

Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’s North-East: Rethinking the Experiences of the Barracks Women

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Abstract

This article examines the experiences of the barracks women during the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It is an aspect of women’s history that has been overlooked in scholarly treatments due to military culture and “a closed community”. The Boko Haram insurgency has attracted global attention since the attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja and the abduction of the Chibok school girls from Government Girls Secondary School. Consequently, Nigeria has become a ‘country of particular concern’ due to terrorist activity. This article argues that the Boko Haram insurgency has affected the barracks women. It brought physical and psychological trauma, economic and social disruptions, which have resulted into protest by women in military barracks. Using qualitative data and an interdisciplinary approach to substantiate its claim, this article reveals that insurgency affected the lives and livelihoods of women in the barracks. It concludes that community-level and international collaboration would bring a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Keywords: Boko Haram insurgency, Barracks women, North-east Nigeria, Socio-economic disruptions, Diplomacy.

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Introduction

This article examines the effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on the barracks women in Nigeria's northeast. The paper is important, because women also share in the occupational hazards of their military husbands. This paper argues that the impact of the Boko Haram rebellion in the Northeast was visible on the barracks women, yet overlooked because of the military culture of silence and national security considerations. The Boko Haram insurgency brought physical and psychological trauma, displacement of military families, and disruptions to socio-economic life. The experiences of these women underscore that wars create unforeseen roles for women, as healthcare workers, homemakers, and food providers. Accordingly, women's role in the barracks was reconfigured due to the Boko Haram crisis.

The term "Barracks women" refers to women married to officers and lower ranks in the military. They were also known as "wives of military personnel," unlike the female soldiers who were trained to carry arms and ready to mobilize at short notice. The barracks women live "behind the walls" and also internalize the military tradition and culture of their husbands. "Insurgency" means a violent struggle of a group that refuses to accept its government. Insurgency can take the form of terrorism and banditry, as is the case in Nigeria. It is also an attempt to take control of a country by force (Hornby, 2015). "Terrorism" has no universally accepted definition due to ideological differences, varying opinions, motives, and differing schools of thought. For instance, there is the saying "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", and this explains the challenge of a commonly accepted definition (Weir, 2012). A commonly accepted definition is also difficult when scholars consider the local, international, and religious dimensions of terrorism. Therefore, the term is socially constructed to suit individual goals, sects, and organizational purposes. Nevertheless, "terrorism" has its root in the Latin word "terrere," meaning "to terrify", which is intended to achieve specific objectives by creating fear to overcome obstacles (Seteolu, 2011, p.5). This is Boko Haram's tactic in Nigeria; the sect

has violently attacked security operatives, military bases, communities, and worship centres. Therefore, it is noted that “terrorism” is the use of violence and terror to achieve set goals.

This paper accordingly explores the Boko Haram insurgency and the experiences of the barracks women. The study underscores that women also face the hazards of the military profession, contrary to the notion that war is only men’s burden. It is also conceived as a contribution to the existing literature on women and conflict in Nigeria.

Literature Review

Much has been written about the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, yet relatively little is known regarding the experiences of the women in the barracks. Generalized literature on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria includes (Falode, 2016); Montclos (2025); Campbell (2014), Mbagwu (2017), Omotuyi (2016/2017), Maiangwa et al. (2012), Kah (2017). These works provide an understanding of the origins and activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. For instance, Falode argued that Nigeria’s difficulties in defeating Boko Haram have security implications that extend beyond its borders. He advocated for more effective counter-strategies to overcome the menace. For Montclos, the narratives of “Sahelistan” terrorism show a degree of historical myopia. According to him, in the case of the Boko Haram sect in north-east Nigeria, the accounts ignore ancient rivalries between the Bornu Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate. Montclos added that modern terrorism tends to place ancient episodes of rebellion under the banner of radical Islam. Contrary to Montclos’ viewpoint, Campbell revealed that Boko Haram was a radical Islamist movement shaped by Nigeria’s history of poor governance and neglect in northern Nigeria. He observed that the struggle between the government and Boko Haram has severe humanitarian repercussions; hence, the need for the international community to provide humanitarian aid to the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Others focus on the Boko Haram insurgency and its implications for the future and food security.

Literature on Boko Haram and women includes (Amnesty International Report, 2018; International Crisis Group Africa Report, 2016; Zenn and

Pearson, 2014; Suleiman, 2024). These authors consider the themes highlighted in their reports, especially the atrocities of Boko Haram on women and organized sexual violence. The Reports conclude that the UN Human Rights Council should pressure the Nigerian government to address violations of international law committed against women by the security agencies and Boko Haram. Other works discuss the changing roles of women as war brides and attractions for potential Boko Haram recruits. The authors further explained the gendered rationale for integrating women within the framework of Boko Haram's ideology and culture. None of the authors discussed the Boko Haram insurgency and the experiences of the barracks women, which this paper attempts to explore.

Methodology

To fill this gap, this study draws on qualitative data; primary and secondary materials from a wide variety of sources and participant observation. The primary sources were from several months of ethnographic fieldwork in major cantonments in Adamawa, Yobe, and Bornu States. Structured interviews, newspaper publications, and military literature were also used. The names of the interviewees are pseudonymous because they requested to be anonymous to safeguard their privacy. Secondary sources, on the other hand, include journal articles, books, published and unpublished dissertations, and internet sources. These materials were collected from the Nigerian Army Libraries and Training Schools in Lagos and Kaduna. Others were sourced from the National Library, Lagos, the Universities of Lagos and Ahmadu Bello. As a participant-observer, the present researcher had a robust stint in the Nigerian military for over two decades, where he gathered some of the materials. These sources, as well as participant experience, shed light on the subject and the grey area.

This paper also utilized the theory of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation originally propounded by Samuel Stouffer and improved by Dollard et al. (1939) because of the perspectives and insights on violence. The theory explains that frustration leads men to act aggressively to achieve their goals or act irrationally. The relative deprivation theory was given a

boost by James C. Davies' influential work, "Towards a Theory of Revolution". It explains that feelings of deprivation and frustration motivate individual decisions to engage in collective action and political violence (Davies, 1962). Over the years, the theory has received further modifications (see Gurr, 1970; Berkowitz, 1962; Yates, 1962). Remarkably, the theory is commonly used in the analysis and interpretation of violent behaviour arising from the inability to fulfil essential needs (Ademola, 2021; Ordu, 2017).

Despite the acceptability of the theory, it has also been criticized for its shortcomings. Nevertheless, the theory of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation give us a deeper insight into the origins and activities of Boko Haram on the one hand and the barracks women's protests on the other. As applied to this study, the Boko Haram insurgency was caused by prolonged societal neglect, religious fanaticism, and frustration-aggression. It was the poverty level and the breeding of panhandlers that midwifed insurgency in Northern Nigeria, while the barracks women's protests were born out of the increased death rate of soldiers and socio-economic disruptions.

The Origins of Boko Haram in Nigeria

The origins of Boko Haram cannot be divorced from the interconnected challenges that defined Nigerian history in the colonial and post-colonial periods. These include the amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria, constitutional crisis, religious bigotry, and ethnic politics. These factors not only hindered the unity and progress of the country but also promoted corruption and sectional interests. In modern times, the indifference to Western education in most parts of northern Nigeria, caused by some religious zealots and political leaders, has brought marginalization and social exclusion. Hence, the beginnings of the Boko Haram sect, composed of a vast army of unemployed youths and some *Alma-Jiri* used as human shield (William W. Hansen et al., 2016). The *Alma-Jiri* institution is composed of abandoned children and those left in Quranic Schools (Madrassa) due to the lack of parental care and the government's attention. Therefore, these children roam the streets begging for alms and food (panhandlers). Their presence in the city centres made them willing tools in the hands of politicians and

religious sects, ready to cause mayhem (Hansen et al., 2016). The social and economic exclusion of this group promoted violent behaviour, aggression, and revenge attacks on society (Adelaja et al., 2018). The origins of Boko Haram cannot be accurately ascertained due to the lack of documentation on the activities of the sect. Nevertheless, their activities might have begun much earlier than the received date of 2009, as a non-violent group, because of the search for an operational base and followership.

According to Nwolise (2017), the creation of Boko Haram has a long historical background. Although most studies have linked the beginning of the group to the year 2009, it goes beyond this year. The true historical roots of the group can be traced to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* or *Shabaab* group (Muslim Youth Organization) in Maiduguri, Borno State. (p. 134)

Another scholar argued that the sect has existed since 1995 under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan, who later went for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. "Since then, the sect has survived under different leaders and names" (Onuoha, 2010, p.55). A retired military officer also noted that "the Boko Haram had developed in northern Nigeria before 2004, and its threat was part of the agenda in the Security Thematic Group of the Vision 20: 2020" (Don Idada-Ikponmwen, as cited in Ero, 2012, p. 46). When one juxtaposes the above, one would discover that the Boko Haram had existed before 2009 when it launched attacks on institutions, worship centres, and security personnel. Thus, we can convincingly state that the 2009 date might not be realistic because the sect was in its formative years, developing extremist ideology, networks, and funding strategies.

The term "Boko Haram" refers to a radical Islamic organization in northern Nigeria, popularly known as *Jama'atu Ahles Sunnah Ladda'Awati Wal-Jihad*, meaning people committed to the propagation of Prophet Mohammed's teaching and jihad. In another sense, "Boko Haram" means Western education is sacrilege or sinful, and this is explicit in their philosophy and violence. The sect assumed that Western education was the cause of syncretism and pollution of Islamic worship and culture. According to them,

it was one of the factors that marginalized the ordinary people from employment, social inclusion, and politics. As Shehu (2023) stated:

The group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers anything Western as an aberration or completely un-Islamic. The group viewed the Western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion's weakness. Hence, their declaration that Western education and indeed all Western institutions are infidels and as such must be avoided by Muslims. (pp.1-2).

When one considers the above, it is clear that the opinion of the sect on Western education cannot be substantiated. This is because they failed to understand the utility of religion in society and nation-building. More importantly, "the sect had no independent orthodoxy, hence the link with the Al-Qaeda of the Maghreb and the Taliban." (Musa, 2013, pp. 26-2) The association with international terror organizations suggests its transition to terror activities. It also represents a change in ideology and modus operandi. Before 2009, Boko Haram enjoyed political patronage and individual support. At first, "the support and allegiance were mainly tied to electoral victory in the 2003 and 2007 Elections in northern Nigeria" (Olojo, 2013, p.5). For example, one of the ardent supporters of Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect, was Alhaji Buji Foi, who met his untimely death in the hands of security operatives in 2009 (Adaji, 2009, p 29). Buji Foi and Yusuf were ardent followers of one Sheikh Mahmud Ja'afar Adam, an itinerant Islamic preacher murdered in Kano due to a leadership tussle. Thus, Yusuf took over the leadership and attracted followers, including Alhaji Foi, who provided financial support. As Abimbola (2010) noted:

There was also financial support for the sect from within Nigeria. Although many of them are not yet known, the support of Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State, is commonly acknowledged. There were also other speculated sponsors, from prominent religious leaders to businessmen from the North. Motivations for such support could include belief in the sect's cause, desire to promote religion, or sowing the seeds for future reciprocity of goodwill. (Abimbola, 2010, p. 101)

Similarly, the sect derived support from some Islamic countries and international Islamic organisations, and businessmen. “Having accumulated the necessary funds, the sect became emboldened” (Adaji, 2009, p. 29). Remarkably, the disagreement with the sect began in December 2003, following a community dispute concerning the fishing rights of a local pond. During the conflict over seventy of its members were killed, and many others were injured. Moreover, the whereabouts of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was unresolved by the security agencies until news spread that he died in the crossfire. Others claim that he died in Police custody but this could not be substantiated. Afterward, the activities of the sect became pronounced when students in tertiary institutions and Universities in Yobe and Bornu States abandoned their studies for Boko Haram recruitment and volunteer service. This development transformed the profile of the sect because most of the recruits were children of influential politicians and businessmen. It also increased the number of volunteer militia and funding networks of the sect.

By 2009, the sect had activated its sectarian violence by bombing public places and places of worship, strapping bombs on radicalized female members, kidnapping school children, and waging war on security personnel (Bloom and Matfess, 2016 pp. 105-106). “On September 7, 2010, the Bauchi Prison was attacked, and on December 31, 2010, the *Mogadishu Barracks, Mammy Market, Abuja*, was bombed with casualties” (Mbagwu, 2017, p. 139). Also, in December 2011, “a bomb went off on Christmas Day at St Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, leaving scores of people dead” (Babalola et al., 2011; Odeh, 2014, p. 22). These deadly attacks shook the nation because terrorism is strange to this part of the world, but the coordination of attacks and precision explains the military capability of the sect. Similarly, 14-15 April 2015, witnessed the Boko Haram abduction of the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Bornu State, and this was shocking news to the international community and civil society. The condemnation of Boko Haram around the world marked them as a terrorist organization. More terrifying was “the announcement of President Goodluck Jonathan that Boko Haram was affiliated with international terrorist organizations, such as West Africa’s Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and Taliban”

(Ehikioya, 2014, p. 5). This, perhaps, is because of the similarities in their operations, logistics, and ensigns, but more important was the palpable sabotage of some of his ministers and cabinet members. Therefore, the Boko Haram insurgency marked a turning point in Nigeria's chequered history, and this affected the barracks women.

Physical and Psychological Experiences of Barracks Women

The Boko Haram insurgency marked a new chapter in the history of women living in military barracks. Many lost loved ones, others sustained injuries, and numerous women were widowed. These experiences contributed to physical and psychological trauma, insomnia, and high blood pressure. The insurgency also triggered stroke, memory loss, aggression, and frustration among some women. These traumatic experiences and related health challenges continue to affect women in north-eastern Nigeria. Of greater concern to the sick and wounded was the collapse of infrastructure, healthcare facilities, and the migration of medical professionals from the zone. This corroborates the views of Markou-Pappas and Ansaloni (2025):

Armed conflicts damage healthcare infrastructure, displace millions, and create long-term public health crises...war has systematically dismantled medical facilities, forcing physicians and healthcare workers to operate under siege, with severely limited resources. (Markou-Pappas and Ansaloni, 2025, p.1)

Lived Experiences of Barracks Women in North-eastern Nigeria

Part of the lived experiences of these women was the treatment of the wounded and the funeral ceremonies of soldiers. For instance, *The Guardian Newspaper*, 12 January 2019, reported:

The Nigerian Army authorities in Kaduna, yesterday, buried 13 soldiers and one officer killed along the Damaturu /Maiduguri road while on national duty by suspected Boko Haram insurgents in the northeast. (Akhaine and Njadvara, 2019)

It was also reported that some security officers in Bama, Borno State, were attacked, “while hundreds of Boko Haram fighters were decimated” (Mbagwu, 2017, p 144). The above clearly explains the grim condition of soldiers and their families during the Boko Haram crisis. During an interview in Maiduguri, Borno State, with some bereaved women from the barracks, one of them remarked, “My greatest worries are the children because I do not have a job and my petty trade has been disrupted” (B. Yaro, personal communication, May 20, 2024). Another widow said, “My children were born in the barracks and have not been to the village, not even once. How do I convince them that we are returning to the village because of the death of their father?” (N. Etuk, personal communication, June 10, 2024). Also, in Yobe State, a respondent lamented, “I would have wished my husband were alive to enjoy his gratuity and pension because he dedicated his life to the military” (S. Bulama, personal communication, June 15, 2024). Another respondent gave a sharp retort. “Who will help me in this circumstance, who will train my children?” (J. Danladi, personal communication, June 16, 2024). When one juxtaposes the condition of these women, one would discover the agony in their hearts. Due to the fatalities, most widows became regular patients in military hospitals and teaching hospitals in Zaria and Kaduna, fighting for their lives.

The Boko Haram insurgency also affected the family unit, especially the wounded military husbands and their medical bills. This was of great concern when they considered the wages and health insurance programme of the military. Consequently, a substantial amount of their salaries was spent on medical bills, and this affected most marriages, often leading to divorce because not all women accepted their condition. The family system was also affected by the displacement of children due to the insurgency. Most women relocated from the barracks to the villages, while others left their children in the care of family and friends to nurse their husbands. Therefore, the anxiety of separated homes added to the physical and psychological trauma. Given the above, some barracks women chose to have their children around while they assisted their sick husbands. As the war on terror escalated, the military authorities directed that families of military personnel involved in *Operation*

Lafiya Dole and Operation Hadin Kai in the northeast region should remain in their previous units. This was to minimize casualties and the kidnapping of military dependants. More importantly, it was to counter the Boko Haram threat of using women as pawns, war brides, and bombers (Zenn and Pearson, 2014, p. 47; International Crises Group, 2016, p. 6). The second policy emphasized that officers and men should intermittently be granted passes to visit their families. This was to offer soldiers in war zones a breather from active duties and also allow them to solve family issues, such as children's education and housing. It should be clear from our discussion that barracks women in the northeast suffered physical and psychological trauma, separation from children, and treatment of wounded husbands. This explains that wars brought unpredictable roles to women, as home managers and caregivers.

Socio-economic Disruptions

The impact of insurgency on the socio-economic activities of the barracks women was enormous. With the increase in the Boko Haram threats, social gatherings of the barracks women were suspended. These include religious activities, marriage celebrations, the West African Social Activities (WASA), and intergroup relations. Other social activities include Tombola/ Gala Nights and the Nigerian Army Officers' Wives Association (NAOWA). The suspension was to avoid fatalities because terrorists often target crowded places and gatherings. For most Christian and Muslim families, religious festivals were celebrated at home without the usual pageantry, yet they did not lose their value. Also, intergroup relations between the barracks and their civilian neighbours were negatively impacted. Soldiers and their families created social distance as the Boko Haram terrorists disguised as civilians. The suspicions were very strong that civilian neighbours equally feared the presence of soldiers because everyone was a suspect.

Apart from the disruption to intergroup relations, the suspension of the activities of NAOWA was a setback to the humanitarian efforts in the northeast barracks. Most women depended largely on the empowerment of the association because of the insurgency. Arising from this, most women

resorted to friends and families, while others left for new endeavours. The restrictions on social life consequently left the barracks women at the margins of society. On the economic front, insurgency disrupted agriculture, arts and crafts, and the *mammy market* institutions. Before the emergence of Boko Haram in the northeast region, women played a significant role in food production and exchange. They were in charge of the barracks economy and food security. Their involvement in the economy complemented their husbands' income and personal welfare. "They planted cassava, cereals, yams, vegetables, tomatoes, pepper, sugarcane, and perennial fruit trees on fallow land and undeveloped plots. Through farming, they derived income to support the home" (Nzemeka, 2015, p. 192). With the emergence of Boko Haram, economic activities were banned because of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and bombs. This development contributed to food shortages and the lack of food varieties. When we consider the devastation caused by insurgency, it should be clear from our discussion that the barracks women were greatly affected.

Trade and markets were also not spared. Most women traders were afraid to venture out of the barracks for fear of Boko Haram. Therefore, the compound trade organized around the living quarters, and the *mammy market institution* was disrupted. Most of the items sold in the compound, such as the general goods, became scarce and costly because of restrictions on movement in and out of the barracks. The *mammy market* trade was also suspended. It was a market dominated and patronized by the barracks women. Consequently, the barracks women were economically disenfranchised with little or no means of supporting the family.

Barracks Women's Protests

Women's protests were not new in Nigerian barracks. It was first recorded at the close of the First World War in 1918. During the period, military families in Lagos were in high spirits about the homecoming of their husbands, but the unexpected happened at the Lagos Lagoon. As Frederick Lugard puts it:

There were great preparations in Lagos for the soldiers' return early in 1918. The bunting was up; the usual "indefatigable ladies" were there dispensing food and drink, cigarettes and the more traditional stimulant of the kola-nut was ready. The weather was unkind. The big troopships could not enter the harbour and the soldiers, many of them diseased and wounded . . . It was sad, indeed, to hear that men were dying of pneumonia on the troopships before they could be disembarked. Tragic...to have been through so strenuous a campaign and to get back to Lagos harbour and die without landing (Lugard, cited in Perham, 1960, p. 550).

The sad event, as summarized by Lord Lugard, captures the plight of African soldiers at the close of the war. It was a pointer that weather and natural elements also conspire against the military profession. The sad event at the Lagos lagoon triggered women's protest to the chagrin of Lord Lugard and the colonial authorities. They yelled and accused the colonial officers of negligence and exploitation of Africans; after all, no European officer died in the Lagos lagoon disaster. Members of the public supported the barracks women against the colonial authorities. (Nzemeka, 2022). To assuage the anger of the women, the influential Victorian Lagos (mostly educated and wealthy class) and the Lagos Market Women (LMW) visited the barracks, hugged and consoled the women and the commanding officer. Also, the then Oba of Lagos, in the company of his White Cap Chiefs, paid a condolence visit to the Government House, Marina, Lagos, and later presented relief materials to the deceased soldiers' families (Nzemeka 2022). Although the protests ended through diplomacy and appeasement, it was one of Lord Lugard's misfortunes in colonial Nigeria.

The women's protests in northeast Nigeria were caused by a combination of factors. First were the complaints of military husbands, and second was the frustration of the barracks women with the persistent burial ceremonies of soldiers. Recall that soldiers often complain of the sophisticated weapons of the terrorists and thus envisage that the government would equip them to

overrun the terrorists. Another factor was the delayed payment of allowances to troops of *Operation Lafiya Dole* and *Operation Hadin Kai*, which reduced their morale. More worrisome was the report of complicity among the senior officers (BBC News May 14, 2014). There were also the challenges of timely payment of gratuities and pensions, which affected most families. We can only discuss a few of the above points for want of space. On March 10, 2022, a group of barracks women in Kebbi staged a protest. These were widows whose husbands died in the war against insurgency. The protesting women, clad in black attire, barricaded the official quarters of the Commanding Officer in Zuru, shouting in Hausa, “Whatever will happen, let it happen, we are also ready to die. The killing is too much and is unacceptable” (Channels Television, 2022).

Also, during an interview with one of the cable networks, a woman in Maiduguri reported:

They were opposed to their husbands going to battle because, every time their husbands went to fight, Boko Haram launched a reprisal attack on the barracks. The terrorists' weaponry was more sophisticated.... Now, the army wants to send their husbands to Gwoza, and they said no. (*BBCNEWS*, August 11, 2014)

When one juxtaposes the reasons for the protests, one would discover that women's lives were affected as partners in progress. Most of them had no other means of livelihood due to the insurgency, and the humanitarian activities of NAOWA had been suspended. Were this group to have been incorporated into the government's empowerment programme or the military social schemes, their predicaments would have been mitigated. The social investment programme should have provided an investment opportunity once the unexpected happened to their husbands. The women's protests explain that they were stakeholders in the system. The frustration of the women was the indifference of the government and the collapse of esprit de corps in the system.

Reactions of Military Authorities

The responses of military authorities toward the barracks women were considered because barracks women could not be court-martialled because of their status as “military dependants. The authorities discovered the women were emboldened by the death of their spouses, and in the event of sanction, the civil-military relations would be affected. Moreover, there was an ongoing debate in the public domain that women’s protests in the barracks were necessary and timely because the war against terror seemed not to be effective. Based on the above, there were constraints on the military authorities to arrest widows mourning their husbands. Therefore, to alleviate their grief, the military authorities directed the immediate payment of gratuities and pensions to the deceased’s families. Also, Commanding Officers were directed to create jobs for some of them as ward maids, nurses, clerks, teachers, cleaners, and highway managers. This was to enable them to take care of their children, in addition to the scholarship offered to soldiers’ children.

Conclusion

This article considered the Boko Haram insurgency and the experiences of the barracks women in Nigeria’s north-east. The paper answered an important question: first, that the Boko insurgency affected the barracks women in north-east Nigeria. Second, it invalidates the assumption that wars affected only the men while the women remained bystanders. One of the core observations of this paper is that the Boko Haram attacks on military barracks and the experiences of army wives have not received significant scholarly treatment due to the military culture of silence and a closed community. This paper established that insurgency contributed to the physical and psychological trauma of the barracks women. It was discovered that the barracks women suffered socio-economic disruptions due to the insurgency. It revealed that the theory of frustration-aggression is useful to this study. The paper concluded that community partnerships and international collaborations would bring a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

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