturbing background of corruption in the Nigerian society, there is the need for urgent re-orientation of the citizenry towards positive social values/virtues. Alongside the existing anti-corruption agencies such as EFCC and ICPC, there is need for the provision of genuine mechanism and / or platform to address corrupt practices among citizens (followers). More than ever before, the fight against corruption should be directed at schools and religious bodies, and other relevant institutions.

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Militarization and the Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Reconsideration of the Fourth-Arm Theory

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Abstract

The reconsideration of the relevance of proposal for the practice of diarchy in Nigeria is the thrust of this paper. This becomes necessary due to the recurring features of militarization and crisis of democratization which have plagued past democratic projects in the country and evidently constraining efforts at sustaining the democratic process of the current Fourth Republic dispensation. The essence of the fourth arm theory is drawn from the diarchy proposal that seeks to incorporate the military institution as the fourth arm of the state, beside the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The diarchy option proposed by Nigeria's first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, gained ascendancy in the 1970s, as a constitutional arrangement of power sharing between the military and political class, to resolve the intractable political instability and challenges caused by apparent lack of capacity of the political class to sustain democratic culture in the country. Therefore, in view of the prevailing political challenges that have characterized the Fourth Republic democratic experiment in Nigeria and the expediency of a constitutional reform, this paper makes a strong case for a reconsideration of the fourth-arm theory of diarchy, as an operational template for ensuring political cohesion and stability in the country.

Keywords: *democratization, militarization, diarchy, fourth-arm theory, Nigeria's Fourth Republic.*

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Introduction

The reconsideration of the diarchy proposition that gained ascendancy in the 1970s in explaining the element of militarization that has characterised the crisis of democratization in Nigeria's recent political history is the thrust of this paper. As advocated by Nnamdi Azikiwe, a foremost nationalist and first president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, diarchy simply advocates the incorporation of military hierarchy on a more active and constitutional basis in a civil rule dispensation (Azikiwe, 1974: 24).

Though, the proposal was made as an examination and response to what was conceived to be the bane of effective governance and political stability in Nigeria as well as other African states, a decade after independence, it is nonetheless, very relevant when situated in the current Fourth Republic democratic in which, there is symbiotic relationship between military and civil leaders and soldiers in dispensing the affairs of the state, political parties and electoral process. Indeed, the civilians have become highly militarized, while both active and retired military actors are strategically infused into the democratic process.

Militarisation, as conceived, is associated with military rule and military factor in societal affair such as resort to force and unconstitutional exercise of political powers. This is antithetical to democratic practice of institutional and constitutional approach to governance that incorporates popular participation and freedom of choice in political recruitment and governance. In preference to military rule, democracy has acquired legitimacy and moral authority as a form of governance because of its inherent virtues, which include respect of human rights and freedoms, self-government, accountability, the rule of law and transparency. In reference to Nigeria and similar African states, there is, undeniably, blatant denunciation of its democratic practice because of the political ecology with unwholesome admixture of militarization with democratization. This is because, the political experience of Africa has shown that the long history of frequent military interventions in their politics, has laid the foundation of practices that are antithesis of democracy, and, that have as well, impeded the progress of democratisation on the continent.

To this end, the political history of Nigeria has been described as one of “a litany in brinkmanship, incoherence and uncertainty” resulting in perpetual transition – a sort crossroads – rather than an assured path to democracy and good governance (Agbaje, Onwudiwe & Diamond, 2004: ix). Though, when the event of May 29, 1999 produced widespread excitement and expectation because of the country’s successful transition from a military regime that had lasted for over 30 years into the league of democratic states, historically-minded Nigerians were not oblivious of the intermittent interposition of military factor in the chequered political history of the country. Beginning from the democratic transition that accompanied the emergence of Nigeria as a sovereign state, the military take-over of government of 1966 put an abrupt end to the democratic governance of that phase barely six years of independence, The first era of military intervention in Nigeria politics during which a wind of civil war of secession that lasted between 1967 and 1970 was blown, ended in 1979, after a three-year military supervised, transition to democratic rule of the Second Republic. The succeeding civilian dispensation was ousted in a military coup d’état of December 1983, thereby paving the way for the military to return to power (just about four years of quitting). The latest, in difference to previous democratic projects, is significant because of the prevailing global convention that disallows military or other elements of tyranny to feature in governance. This was borne out of the trend that accompanied the triumph of global liberal order in the aftermath of Cold War, termed “the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), occasioned by widespread internal and international pressures for adoption of democracy as a universal framework of governance. With the new dawn of democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999, therefore, it was hoped that the militarization tendencies that were conspicuously ingrained in the country’s memory during military would gradually evaporate and superintended by the emerging liberal values. However, such hopes are increasingly dashed as the democratic process that set in is riddled in crisis caused by unwavering elements of militarization. This is why some political commentators have opined that since independence

to putatively democratic rule, Nigeria has had a succession of regime change whose main “added value” had been mainly the mere change of leadership (Ibrahim & Garuba, 2008:11). Contemporary discourse of liberal democracy has recognised and appreciated the place of a free and fair electoral process as a critical component of any effort to democratize and enthrone a democratic culture that gives effect to the right to govern by consent as opposed to military approach of forceful takeover of power. However, elections and electoral process, characterized by internationally acceptable standard that are expected to be the pillar of democracy are deficient in and, disappointedly, not feasible in Nigeria:

The result has been a sad feature of a political history in which the outcomes of every general election, beginning from 1959, have been disputed and contested. Every election is followed by controversy from real and perceived flaws; structural and institutional inadequacies; and deficiencies in the electoral laws, including the Constitution. (Ibrahim & Garuba, 2008:15)

Deriving from this unwholesome situation is the concern and constant clamours for establishing an acceptable and enduring constitutional model for the political stability of the country, which must consider the interplay between elements of militarization and democratization, as well as, the conspicuous protrusion of the military actors into Nigeria's democratic space.

It is therefore in view of the foregoing that this paper attempts to examine the features and relevance of diarchy in Nigeria political trajectory, in the recurrent and peculiar challenges of militarization and democratisation Nigeria politics. The paper essentially makes a strong case for a critical reappraisal of the diarchy option within the context of Fourth Arm Theory from a perspective of constitutional and political reform. After, the introduction, the second part examines the concept and extent of militarization in Nigerian politics. The third part appraises the crisis of democratization in Nigeria while the fourth part focuses on the idea and

application of the Fourth Arm Theory to the country constitutional and political reform process. The fifth and final part is the conclusion.

Militarism in African Politics: Background to the Fourth Arm Theory Proposition

Militarism, from which the act of militarization is derived has been defined as the institutionalization of organized (military) force [and military means] to serve as an instrument of politics, through the resort to force to resolve political problems (Aning & Hutchful, 2001:2). The idea of militarism goes beyond its conception in classic form as the domination of national politics by the armed forces. This is because, as contended,

“it is not all officers that are of militaristic or authoritarian bent, on the other hand, civilians have been not only been deeply implicated in (the militarization of national politics (instigating and financing coups) but have been indispensable to the functioning of military regimes’ civilian leaders have often misused the armed forces... Civilian regimes are often among the most militarized on the (African) continent. in terms of their willingness and ability to use repression (Aning & Hutchful: 2).

The complex web of civil-military relations in the post-colonial political trajectory of African states and the recurring trends of militarism, provided the premise for the proposition of the diarchy arrangement by Dr Azikiwe. As a novel constitutional model of civilian military-diarchy in Nigeria, it is a framework of synthesis of military and democratic factors in governance and political power arrangements. Given Azikiwe's political and intellectual pedigree, the idea was originally proposed, as his pivotal contribution to the political blueprint to herald a constitutional and institutional arrangements for a transition to civil rule proposed by the then military government headed by Gen. Yakubu Gowon. However, the relevance of the diarchy proposal in terms of time and space, outlived the political expediency of the period, as well as, extending beyond the scope of Nigerian political scene (as it is applicable to the general political

development in Africa). This is because of the prevalence and persistence of militarization in the polity, as a result of military incursion into politics and the antics of civil leaders which manifested in the erosion of democratic values in Africa.

A major political challenge emerged which emanated from a deviation of a theory of new national armies that were created in independent Africa to ensure defence and territorial integrity and to contribute to the nation-building project, but which in practice, has evolved to play other roles, including involvement in partisan politics. Consequently, a few years into self-government, Africa became a theater of military coups in which governance by the barrel of the gun took centerstage, postponing democratisation and jettisoning rule by the ballot (Matloza & Zoumenou, 1993:95). Thus, at independence, most emergent African states took the path of popular elections to choose their first national leaders as part of their decolonization process. After the celebrated transition from colonial rule to independence, a dramatic twist to the democratic consolidation of the nascent states soon evolved as, such that the legitimacy of those new governments shifted from being products of popular choices to those decided by the barrel of a gun as one country after another experienced military coups. The military usurped political power and entrenched itself by convoluting the course of governance in the series of coups d'état, that took place especially between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. This development led to general disillusion about the feasibility of democratic project in Africa.

The historical justification for the involvement of the army in national politics in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular is structurally rooted in colonialism itself, whose authority was predicated upon conquest, coercion and violence in which the security forces were systematically used to impose foreign domination on the African people, who were considered to be colonial subjects (Matloza & Zoumenou) thereby turning the military to an instrument of social and political oppression and repression. According to Osabiya (2015: 45),

During the days of colonialism, the colonial powers needed to use

military force to pacify and capture the conquered territories of Africa in the course of the arbitrary rule perspective by colonialism, military came in handy (as a useful instrument) and all through the period of colonial rule the military related to the people without civility and they were accustomed to the practice of using the language of force and intimidation. The African military came from the background of relating to the people as enemies and not as friends. Indeed, the military sees itself as been completely different from the bloody civilians." From this foundation, the military had perfected its strategies of subjugation of other groups, and dislodging it from governance has remained a tall agenda.'

Upon independence African states inherited weak state apparatuses predicated upon military repression and, in many senses, detached from the people. In many countries post-independence leaders failed to transform the state by, for instance, developing with their people a "social contract" that might have served as a basis of state legitimacy and sustainable democratic governance. In a word, the necessity for political survival compelled most leaders to manipulate the army or to be manipulated by it (Matloza & Zoumenou; 95)

It was against the incessant military intervention in the polity, which triggered political instability and general disillusion about the feasibility of democracy in Africa that informed the proposition by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. While arguing that that majority of African had become disillusioned with the poor performance of due to poor leadership, absence of organized opposition, decay of political institutions and practice, incessant military coups d'état and emergence of cabal dictatorship, he then declared unambiguously that: "I can see no hope for democracy in Africa but a lapse to tyranny with its cyclical recurrence of armed and violent revolution" (Azikiwe;24). It was against this declaration that Nnamdi Azikiwe went further to revolutionary change interpretation was necessary, and as a matter of exigency, he advocated a new constitutional arrangement that would bring both the military and civilian ruling class under a political accord for power and responsibility sharing.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Nigeria has been confronted with protracted crisis of democratization arising principally from militarization of its polity which has threatened foundation of its statehood. An insight into the extent of the crisis can be helpful in determining expediency of the Fourth Arm Theory in ongoing debate on the viable governance framework for the country.

An Overview of the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria

Like its parent concept, democracy, the term democratisation has attracted substantial scholarly attention and subjected to extensive usage. While democracy, given the popular definition attributed to Abraham Lincoln as the government of the people, for the people and by the people, denotes a political practice that embraces freedom of expression, right to life, right to dignity of the human person, right to personal liberty, free press, peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, political participation, right to fair hearing, right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, etc (Oddih, 2007: 147-148), democratization has often been described as a process for attaining the ideals of democracy. In the view of Donnel and Schumpeter (1986), for instance, democratization is defined as a process whereby rules and procedures are of citizenship are either applied to political institutions. Previously governed by other principles (such as coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (as non-tax payers, illeterates women, youth ethnic minorities, or extended to cover, issues and institutions not previously, subject to citizen participation, such as state agencies, military establishments, partisan organisations, interest groups, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.)

As a process, Nwabueze avers that the democratization is geared towards making the society, the politics, the state, the electoral system, and the practice of government fulfil the conditions of virile civil society, a democratic society a free society, a just society, equal treatment of all citizens, an ordered, stable society, a society infused with spirit of liberty,

democracy, justice and equality, and independent, self-reliant, and prosperous market-economy (Nwabueze, 1993)

From the foregoing, it is obvious that, societies that are hitherto under authoritarian rule have to place a high premium on democratization which requires the nurturing and expanding of the democratic space, in order to achieve the ideals of democracy. This has become particularly, with the advent of the so called third wave of democracy which became pronounced in the 80s and 90s following the end of the Cold War, by which, many hitherto undemocratic and authoritarian governmental units were transformed into democracies, with majority of the states, particularly in the Third World, now qualified to belong to community of liberal democracies.

It has been over three decades of democratic experience since the end of the Cold War. States on the continent have purportedly embraced the worldwide frenzy towards political systems based on democratic norms including: adopting a culture of regular multiparty elections; establishing democratic institutions of varying degrees of effectiveness and also putting in place institutional, constitutional and legal mechanisms for orderly civil–military relations, as well as civil control over the armed forces; and, effected transfer of power from one elected regime to another. However, for many of the African states, the military still remains a major factor in the national polity and in control of the state.

Nigeria rejoined the league of democracies after the cessation of military rule in 1999, to usher in a new phase of democratic rule in the country. After over two decades of uninterrupted civil rule, the current Fourth Republic has not only outlasted previous civilian dispensations in the country's history but also indicated that there is an apparent elite consensus on the utility of democratic institutions (Lewis, 2011:2). However, despite the apparent consensus of the elites and the belief by the majority of the people in democracy as the most acceptable form of government, as indicated by the sustenance of the Fourth Republic so far, however the crisis of democratisation in Nigeria has continued to fester with the increasing frustration of the voting public over the inability of

democracy to yield desired dividends. The lack of democratic culture has been a source of instability and in the country. According to this verdict:

The repeated cycles of frustrating Nigerian voters have been central to the country's tortuous history of political instability and the recurrent incursions of the military into governance. This is the sense in which Nigeria has managed to merely survive since independence. The First Republic merely survived up to 1966 when the military, through a coup d'etat, initially struck to introduce organised violence into governance. Since then, the country has oscillated between military rule and civilian rule, with the Second Republic running between October 1979 and December 1983. This was followed by a protracted transition to the Third Republic, which was eventually botched in 1993 following General Babangida's annulment of the June 12 1993 elections and the resumption of full-blown military rule. What is presently described as the Fourth Republic came into existence in May 1999 following yet another return of Nigeria to civilian rule. While the country appears to have survived all of the threats around its pathways to democratic development so far, it has been at a serious cost to democratic culture (Ibrahim & Garuba:15)

One of the misgivings about the democratization process in Nigeria is the control of the political space by a handful selfish elites who constitute themselves into an oligarchy that ceaselessly hold the country to ransom by abusing and manipulating the democratic institutions in order to achieve their narrow interests. A damning report on the structural obstacle to deepening democratic rule in Nigeria, by identifies the manifestation of authoritarian rule by an institutionalized oligarchy (comprising of self-serving politicians, businesspersons, political fixers, "godfathers," former military officers, and elite bureaucrats) who share a common interest in sustaining oligarchic power. The report further indicted the oligarchy of falling far short of their claims to represent democratically based regional, professional, and ethnic constituencies, through their activities and records (Omilusi, 2015: 20) The oligarchy perpetuates themselves in

power by subverting the popular will of the people through manipulation of elections by political parties operated by gladiators who are sponsored by them. The stylishly employ the use of money, deployment of thugs, intimidation, maiming and killing of opponents and perceived opponents to subvert the electoral process, leading to the imposition of the preferred candidates of the godfathers. The selected candidates only pursue the narrow and selfish interest of their sponsors, rather than pursuing. The report also explains that, in practice:

the members of the political oligarchy switch political parties, form new ones, or change party affiliations according to shifting opportunities to gain access to petro-rents and political privileges regardless of professed political principles, or regional or ethnic affiliations. The outcome is a patrimonial, patronage system that tends toward unstable authoritarianism without accountability, transparency, or democratically organized political parties (Omilusi).

The custodians of the democratic project explore the ethnic, religious, racial or class divisions in the Nigerian society leverage democratic competition. The fault-lines are readily triggered to and ignite political violence as a tool to wage political struggles—to exert power, rally supporters, destabilize opponents, or derail the prospect of elections altogether in an effort to gain total control of the machinery of government (Omilusi, 6). As a consequence, Nigeria in its Fourth Republic has become a theatre of various forms of violence ranging from ethnic, religious and communal unrests to organized terrorism and insurgency.

The vast majority of Nigerian citizens having been left disappointed about the feasibility of democracy to meet their expectations for improved living conditions, as well as guaranteeing them justice, equity, fairness, social economic and political rights, have also realized that democracy, as practiced in Nigeria does not offer much respite from their harrowing experience of military rule. It is also a bitter pill to swallow by them that there is no prospect for civil liberties as the oligarchy and the state

apparatus at their disposal do not have absolute control over the use of force as well as the political will or judicial control, as indeed, a common feature in the Nigerian scene to have non state actors such as militias, vigilantes, religious fundamentalists and criminal gangs regularly violate civil liberties while security forces employed by the state habitually violate human rights and routinely engage in extrajudicial killings of the citizens. Thus, given the contention that, “democratization frequently stimulates a surge of demands on the part of previously quiescent and perhaps even actively repressed groups such as those in the lower classes, excluded ethnic or racial groups,” the path to survival and ventilation of accumulated grievances by these groups assumed combative, often militarized engagement against their tormentors, “that is why the history of the country is that of epic bloodletting arising from civil wars, coups, counter-coups, civil uprisings, religious insurgencies, invasions, massacres, pogroms, tribal feuds, state executions and economic genocide (omilusi: 6). The militarized segments of the society and the militarised political environment thus sets the basis of the crisis that Nigerian democratization project is bedeviled with.

It is usually convenient to attribute the roots of the failure of sustaining democratic practice in Nigeria to the combination of colonial heritage and legacy of military rule. However, it is equally expedient to add lack of democratic temperament by political elites and poor exhibition of democratic culture by the general populace as the bane of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. It is agreeable that the nature of colonial system of occupation nurtured the militaristic features in the political system of Nigeria just as the several years of military intervention in Nigerian politics sustained the tendencies of militarism and authoritarian control of the Nigerian political space. However, the attitudes of the political class including the intergenerational stimulation of oligarchic ascendancy as demonstrated from the first republic to the unfolding fourth republic are good basis for interrogating the causes of instability arising from faulty democratic experiments in Nigeria and particularly as a way of finding lasting solutions to perennial political crises, development deficits and

poor governance in Nigeria. In the light of estimating the depth of crisis of democratization and militarization which signposts a relapse into anarchy, of Nigerian polity, perhaps, a reconsideration of the diarchy option is worthwhile.

Fourth Arm Theory of Diarchy and the Challenges of Political Reform in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

When it was espoused and proposed about for decades ago, the circumstances of the 1970s under which the Diarchy proposal was advanced are not considerably different from the prevailing political environment of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic. The spate of militarisation that has militated against democracy and democratization in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, has necessitated the demands for political reforms as a way of overcoming the seemingly insurmountable political challenges of the past and present. Thus, as remarked earlier, the proposal of a brand of diarchy proposed by Azikiwe was for the purpose of a constitutional arrangement to address the intractable political crisis caused by incessant military intervention and militarism that characterised the political affairs of Africa- in general- and Nigeria, in particular after independence. Diarchy or co-rule is a form of government in which two people or institutions jointly administer a polity either by agreement or force. The term is derived from the Greek words *di*-“double” and *arkhia*- “ruled”; or *duumvirate* from the Latin word, *duumviratus*, meaning office of two men. Duumvirate was originally practiced by the Roman republic and the idea of diarchy became popular when it was established through the Government of India Act, in British India between 1919 and 1935 and has been practiced at various times in various societies with varying form, depending on the political circumstances that demanded for such.

As a foremost participant in the politics of First and Second Republic, it is difficult to fault the insight and hindsight of Azikiwe offered on issues of national importance, such as his proposal for diarchy. Prior to military incursion into African politics, the First Republic politics of which Azikiwe was an active participant, collapsed when the political actors of the era,

instead of consolidating democracy, embarked on rampant destruction of democratic principles and ethos by hounding opponents, falsifying census figures, manipulating the 1964/65 elections and inflaming violence and chaos leading to military takeover of power in order to save the situation Dudley (1982). The position of Azikiwe has found justification in the revelation by Chinua Achebe of events that preceded the military takeover of government in 1966 (2012:71-72) has since revealed how the aforementioned events preceded military take-over of government. He explained the general feeling of frustration and disillusionment that permeated every segment of the Nigerian society, including the military and the intelligentsia, prior to the coup, while the political class were indifferent to this ominous signals, as they were blinded by their selfish and ethnic inclinations, as well as inordinate quest for power and accumulation of resources. As hopelessness and disenchantment grew, with no respite in. Nigerians began to literally take laws into their hands and the Police became powerless in the face of anarchy that was descending. Many bewildered Nigerians believed that the military was the only institution in the country restore stability and order and stability, as well as public confidence in the polity (Ojibo, 1980). At this point, leaders like Azikiwe who could have mitigated the impending doom were overwhelmed by the intensity of the political crisis that made it expedient for military to intervene. According to Achebe:

Many within the military leadership were increasingly concerned that they were being asked to step in and set things right politically. In the first six years of post-independence, Nigeria found itself calling on the armed forces to two Tiv riots in the Middle Belt, crush the 1954 general strike, and establish order following regional elections in the Western region in 1965. In hindsight, it seems as though President Azikiwe may have been aware of the sand shifting beneath the feet of the political class, and he tried to gain the support of the military brass during the constitutional crisis, following the 1964 federal general election. The failure of Azikiwe's

attempt perhaps should have been the first sign to many of us that trouble lay ahead for our young nation. (Achebe: 71)

The state of fragility and anarchy that precipitated the military intervention could only plunge the country into deeper crisis of the civil war of 1967 to 1970 soon afterwards. In the aftermath of the civil war which ended with the rhetoric of “no victor and no vanquished,” that the military then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, encouraged debates on transition to civil rule programme and an ideal form of government that would help in stabilizing the Nigerian polity. It was against such background that diarchy option was proposed by Azikiwe, as the major theme of his contribution to the debates. Though, it has been recorded that the diarchy proposition by Azikiwe was influenced by his anticipation of the “hidden agenda” of Gowon’s military administration to pave way for diarchy. The administration was not only dominated by leading politicians and technocrats such as Obafemi Awolowo, Tony Enahoro, Aminu Kano, Ahmed Joda, Shettima Ali Monguno, Joseph Tarka, Phillip Asiodu and others, certain utterances were revealed to have emanated from some of them toward advancing the adoption of diarchy. One of such as credited to Alison Ayida, the supersecretary, who claimed that:

Nigeria no longer has a ceremonial army. We are building a large modern army of well-trained, self-conscious and intelligent young men who will not be content to be relegated to the barracks and that the “constitutional settlement” must take into account the “new and crucial factor” of the military leadership who “in the new set up is of necessity obliged to conceive an interventionist role for itself” (Osaghae, 1998:70).

In view of this, the contention could be justified that Azikiwe merely reechoed what had been put in the public glare and associating him with the diarchy proposal, given his pedigree, was one of Gowon’s ways of attempting to achieve legitimacy mobilization for its “agenda,” which

was why it generated considerable debate and was “well received by top-ranking military officers . . .” (Osaghae, 1998:70-71).

An alternative view on the inspiration for the diarchy proposal is that the contention was a product of deep reflection and introspection given the trend in post-independence African states. The proposal was sequel to a expression of disappointment by Azikiwe, about the anti-democratic antics and poor leadership records of his contemporaries which he blamed om the political and economic declines of African states, when he lamented that:

As one who spent a lifetime fighting against imperialism, I feel ashamed at what is happening today. I shudder when I read what some of my former freedom fighters are doing to repress opposition and to destroy the last vestiges of democracy in Africa. (Azikiwe; 18). .

Azikiwe maintained that he and other nationalists were driven by the need to put an end to colonialism because they felt the system should represented bad governance and should therefore not be tolerated. Surprisingly however, the indigenous rulers who succeeded the colonial rulers, most of whom were at the frontline of fighting against colonialism, continued and became worse administrators. The poor performance of indigenous rulers that led to political instability and social convulsion that necessitated incessant military incursions into the governance of African states was the basis on which Azikiwe advanced his proposal.

Azikiwe’s position and proposition were justified about a decade later, after the the democratic dispensation of the Second Republic which became a product of the military transition of 1975 to 1979 collapsed. Azikiwe as a principal actor in the democratic project could only be disappointed by the confirmation of his earlier fears in the new dispensation. This is due to the anti-democratic tendencies of his fellow civilian rulers which apart from the massive rigging of the post-military elections of 1983 that gave landslide victory to the ruling party, political violence, abuse of judicial process, militarization of security apparatus, etc., also characterized the

democratisation process, which once again, attracted the intervention of the military on 31 December 1983. After carefully observing the scenario, Richard Joseph (2001:170) blamed the nonexistence of requisite social terrain for competitive party politics for failure of democratic culture and seeming unsuitability of constitutional democracy in Nigeria or any other African nation. According to him:

the individuals who emerged to win control of machinery of the political parties, which were able to gain registration, and subsequently to win offices at the state or federal level in Nigeria, displayed the range of skills that competitive party politics calls for in any election. However, the Nigerian social context...ensures that such individuals carry into the legislative halls and ministerial offices certain attitudes and priorities that which eventually convert democratic politics into a system characterized by greed, sectionalism, and disregard for stipulated procedures. Instead of democracy being a mode of collective self-representation, a way of harmoniously pursuing divergent interests within the bounds of the law, it becomes a mere ordeal, a tragedy in which government leaders and the masses of the people are increasingly trapped until rescued by military officers once again to extend the walls of their barracks to the nation's boundaries (Joseph: 171) .

The attempt to put diarchy into practice dominated the military administration on General Babangida who came to power in August 1985 after successfully leading a palace coup that overthrew the government of General Muhammadu Buhari in which he served as Chief of Army. Babangida, who exhibited the character of a reformer and populist “general,” accused his predecessor of failing to commit to transition to democratic rule, in order to appeal to the sentiments of democracy enthusiasts. Babangida encouraged open debates on virtually every issue of national importance and established a political bureau drawn from the intelligentsia many of whom previously would rather have nothing to do with military government. Indeed, Babangida's liberal initiatives

at the beginning of his regime earned his administration some praises. According to Ugboajah (2013: 63),

. . . In the political bureau and the general political orientation debate... a sizeable pocket of informed Nigerians, in re-echoing Dr Ninamdi Azikiwe thesis, may have been persuaded that the Babangida junta had some inherent qualities that could facilitate civil polity and enduring democracy. . . .

This is an educated guess from a highly charismatic and euphoric early period of the administration. To further earn legitimation from a wide spectrum of the civil society for legitimization of his government, Babangida soon embarked on what would later become “transition without end,” which eventually ended with the annulment of 1993 presidential elections. During the eight years of his “reign,” Babangida assumed the title of president while his military deputy also earned the title of vice-president. His transition program was implemented in phases: by installing civilian governments at both local government and state level and constituting the National Assembly at the national level. Consequently, it has been claimed that:

the Babangida administration assumed a diarchical dimension in 1992, when he inaugurated the National Assembly which was to exist concurrently with the National Defence and Security Council. . . . The National Assembly (Basic and Transitional Provisional) Amendment Decree Number 53 of 1992 gave General Babangida the power to inaugurate the National Assembly. It also provided for the convening of the National Assembly by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Babangida (Okike, 1998: 29)

The last phase was the presidential election that held on the 12th of June 1993, which was believed to have been won by MKO Abiola, before it was annulled by Babangida. The upheaval that greeted the annulment of the led to the exit of the regime of General Babangida and the composition

and the swearing in of Interim National Government (ING), comprising of 32 military and civilian members, on Aug. 27 1993. The ING led by Ernest Shonekan only lasted for about three months, following the purported resignation on Nov. 27, 1993, orchestrated by Gen. Sani Abacha, who was the de-facto second in command to Babangida and the most senior military officer in ING to emerge as a new military ruler. After settling down, Abacha dissolved the democratic structures that had been put in place during Babangida's transition period and instead, embarked on another round of democratization process that was only aimed at his transmutation from military to civilian head of state (Ugboajah: 69). With elections already conducted into councils, states and federal legislatures. Abacha was poised to emerge as a civilian president, going by indication of his adoption by politicians in the five registered political parties as their consensus candidate for presidential election scheduled for 2009, but for his sudden death on June 8, 2008. Thus, another era ended with its own façade of democratization.

The regime of Gen. Abdusalam, who succeeded Abacha, invalidated all the elections conducted under his predecessor and dissolved all political structures. He thereafter initiated a fresh democratization which lasted eleven months and ended the transition that lasted between 1985 and 1999. Thus, the political class, apart from exhibiting attitudes that eroded the gains of democratization in the Second Republic which enabled the military to intervene, they were involved throughout the period, of military rule by, by participating and aiding the process involved in prolonging military rule and collaborating with military rulers to compromise democratization projects such as the role played in the annulment of June 12 presidential election and manipulation of electoral process to ensure that Abacha emerged as civilian president, unchallenged.

The current Fourth Republic dispensation came into existence on May 29, 1999, after a transition program that was teleguided and decreed into existence by the departing military rulers who were rather compelled by the internationally-induced pressures for conforming with the emerging post-Cold War liberal dictates that prohibit any form of authoritarianism

in order to “make the world safe for democracy” (Jackson, 2021). The democratization process was severely tinkered with, and the outcome resulted in the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo (a retired General and former military ruler) as president whose regime (1999-2007) was dominated by many retired military officers including Aliyu Gusau, Theophilus Danjuma, Bode George, Ahmadu Alli, Olagunsoye Oyinlola, David Mark, Jonah Jang and a bulk of politicians who played prominent roles in during the military rule. The 2015 elections produced, Muhammed Buhari, a retired general and former military dictator, as president. Before the emergence of Buhari, who had been a leading political force in the country, the departing President Obaasanjo ensured that Alhaji Umaru Yar Adua, who was a younger brother of his erstwhile de facto second in command as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters during their military regime, emerged president. The death of Yar Adua only paved the way for his former vice, to become president, Goodluck Jonathan to be president. Meanwhile, from 2007 to 2015, the position of the senate president was occupied by David Mark, another retired general who played prominent role in the aborted transition period of the Third Republic.

Indeed, a “covert diarchy” that manifested in the regime commenced with the release of the current Constitution to the public on May 29, 1999 which “other than the conscripted drafting team, no one had previously set an eye on its contents” (Soyinka:2019). The content of the constitution was later found to reinforce the system of diarchy as the political arrangement once proposed by Nnamdi Azikiwe... as a solution to the power struggles that had roiled Nigeria since 1966.” This has been confirmed by Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka (2019), thus:

The military had mothballed the idea at the time, only to roll it out in 1999, camouflaged as democracy. The true name of this governing structure is diarchy and it describes a government jointly ruled by military and civilian, with or without the latter's content. According to the perspective, as an embedded force of internal colonialism, the Nigerian military will never quit the political stage. Military coups may no longer be fashionable in Africa, but that doesn't

mean that the military has removed its hands from the wheel. In the last couple of decades, the managers of power in Nigeria” s “democratic” system have learned not only to secure approval of their political preferences, but also to plant their enforcers in key positions before quitting the scene. These enforcers appear in the Senate, House of Representatives, as well as the security services, as well as in various committees, state assemblies, parastatal organisations and important economic agencies. It is however at the very center of the government that the military has built and effectively garrisoned its control tower in Nigeria .

Earlier before the implementation of the transition programme of the fourth republic, in September 1998, a statement credited to the Northern Elders Forum (NEF), after a meeting in Kaduna in a communiqué signed by its secretary, Senator A.M. Gani and chairman, Aliko Mohammed said “more realistic civilian/military relationship should be considered in order to ensure a stable polity” (Oluwajuyitan, 2013).

There is no doubt that the above picture indicates that diarchy is already in practice in Nigeria. There are obvious attestations to this. First it was widely expected that the electoral process that ushered in the Fourth Republic could best be seen in the broader impetus to end military rule and begin a process of democratization and the rebuilding of political institutions to sustain and broaden the efficacy of civilian rule. The process that were characterized by obvious flaws, tainted towards a predetermined outcome were largely overlooked or otherwise tolerated by the population and the political competitors (Ibrahim & Garba, 52) rather than been vigorously contested as a way of deviating from inherited military legacies and chart a direction for the running of democracy in a liberal fashion, Also, it is confounding that over two decades after the commencement of the democratic experiment, the political elites are still finding it difficult to effect serious political reforms to structural and institutional deficiencies that the 1999 constitution features despite popular agitations for constitutional reforms and the restructuring of the polity. This suggest that there is an tacit agreement between military and political leaders

about the preservation of the system of diarchy already in place, which is implicit in the contents of the constitution, but mostly experienced in the “in the form of explicit government actions (Soyinka, 2019). The spontaneous deployment of troops by Nigerian leaders since inception of the Fourth Republic to intervene in even petty and completely civil matters, including peaceful protests, elections, private land disputes, etc., that made military operations under different guises to be conspicuous across the country suggest that the path of diarchy is undertaken in preference to full-fledged democracy. Despite being operated in denial, it is an undeniable fact that the Nigerian political scene is replete with elements of diarchy as evident in the Nigerian presidents being flanked publicly by a fully decorated, army colonel serving as military aide de and the address of the civil populace and political leaders on issues relating to governance,. As a recent observation in a leading Nigerian newspaper, averred:

Those who have long suggested that Nigeria democracy exhibits diarchical overtones may not be far from the truth. Increasingly, diarchy which is defined as a form of government in which power is held by two supreme rulers or two governing bodies, is manifesting in a way that it is no longer dubitable. Both the Nigerian military and the Nigerian police made their presence powerfully felt in the polity, so much so that the people have become accustomed to their imperious and periodic interventions in governance and politics (*The Nation*, 2019)

A sincere appraisal of the current Nigerian situation must acknowledge the latent existence of the diarchy system in in the constitution, as well as state, institutional and general political behavior of the country’s political system, of which framework, pragmatically requires further modification or outright repudiation in ongoing political and constitutional reforms efforts. Thus, as emphatically declares Adekanye (1999: 159) in the context of Azikiwe’s proposal for diarchy, a meaningful reform must therefore consider the significance of his admonition that:

In addition to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary forming the three arms of the state, the armed and security forces shall constitute the fourth arm (Azikiwe: 24).

The fourth arm theory, in the context of Azikiwe's diarchy proposal, seeks a constitutional recognition of the military institution as a distinct arm of government, to coexist and co-function with the executive, legislature and judiciary. With this, the military would assume the mandate to check and correct the institutional indiscretions of the other arms whose manners have been responsible for failed democratic projects and instability in Nigeria, by which they become guardian of the state. The fourth arm theory, as explained by Okike, is predicated on the fact that since states are governed by human beings, soldiers as human beings also possess the requisite capacity to govern (Okike: 29). The need to give the fourth arm theory a prime consideration as a *de facto* political condition, even when it is currently practiced covertly in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized.

Conclusion

The proposal for the adoption of diarchy as a complex hybrid political arrangement is expedient for addressing the peculiar challenges of militarization and democratization since Nigeria became independence. Before the proposal was made in the 1970s, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was a major stakeholder in Nigeria's democratic project, the situation had generated general disillusion and pessimism about the feasibility and suitability of democracy in the country and in other African states which led to persistent military incursions. There is a notion that "If Nigeria reverts to military rule, descends into political chaos, or collapses, it will deal a harsh blow to democratic hopes across Africa. Indeed, the many African countries that remain blatantly authoritarian will never liberalize if the continent's new and partial democracies cannot make democracy work" (Diamond 2021). Though military rule is farfetched as a result of the prevailing liberal intentional convention, but the fears and pessimism about democratic experiments still subsists even since

the commencement of the Fourth Republic in the country. “Nigeria is regularly haunted by a “ghost of the past,” a cloud of fear organised around perceived uncertainties and a constant fear of repeated violence and election rigging producing electoral failures and undemocratic rule” (Ibrahim & Garuba, 2008: 9). Consequently, the political situation arising from unbridled militarization and crisis of democratization, has been likened to anarchy, and a suggestion that,

If diarchy with restricted freedom guarantees “responsiveness of government to the people, justice, and civil liberties of thought, speech writing, and worship, we will still not be too far away from the initial concept of democracy by the Greeks.” (Oluwajuyitan).

This contention is not out of place. Indeed, evidence abound about country's that have adopted diarchy to mitigate anarchy in their systems. The result of the overture made by Charles de Gaule to initiate the process that would steer France away from anarchy and doom has stabilized and sustained the polity since 1960s, when a serving general resolved what five previous revolutions could not achieve. Similarly, diarchy arrangements have been experimented in African countries like San Marino, Sudan, Egypt to navigate the country out of crisis. In the case of Nigeria, since the failed democratic experiment of the First Republic, the military has surreptitiously wielded power and influence, and controlled the commanding heights of the economy with the active collaboration of the political class and the process of democratization and democratic consolidation in the country have been embellished by highly militarized attitudes by all and sundry. In the ensuing scenario and with the clamour for comprehensive constitutional reforms and political restructuring of the country, it is necessary to reconsider the diarchy proposal of Nnamdi Azikiwe by formally constituting the military institution as the fourth arm of government in order to enable them play a guardian role that would enhance the stability and progress of the country.

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